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Why are opposition groups able to form alliances in their activism against the 
regime in some cases but not in others? Specifically, why did opposition groups in 
Pakistan engage in high levels of alliance building, regardless of ideological and other 
divides, while similar alliance patterns did not emerge in Egypt? I explain alliances 
among various opposition groups in Egypt and Pakistan as a result of two factors – 
the nature of group constituencies and the nature of the alliance. I argue that 
constituencies can be characterized as two kinds: Divided and Fluid. Under divided 
constituencies, different opposition groups receive consistent support from specific 
sections of the population. Under fluid constituencies, opposition groups have no 
consistent basis for support. Alliances can be of two kinds, Mobilization or Elite. 
Mobilization alliances are formed among two or more groups to bring constituents 
together to engage in collective action, for example, protest, sit-in or civil 
disobedience. Elite alliances are formed among group leaders to express grievances 
and/ or find solutions to issues without engaging their constituents in street politics.  
  
 Groups may work together on an issue-based or value-based concern. Issue-
based concerns focus on a specific aspect of the grievance being raised. For example, 
a law that imposes censorship on the press. Value-based concerns have a broader 
focus, for example media freedom. Mobilization alliances emerge among political 
groups that have divided constituencies and are unlikely among political groups that 
have fluid constituencies. Since a joint mobilization event requires groups to pool 
their supporters, groups with fluid constituencies fear that their participation will 
provide their partners with a perfect opportunity to make themselves visible to their 
support base and engage in “member poaching.” While groups with fluid 
constituencies are unable to form mobilization alliances, they are able to form issue-
based elite alliances. Groups with divided constituencies are likely to form elite 
alliances on both issue-based and value-based concerns. Since elite alliances do not 
require groups to pool their constituents, groups with fluid constituencies have few 
concerns about “member poaching.” However, when formed to address a value-based 
concern, such alliances can easily lead to  mobilization in the future, especially when 
the concern is broad and sensitive. For this reason, groups with fluid constituencies 
may form issue-based elite alliances. 
Groups with divided constituencies often form elite alliances when they are 
unable to engage in mobilization because of material or other constraints. Since they 
do not share the same concerns about mobilization in the future, groups with divided 
constituencies may form both issue-based and value-based elite alliances. I argue that 
examining the nature of constituencies and the nature of the alliance being formed 
  
provides more leverage in explaining the formation of alliances as compared to other 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
 In 1997 relations between the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) party and its long-
term ally, the Awami National Party (ANP) had never been worse. The two parties had 
developed deep differences over several complex issues. As ANP leaders deliberated 
their stance on continuing their alliance with the PML, a Karachi-based newsmagazine 
published a cartoon showing a man on a visit to his doctor. The man shows the doctor a 
large protrusion from his backside labeled – ANP. The man’s shirt reads – PML. The 
doctor exclaims in shock and horror, “Oh, alliancitis!
1
” 
 Politics makes for strange bedfellows. Groups that clash at certain times form 
alliances with each other at other times. Yet, as I will argue, the process through which 
opposition groups come to form alliances with each other given the constraints and 
opportunities presented by their environment remains an open puzzle. My research 
explores the answer to the following question: 
Why are opposition groups able to form alliances in their activism against the 
regime in some cases but not in others? Specifically, why did opposition groups in 
Pakistan engage in high levels of alliance building, regardless of ideological and 
other divides, while similar alliance patterns did not emerge in Egypt? 
 
In this study I examine two cases where opposition actors operating under 
seemingly similar circumstances show very different patterns of alliance formation. In 
Pakistan, groups have been able to work together through joint protests, strikes, civil 
disobedience as well as through parliamentary walkouts and joint statements. In Egypt, 
while opposition groups formed alliances under some circumstances, the same groups 
have been unable to work together under most other conditions. For example, Islamists, 
                                                 




leftists and right-wing parties engaged in a campaign against the regime-initiated Press 
Law Number 93 in 1995, but could not form an alliance to protest the results of the 
elections held a few months later, despite making individual public statements declaring 
their intentions to work with other groups on this issue. By contrast, Islamists, leftists and 
ethnic parties in Pakistan formed several alliances against the Sharif regime’s attempts to 
muzzle the press in 1998 and collectively protested the annulment of democracy in the 
country under General Pervez Musharraf in 1999.  
The contrast in the frequency of successful alliance building among groups in the  
countries is even more striking when comparing the 2005 political opening in Egypt to 
the 2002 elections in Pakistan. In 2005, Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak held 
presidential and parliamentary elections in the same year. This was the first time in nearly 
a decade that the position of the president was contested. In Pakistan, Musharraf 
announced parliamentary elections in 2002 and provincial elections in 2005 after taking 
over the government in a bloodless coup in October 1999. While state- initiated political 
openings provided opposition parties and groups with opportunities to campaign, increase 
their support base and gain additional power in the parliament, the ruling regime 
maintained its hold on the state in both Egypt and Pakistan. Political reform sparked high 
levels of street activism in both countries. In Egypt, new political movements emerged 
and existing groups challenged the regime through controversial statements, slogans and 
mobilization. In Pakistan opposition actors raised issues of religious freedom and other 
economic and social problems.  
The reforms sparked a wave of contention in both countries, providing a perfect 





. In both cases, the ruling regime employed direct and indirect 
strategies to divide and weaken the opposition. Yet, while alliances among various 
groups emerged in Pakistan, in Egypt, Islamist parties saw internal factionalism and other 
groups were also limited in the extent to which they cooperated with each other and with 
the Islamists. Given that groups in both countries had incentives to work together and 
made efforts to form alliances, how can we explain the differences in the patterns of 
alliance formation? 
I explore how while theories based on regime policies, cost-benefit analysis and 
the bridging of ideological divides provide some leverage in explaining different aspects 
of alliances, they leave many questions unanswered. I provide an explanation that 
addresses many of the deficiencies of the current approaches and adds a new dimension 
to how alliances have been studied so far. I explain alliances among various opposition 
groups in Egypt and Pakistan as a result of two factors – the nature of group 
constituencies and the nature of the alliance. I argue that constituencies can be 
characterized as two broad kinds: Divided and Fluid. Under divided constituencies, 
different opposition groups receive consistent support from specific sections of the 
population. The constituencies may be located in a particular geographical area, ethnic 
group or race with which group leaders may have some affinity. The boundaries of the 
constituency are clearly and consistently located in a specific section of the population 
and group leaders realize that the probability of gaining additional support from another 
group’s constituency is limited.  
                                                 




Under fluid constituencies, different opposition groups have no consistent basis 
for support, that is, they may receive support from different sections of the population at 
different times. The boundaries of the constituency are not defined and the probability of 
gaining additional support from another group’s constituency is high. I illustrate further 
through the following diagram: 

























The drawing pane reflects the total politically active population in the state while 
the circles show each groups’ constituency within the population. Figure 1 shows that 
groups A,B,C and D receive support from different sections of the population with very 
little or no overlap among the bases of support. For example, Group B receives support 
















a pocket of consistent support from a specific geographical region while Group D 
receives support from a different region.  
Figure 2 shows that groups A, B, C, D, E and F have less exclusive bases of 
support. While each group may have some core supporters, their constituency may 
overlap with other groups’ in significant numbers. For example, Group A receives 
support from workers while Group B also receives support from workers in addition to 
professionals. Group D receives support from liberals while group F also has support in 
the same population section. The nature of group constituencies has a significant 
influence on patterns of alliance formation.  
A country can be said to have divided or fluid constituencies when the majority of 
the groups have divided or fluid constituencies in relation to each other. Not all groups 
may fit into the overall characterization – for example, in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood 
has a consistent basis of support among students and professional associations, but almost 
all other groups have fluid constituencies. Many groups are also trying to expand their 
basis of support in Brotherhood dominated sections of the population. This makes Egypt 
a case of fluid constituencies, especially in comparison to Pakistan where nearly every 
group has an exclusive ethnic, linguistic or regional basis of support.  
Alliances can be of two kinds, Mobilization or Elite. Mobilization alliances are 
formed among two or more groups to bring constituents together to engage in collective 
action, for example, protest, sit-in or civil disobedience. Elite alliances are agreements 
among leaders of different groups to work together. The goal is not to engage in street 
politics by mobilizing constituencies, but to act jointly to express grievances and/ or find 
solutions to issues.  
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 Groups may work together on an issue-based or value-based concern. Issue-based 
concerns, while stemming from larger values, focus on a specific aspect of the grievance 
being raised. For example, a law that imposes censorship on the press. Value-based 
concerns have a much broader focus, for example media freedom. Issue-based concerns 
are technical as they ask for specific policy changes. Value-based concerns are often 
highly politically charged and sensitive as they address the core principles of the polity 
and society, for example, women’s rights, religious freedom and the status of minorities. 
In order to form an alliance on an issue-based concern, groups do not have to necessarily 
agree on the larger value. For example, different groups may have different views on 
freedom of speech and expression, but form an alliance to protest against a law that 
imposes fines on newspapers for printing incorrect information. This distinction is 
important because forming an issue-based alliance allows groups to work together in an 
area of mutual concern, while leaving aside controversial and sensitive value-based 
concerns.  
An alliance is successfully formed when the actors agree on a plan of action and 
carry it through, for example, by mobilizing constituents, informing members, signing the 
petition, or making public statements as agreed upon. I do not argue that for an alliance to 
be considered successful it must have been effective in initiating tangible changes in the 
nature of politics in the country, for example, by causing alterations in state policy. This 
dimension of success is beyond the scope of this study.   
I argue that the successful formation of an opposition alliance depends on the 
nature of the alliance being formed: elite or mobilization. Further, opposition alliances 
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are also dependent on the nature of constituencies under which the groups operate. The 
argument is depicted in the following table: 
 
Table I: Formation of Alliances 
 
                             Alliance Type 
 
     
Mobilization alliances emerge among political groups that have divided 
constituencies and are unlikely among political groups that have fluid constituencies. 
Since a joint mobilization event requires groups to pool their supporters, groups with 
fluid constituencies fear that their participation will provide their partners with a perfect 
opportunity to make themselves visible to their support base and engage in “member 
poaching.” Mobilizing alone provides groups with a better opportunity to solidify and/or 
increase their support base by making themselves and their message more visible to 
current and potential constituents.  
Groups with divided constituencies have fewer concerns about joint mobilization 
because their constituencies are largely fixed and their supporters are unlikely to change 
their loyalties. Mobilizing together shows increased strength to the regime and the ability 
of the opposition groups to unite against a common enemy. Groups with divided 
constituencies may form mobilization alliances on both issue-based and value-based 
concerns.  
While groups with fluid constituencies are unable to form mobilization alliances, 
they are able to form issue-based elite alliances. That is, the claim making is focused on a 
Constituency Type Mobilization Elite 







specific policy concern, for example, a particular facet of the divorce law or a law that 
imposes a fine on newspapers for publishing false information. Groups with divided 
constituencies are likely to form elite alliances on both issue-based and value-based 
concerns, that is, the claim making can be focused on a specific policy concern or a more 
general subject like human rights or freedom. Since elite alliances do not require groups 
to pool their constituents and are negotiated among leaders, groups with fluid 
constituencies have few concerns about “member poaching.” However, when formed to 
address a value-based concern, such alliances can easily lead to mobilization in the 
future, especially when the concern is broad and sensitive. The value-based nature of the 
concern may incite constituents, who may start mobilizing spontaneously, even though 
the groups intended the alliance to be elite only. For this reason, groups with fluid 
constituencies may form issue-based elite alliances that are focused on a specific policy 
concern and are unlikely to lead to mobilization.  
Groups with divided constituencies often form elite alliances when they are 
unable to engage in mobilization because of material or other constraints. Since they do 
not share the same concerns about mobilization in the future, groups with divided 
constituencies may form both issue-based and value-based elite alliances. I argue that 
while other explanations, such as ideological similarities/differences and regime policies 
provide some leverage in explaining alliances, understanding the nature of constituencies 
provides an additional window into how groups form alliances without which the cases 




Pakistan’s ethnic and regional diversity and experiences with democracy and 
political freedom in the past have been among the contributing factors in the formation of 
a variety of political parties and organizations that command constituencies among a 
certain ethnic group, region or class. Even though political parties in Pakistan have many 
differences based on ideology, ethnicity and class affiliations, their divided constituencies 
have been an important variable allowing the formation of various alliances that may 
appear improbable or surprising at first.  
In Egypt, relative cultural homogeneity has been a factor in preventing the 
emergence of ethnic and regional based political groups
3
. Decades of authoritarian rule 
accompanied by limited, state controlled political openings has not completely stunted 
the formation of opposition parties and other political groups, but has been one of the 
reasons why groups have been unable to command base constituencies. While ethnic and 
religious based parties are illegal in Egypt, groups organized along these bases may 
register themselves as a charity or continue their work illegally (for example, the Muslim 
Brotherhood). Even though many such charities and other unofficial groups exist, they 
have been unable to command consistent constituencies. In subsequent chapters I explain 
how opposition groups in Egypt have many differences with each other along class and 
ideological lines, these differences have not translated into divided constituencies (as 
seen in the case of Pakistan). While ideological and other differences are important 
considerations for groups when making decisions regarding forming alliances, I explain 
how my model provides substantial insights into explaining and predicting alliance-
making that have so far been missed in the literature. 
                                                 




 A full explanation for the factors that lead to differences in the nature of 
constituencies in various countries warrants a separate study. In this research I explain the 
history of politics in both countries and argue that Egypt and Pakistan have 
predominantly fluid and divided constituencies respectively. While the overall 
constituency characterization in Egypt and Pakistan may not apply to every group, a large 
majority of groups show such constituency patterns in each country. The prevalence of 
fluid constituencies has prevented the formation of mobilization alliances in Egypt, but as 
I will show, issue-based elite alliances have emerged from time to time despite the 
regime’s policies and ideological differences among the actors. In Pakistan, divided 
constituencies allow groups to form both mobilization and elite alliances. 
While in this project, I apply my model to opposition groups in non-democratic 
contexts, it can also help explain alliance making among any groups that aim at 
increasing and/or protecting their constituency. Opposition groups provide an interesting 
context for applying the model since they all work against a common enemy (the regime) 
and must interact with each other in doing so.  
Understanding why groups are able to form alliances under some circumstances 
but not others is central to both academic and policy debates. To some scholars and 
policy experts, the formation of alliances among opposition groups against the power of 
despotic regimes seems like a logical solution to the problem of stagnant political 
systems. In their analysis of the 2005 presidential election in Egypt, the International 
Crisis Group recommended that legal political parties, “contest the legislative elections 
on a ‘democratic unity’ platform of political reform by forming a united bloc.” The report 
also recommended that political parties endorse a single platform or strategy and back a 
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single candidate in each constituency
4
. While “working together” may seem like a ready 
solution to defeating a common enemy, there may be important reasons why opposition 
alliances may not emerge. These impediments may not necessarily stem from ideological 
differences among actors or regime policies. By comparing relative failure of alliance 
making in Egypt to successful alliance formation in Pakistan, I provide an analysis of the 
circumstances under which opposition groups can work together and conditions that 
make such alliances unlikely. I now explain the cases in greater empirical detail to 
establish the logic of the puzzle.  
 
Alliances in Egypt and Pakistan: 
 
Pakistan and Egypt are useful cases in examining alliances among opposition 
groups. In this section, I establish the differences in the patterns of alliance making in the 
two cases, showing that while various alliances have emerged in Pakistan, they have not 
formed in Egypt. I then go on to examine how the current literature does not explain the 
puzzle adequately and/or leaves many questions unanswered. I then explain my argument 
in detail.  
Despite varying social and political circumstances, such as regime stability, levels 
of repression, the overall international and regional climate, and the history of intense 
ideological and other rivalries among groups, Pakistan’s politics shows several instances 
of opposition groups forming alliances against the ruling regime. In 1998 the ruling PML 
party faced growing activism from the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami party allied with the 
leftist PPP, PPP’s ethnic rival MQM and other regional parties. The alliance brought 
together thousands of supporters in major cities to protest PML’s intimidation tactics with 
                                                 




the press, arbitrary use of anti-terrorism laws and increased heavy handedness in the 
administration.  
Further instances of alliance making emerged after the October 1999 coup which 
brought Musharraf to power. Many opposition parties had actually welcomed the October 
1999 coup as a step towards curbing corruption and lawlessness
5
. However, soon after 
the new military government was formed, the opposition realized that the generals had 
come to power without a clear plan of action towards solving the nation’s mounting 
social and economic issues. The first instances of party mobilization against the 
Musharraf regime started as early as 2000 when the historically leftists People’s Party of 
Pakistan (PPP) formed an alliance with several small ethnic parties with a history of 
sharp ideological differences. After months of debate within the alliance and the 
defection of Pakistani Tehrik-e-Insaaf in protest, PPP’s arch rival, PML was finally 
inducted as a member in August 2000. In 2001, a new alliance of 15 parties headed by 
PML emerged. The new groups called itself “Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy” 
(ARD). PPP also joined ARD soon after its formation. Given the PPP and PML’s history 
of intense rivalry and even violence against each other, cooperation between PPP and 
PML came as a surprise to many observers of Pakistani politics. 
 Six Islamist parties formed their own alliance, know as the Majlis-e-Muttahida-e-
Amal (MMA). Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami (JUI), two of 
Pakistan’s oldest Islamist movements, occupied a central leadership position in the 
alliance. MMA and ARD cooperated with each other on several fronts including 
organizing protests, petitioning as well as forming electoral alliances. Smaller non-
                                                 




Islamist political parties such as the Tehrik-e-Insaaf, other regional parties and minority 
groups such as the Pakistan Christian Association also gave their support to the MMA on 
different occasions. Overall, opposition activism in Pakistan has been accompanied by 
high levels of alliance building among opposition groups despite their ideological 
differences, high levels of repression by the military government and the Musharraf 
regime’s attempts to divide the opposition by offering material incentives for supporting 
the regime.  
In Egypt, even though opposition groups have made efforts towards forming 
alliances, few have emerged.  After nearly two decades of gradual political reform under 
Mubarak’s regime, the government announced presidential elections in September 2005 
and parliamentary in November 2005. The elections gave opposition parties greater 
opportunities for visibility through the media. The Mubarak government relaxed its 
repressive tactics, which allowed for greater freedom of assembly and expression. 
Observers reported that for the first time, the President was seen actually campaigning for 
his position. The overall atmosphere among the Egyptian people was one of hope that the 
system could change. Many political parties regarded the November election as the first 
real opportunity to contest the NDP’s control over the People’s Assembly and increase 
their representation from its historic low of less than 10 percent
6
.  
 While the Muslim Brotherhood organized large-scale protests following the 
regime- initiated political opening in 2005 and sought alliances with other groups, few 
alliances emerged. Kifaya, while a much smaller movement in scale, participated in some 
protests jointly with the Brotherhood, but the group also organized separate protests on 
                                                 




the same day, even though the turnout at Muslim Brotherhood protests was significantly 
higher. In one instance Kifaya participated in a protest with the Muslim Brotherhood, but 
the protest was soon disbanded because the Muslim Brotherhood did not wish to attack 
the Mubarak regime directly while Kifaya had no reservations about doing so. The 
Muslim Brotherhood has also seen smaller factions break-off to form their own political 
movements (e.g., Wasat Party). 
The Brotherhood initiated an alliance of diverse members of the opposition called 
the “National Alliance for Restoration and Change,” but only the liberal al-Wafd party 
sent a high-level representative to its first convention. Other groups withheld support. Not 
only did the Muslim Brotherhood initiated alliances fail, other groups were also not able 
to unite the opposition. al-Wafd tried to bring groups together under the banner, “United 
Front for Change,” but even other liberal parties did not respond favorably to the attempt. 
The failure of alliances revealed that ideologically similar groups found it just as difficult 
to form alliances with each other as ideologically dissimilar groups. The alliances that did 
emerge successfully during this time period were issue-based elite alliances formed as an 
agreement not to run candidates against each other in the parliamentary elections.  
The low levels of opposition alliance making in Egypt were seemingly surprising 
because the groups had worked together in the past; for example, the Muslim 
Brotherhood had formed an electoral alliance with al-Wafd party during the 1984 
elections. Also in 1995, various groups formed an alliance to launch a campaign against 
the Mubarak’s regime’s new press law, commonly known as Law Number 93. With 
Kifaya and al-Wafd publicly stating their opposition to Mubarak in 2005, some scholars 
and policy makers expected that these groups would be more willing to work with the 
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Muslim Brotherhood. However, since both parties have Coptic Christians as leaders and 
as constituents they would have to seemingly reconcile their fear of Islamism with 
working with the Muslim Brotherhood. Ironically, al-Wafd showed greater proclivity in 
working with the Muslim Brotherhood as compared to cooperating with other parties, 
such as al-Ghad, that are ideologically closer to its goals. While Kifaya did develop 
differences with the Muslim Brotherhood, the key dividing factor was not the religious 
question but how the two parties approached opposing Mubarak directly – with Kifaya 
wanting to attack Mubarak without any reservations while the Muslim Brotherhood being 
unwilling to follow this path. While ideological differences among parties and groups 
were certainly not irrelevant, they were of less consequence in forming alliances, other 
factors were clearly at work.  
No party could actually “win” the 1995 or 2005 elections, but they could 
successfully use the political opening to show the strength of their dissent to Mubarak 
and to the world. Similarly in Pakistan, General Musharraf’s autocratic rule accompanied 
by unpopular policies had angered all political parties providing them with incentives to 
campaign jointly against his regime. In Pakistan, as I have shown, despite many 
differences among political parties and groups several alliances emerged. In Egypt, while 
various groups tried to work together, opposition alliances did not emerge. How can we 
explain the variations in alliance making in the two cases? 
 I argue that examining the nature of group constituencies and the nature of 
alliances provides strong theoretical leverage in explaining the variations in the cases as 
compared with other explanations such as ideological differences, regime repression or 
policies of divide and rule. In the next section I explain how the alternative explanations 
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prevalent in the literature explain some aspects of alliance making they leave many 
questions unanswered regarding why alliances formed in Pakistan, but not in Egypt. I 
argue that while groups consider many factors when forming alliances, the nature of 
constituencies is a very important determinant of successful alliance formation and has so 






 I examine the research on alliances as three broad thematic groupings: 
explanations that stress the ability of regimes to guide opposition alliances, those that 
explain alliance making as an outcome of group cost/benefit calculus, and explanations 
that put forth the importance of bridging ideological and other divides among groups as a 
solution to the problem of working together in an alliance. In this section I examine some 
of the existing research on alliances, highlighting gaps in the literature and questions yet 
unanswered. I show how the existing theories are successful in explaining some aspects 
of alliance formation, but none provide a complete explanation of the mechanisms 
through which groups are actually able to form an alliance.  
 
Opposition alliances are determined by regime policies: 
 
Structural theories of mobilization have stressed the importance of regime policies 
as the main determinant of opposition alliances. While these explanations provide a 
powerful theory of opposition group behavior, I argue that in Egypt and Pakistan, 
alliances among opposition parties are not solely determined by regime policies. 
Opposition groups structure their alliance making considering the structure of the regime, 
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but ally with each other under various structural conditions – for example, during high or 
low levels of regime repression, or high or low levels of regime stability. I do not claim 
to debunk structural theories by providing an alternative theory to alliance formation, but 
explore an additional look into how groups form/ fail to form alliances with each other by 
examining variables that have yet been ignored in the literature and are particularly 
important to these cases.  
Some scholars have argued that regimes can structure opposition alliance making 
by following policies of divide and rule
7
. By favoring some groups and excluding others, 
regimes guide the interactions among opposition actors to prevent them from uniting 
against the regime in their claim making. Robert Bianchi, for example, argues that 
associational life in Egypt under Mubarak can be divided into three sectors. The 
corporatist sectors include middle class professional syndicates where corporatism has 
been the exclusive mode of representation. The corporatized sectors, such as the labor 
movement and agricultural cooperatives, have come under more and more state 
regulation. Finally, the hybrid sector includes the business community and religious 
associations where both pluralist and corporatist sectors continue to coexist and compete 
for predominance. Pluralism combined with corporatism is attractive to regimes because 
such policies alleviate the need for widespread coercion campaigns. Pluralism prevents 
the emergence of a unified opposition by promoting the weak, financially dependent and 
squabbling leaders who can be manipulated and discarded at will. Bianchi argues that 
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many regimes in the Middle East and Asia have used corporatism as a supplement to 
pluralism to prevent the opposition from uniting
8
.  
While Bianchi’s argument is not specifically tailored to explaining alliance 
making, and even though his analysis focuses on the 1980s, his model emphasizes the 
importance of examining regime policies as a predictor of how opposition groups work 
with each other. Regimes that use corporatist policies in addition to pluralism are less 
likely to face a unified opposition challenging state power. While Bianchi’s argument is 
successful in explaining the lack of unified opposition in Egypt during the 1980s, 
Applying Bianchi’s model to Pakistan shows that Musharraf used pluralist and 
corporatist policies, especially in the provinces to create petty leaders that are dependent 
on him for their continued dominance, yet faced several opposition parties allied with 
each other. In 2001, Musharraf announced his plan for provincial autonomy and held 
local elections precisely to create such patron client relationships
9
. At the central level, 
Musharraf tried to induce the formation of pro-government parties and caused a split in 
PML. The newly formed PML(q) refers to itself as the “King’s Party,” and has become 
closely allied with the regime leading to increased representation in the parliament and 
other benefits. While Musharraf has tried to use corporatist strategies to consolidate his 
rule, the opposition has still found ways to ally against him, showing that regime policies 
are not a sufficient explanation in explaining opposition alliances. Other factors are at 
work.  
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Another model that emphasizes the role of the regime in guiding opposition 
alliance making is offered by Ellen Lust-Okar, who argues that regimes structure the 
opposition’s willingness to engage in joint claim-making by establishing institutions that 
allow moderates to contests elections and participate in the polity while excluding 
radicals (Divided System of Contestation). When moderates (defined as groups with 
policy positions closer to the regime) and radicals (defined as groups with policy 
positions further away from the regime) are both included or both excluded in the 
political system (Unified System of Contestation), regimes face a unified and relatively 
cohesive opposition pushing for greater freedom. Under a Divided System of 
Contestation (SOC), moderates who have been included become unwilling to either 
organize protests with each other or to form alliances with radicals as they fear losing 
their privileged position. The institution established through the systems of contestation 
can therefore guide the opposition’s relationship with the regime as well as among 
different opposition actors. She argues that Egypt’s unified system of contestation under 
both Gamal Abdul Nasser and Anwar Sadat led to increased radicalism, protest and claim 
making by a unified opposition. Under Mubarak, by comparison, Egypt has had a divided 
system of contestation and therefore the included moderates have refrained from 




Lust-Okar’s argument spells out the nuts and bolts of the age old strategy of 
“divide and rule.” By including moderates and excluding radicals through the system of 
contestation, regimes can successfully fragment opposition groups that might otherwise 
                                                 




unite in their claim making. Yet, in the case of Egypt, Lust-Okar does not sufficiently 
establish that Mubarak’s divided system of contestation has led to the lack of alliance 
making among moderates and radicals, or among included moderates. 
Much of the radical activism under Sadat and Nasser was carried out by militant 
groups, such as Jamaa al-Islamiayya and al-Jihad. Since the beginning of the Mubarak 
term, these groups have become increasingly marginalized in Egyptian politics. Many of 
them are geographically confined to the northern regions after being active for over two 
decades. There is also evidence that there may have been internal splits and rupturing in 
the movements. In 1999 Jamaa al-Islamiyya announced a cease fire with the government, 
which is widely believed to have come from a faction within the movement
11
. According 
to Lust-Okar, in order for the divided system of contestation to work, radicals must 
balance moderates, such that moderates remain wary of their presence. Yet the evidence 
suggests that this argument is not born out in the Egyptian case with the isolation of the 
radical groups to north Egypt and the break up of Jamaa. Further, the isolation of radical 
groups in Egypt, and their relevant weakness as compared to the large and powerful 
(especially on the street) moderate groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood makes Egypt 
a case that can not fit into Lust-Okar’s model – it does not qualify as a Unified System of 
Contestation and neither does it fulfill all the requirements for a Divided System of 
Contestation.  
Similarly, it is difficult to classify Pakistan as either a Unified or Divided System 
of Contestation as per Lust-Okar’s model. Various regimes have excluded militant 
groups, such as Lashkar-i-Toiba, from access to the political system. Under Musharraf, 
                                                 




many other radical groups have been excluded. Yet it is difficult to estimate the strength 
of radical groups as compared to moderate groups. Radical groups may command high 
levels of international financial and other support, which is difficult to estimate. 
Comparing the relative strength of excluded radical and included moderates in Pakistan is 
like comparing apples and oranges making it difficult to fit Pakistan into the model.  
Lust-Okar also argues that groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood have been 
given more political space under Mubarak and are therefore less willing to form alliances 
with other included moderates in making claims against the regime. Empirically, 
however, this is not the case: the Muslim Brotherhood has campaigned against the 
government and sought alliances with other groups in doing so. For example, in May 
1995, the group launched a campaign against the new press law in cooperation with other 
parties with published newspapers. Newspapers al-Wafd, al-Ahrar and al-Arabi hit the 
newsstands with black frames around each page, as a symbol of their opposition to 
censorship. Opposition parties mutually decided to withhold publications of their 
newspapers on certain days. On Friday, al-Wafd, al-Shaab and al-Ahrar were not 
published, a week later, al-Hakika, al-Khudrm and al-Ahli did not publish. All 
newspapers published articles with scathing critiques of the government’s policies. Even 
the semi-official paper al-Akhbar joined in on the sarcastic comments. These coordinated 
efforts evidence widespread alliance building among opposition parties and groups 
against the Mubarak regime against the press law. The Muslim Brotherhood has also 
sought other alliances with moderate groups, especially during the 2005 political 
opening. Moderate opposition groups in Egypt have made efforts to form alliances with 
each other, but while successful alliances have emerged under some circumstances, they 
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failed under most others. Thus, opposition groups are not “unwilling” to form alliances 
with each other, as Lust-Okar argues, rather, other factors must have prevented these 
alliances from emerging. The key to the puzzle is to understand the specific 
circumstances that make alliances possible, even when the system of contestation remains 
the same.  
 Finally, while Lust-Okar’s argument explains how individual groups structure 
their claim making towards the regime, her model is less successful in explaining the 
processes and mechanisms behind how groups interact with each other. Why are 
opposition groups able to form alliances against the regime under some circumstances, 
but not under others, even when the system of contestation remains constant?  
 Structural explanations of alliances formation assume that regime-led efforts will 
produce consistent outcomes among opposition groups. Yet groups may face many other 
obstacles in forming alliances based on the circumstances within which they operate. 
Therefore, even when structural factors remain consistent, alliances may form in some 
cases and not in others. By examining the variations in alliance making and the 
conditions that allow for certain types of alliances to emerge, I provide a more “nuts and 
bolts” explanation of the phenomena.  
 
Role of cost/ benefit analysis: 
 
A large school of scholars see alliance formation among opposition actors 
primarily as an outcome of cost/benefit calculation among individuals within groups
12
. 
Not only must opposition actors solve the collective action problem internally, they must 
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also compete and cooperate with other actors. Furthermore, this approach argues that the 
formation of alliances is based on incentives to cooperate, which may include greater 
chances of success in their goals through defeating the regime
13
. Opposition actors may 
not form alliances because they are engaged in “product differentiation,” whereby they 
attempt to create their own niche by developing alternative goals and strategies. As Mark 
Lichbach argues, for example, smaller and newly emergent opposition groups are 
particularly prone to product differentiation as they attempt to outbid larger and long 
standing groups
14
. But, under what circumstances does the need for product 
differentiation override the benefits of alliance formation?  
 Cooperation among opposition actors may be achieved though bargaining and 
“tit-for-tat” strategies. Long-standing opposition groups are able to engage in formal or 
informal contractual agreements because they believe that their encounters with each 
other will continue. Further, if the opposition actors believe that the regime is weak, they 
have greater incentives to cooperate
15
. Therefore, opposition actors tactically seek allies 
with movements that will strengthen their immediate position. McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly argue that social movements engage in processes of “brokerage,” whereby they seek 
alliances with disparate groups to achieve specific objectives. They argue that movement 
entrepreneurs frame the claims and identities of different actors such that they appear 
similar
16
. They call this process “attribution of similarity,” which may be either a 
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strategic process or achieved through the revelation of similar claims through collective 
action events. They argue that in order to form an alliance, groups must reconcile their 
ideological differences; but what are the conditions under which “attribution of 
similarity” becomes possible? Why are some groups able to engage in “attribution of 
similarity,” while others are unable to do so? Further, why do some groups fail to form 
alliances even though they have many similar facets in their ideology and agenda? While 
“finding common ground” is certainly an important prerequisite to alliance making, what 
are the factors that makes groups able and willing to engage in such efforts?   
As Lichbach argues, opposition actors are more likely to cooperate when they 
perceive the regime to be weak and their chances of success to be high
17
. During the 2005 
political opening in Egypt, for example, news coverage reported rumors about Mubarak 
stepping down (because of his advancing age) and his son (who is widely known as 
Mubarak’s main advisor on Egypt’s current opening) taking over. Some opposition 
members were quoted calling the regime on “shaky ground” in news publications
18
. One 
of my interviewees also explained that people in Egypt widely perceived the NDP as 
internally divided between the “new guard,” consisting of reform-minded officers, and 
the “old guard,” consisting of the older generation of officers who are anti-reformist in 
their thinking
19
. 2005 saw a record number of protests from legal parties and other 
organizations and groups, showing that the opposition genuinely treated the political 
opening as an opportunity to show their power. Yet counter to the expectations of this 
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theory, alliances did not emerge. By contrast, in 1995, as I examine in subsequent 
chapters  opposition groups formed an alliance to challenge Law Number 100, commonly 
known as the Press Assassination Law, despite the Mubarak regime being firmly 
entrenched. Clearly, regime strength alone is therefore not sufficient to explain 
opposition alliances.  
In Pakistan, the Musharraf regime’s U.S. backing (both military and economic),  
its wide patronage links, and its excellent showing in the 2002 elections had made him a 
formidable presence at the time, yet the opposition groups engaged in widespread 
alliance building against him using their combined power to exert continuous pressure on 
the government. The link between the stability of the regime and opposition alliances is 
therefore unclear and by itself provides an insufficient explanation for predicting 
alliances 
Explanations that stress regime policies and those that argue that alliances are 
based on individual cost/benefit analysis are valuable in highlighting some overall 
conditions under which alliance making is possible. They predict overall patterns through 
time. However, examining the nuts and bolts of how each alliance came to be, or not, 
reveals that additional processes may be at work. Smaller variations in the overall 
patterns may reveal important insights into the processes at work and the circumstances 
that affect different groups in forming alliances. As I have shown above, the existing 
literature leaves many questions unanswered. I now examine explanations that stress how 







Bridging divides leads to alliance formation: 
 
Some scholars argue that while alliances may appear purely strategic, cooperation 
among actors may be a result of political learning or changing group identity that allows 
groups to bridge their ideological differences. The literature on political learning has 
pointed out that different actors can learn to work together through their exposure and 
experience with each other even in non-democratic settings. In Egypt, a faction of the 
Muslim Brotherhood has broken off to form a new movement, al-Wasat, that has an 
explicitly pluralist agenda. Some scholars have argued that this ideational change has 
been triggered by political learning caused by interactions among diverse groups of actors 
and amplified by feelings of shared repression
20
. Therefore, with more exposure to 
different ideas, opposition groups can become more open to forming alliances with each 
other.  
 Carrie Wickham, for example, argues that alliances may not be the result of 
ideational change per se, but that strategic cooperation may actually over time have the 
effect of making political actors more tolerant to pluralist politics
21
. Yet it is unclear how 
exposure to other groups can make actors more open and willing to work together. Was 
the Wasat party formed as a direct result of interactions with other groups? Were Muslim 
Brotherhood Islamists transformed from their previous anti-pluralist dispositions to 
pluralist dispositions through their strategic interactions and experiences? Or perhaps 
were these particular members already pluralist in their orientation, and their interactions 
                                                 






with other actors simply reaffirmed their existing beliefs? The causal explanation in 
Wickham’s argument is not clear. 
Further, as Jillian Schwedler has argued, why did these actors learn pluralism and 
not something else through the shared experience of repression?
22
 Overall, the hypothesis 
that strategic, pluralist politics leads to alliance formation through ideational change is 
unconvincing. In the case of Egypt, as I will show in later chapters, ideologically similar 
and different groups have all faced difficulties in forming alliances with each other; 
consequently, bridging ideological divides through political learning is not a sufficient 
precondition to forming alliances. Other factors must be at work when ideologically 
similar or divergent groups try to work together through alliances.  
 Scholars of political development have focused on how elite networks lead to the 
emergence of greater understanding among various actors and can ultimately translate 
into joint political activity
23
. Parties emerge out of elite “cliques” or political clubs, tribal 
associations, nationalist movements and trade unions where leaders have increased 
contact with each other
24
. In her book on political parties in the Middle East, Michelle 
Angrist argues that provincial elites in Turkey were able to build a united political 
platform through their association with each other in a council established for tax 
administration. Over time, this council became a means for expressing grievances to the 
center, and local elites became politically united through their participation in the group. 
The council united elites across vast geographical areas, she argues, and became the 
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center of organized political activity, eventually leading to the formation of a provincial 
party in the country
25
.  
 Angrist’s argument is based on the presumption that increased contact among 
different individuals on a particular issue will lead to coordination on larger issues as the 
collective action problem is resolved. However, increased contact among individual elites 
can also lead to conflicts based on varying interests. That a unified provincial party 
emerged in Turkey simply because of increased contact among the elite is an unsatisfying 
explanation. How were the elites able to work together? While a preexisting structure 
such as a council can facilitate coordination, the success of alliances remains dependent 
on the constraints and opportunities under which elites operate.  
In her work, Schwedler examines the mechanisms through which groups that are 
included in the political system become more willing to work with other actors by 
bridging ideological divides. Rejecting structural-based explanations, she argues that we 
can not expect different actors to be affected the same way even when faced with similar 
structural circumstances (such as inclusion in the political system). Through an analysis 
of Jordan’s IAF and Yemen’s Islah party, she observes that after the 1993 elections in 
Jordan, an opposition bloc of ideologically opposed actors emerged that included leftists, 
Islamists, and other smaller parties. A similar coalition did not emerge in Yemen (or 
emerged and fell apart), despite the Islah party’s participation in pluralist politics. She 
explains the divergence by examining the manner in which modes of justification of 
acceptable practices were redrawn in the IAF and not in Islah and argues that in order to 
form alliances, groups need to be internally cohesive. This internal cohesion facilitates 
                                                 




debates about whether specific alliances are justifiable to a group on its own ideological 
terms. She concludes that inclusion has different effects on groups depending on how the 
parties evolve in their internal discussion of issues surrounding involvement in the 
political system
26
.   
While internal cohesion and the bridging of ideological divides through redrawing 
modes of justification provides a strong explanation of how groups become more willing 
to participate in politics in cooperation with others, it does not explain how alliances are 
actually formed. In some circumstances groups with different ideological commitments 
are able to form an alliance, seemingly with ease, while under other circumstances they 
are unable despite a significant level of group cohesion and even though internal debates 
surrounding pluralist politics remained the same. Thus a willingness to work with other 
groups does not necessarily mean that an alliance will materialize. I argue that additional 
factors, such as the nature of constituencies and the nature of the alliance facilitate or 
inhibit their successful formation.  
In the cases of Egypt and Pakistan, the largest Islamist parties – Jamaat-e-Islami 
and Jamat-e-Ulema-e-Islami in Pakistan and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt- are all 
considered moderate in popular discourse (as are IAF and Islah). Both parties have been 
included in the political system, with Jamaat having contested elections as a political 
party and the Muslim Brotherhood through wide representation in the parliament and 
fielding independent candidates in several elections. Both groups have sought alliances 
with other political actors. Yet, Jamaat has been much more successful in forming these 
alliances than the Muslim Brotherhood. It has formed alliances with other Islamists, 
                                                 




secular parties, leftist parties as well as minority groups, such as the Pakistan Christian 
Association. Other political movements have not responded favorably to the Muslim 
Brotherhood-initiated alliances. Furthermore, in the case of Pakistan, secular parties have 
been able to form alliances with each other, which has not occurred in Egypt. How can 
we explain this divergence?  
 In this section, I examined three kinds of explanations of alliance making: those 
that stress the role of regime policies in guiding opposition alliances, those that examine 
the role of individual and group cost/benefit calculus and those that see alliance making 
as a product of bridging ideological and other divides. While all of these explanations 
contribute to understanding some aspect of alliance making, they leave questions 
surrounding the actual circumstances that make each alliance possible unanswered. 
Regime policies and individual cost benefit analysis explanations provide predictions 
over time, but do not explain the actual mechanisms through which alliances are formed. 
Explanations that stress bridging divides show how groups may become willing to 
participate in politics with their ideologically divided contemporaries, but do not explain 
how that willingness is actually translated into alliances. By examining how several 
alliances came to be successful or unsuccessful, I provide an analysis of the mechanisms 
that make alliance making possible.  
 
Formation of Alliances: 
 
In the previous section I critically analyzed various bodies of literature in political 
science and sociology that explain the emergence and failure of opposition alliances. The 
available theories provide varying levels of insights into some of the variables that can 
facilitate or inhibit alliance making but leave us with many questions unanswered about 
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why groups are able to form alliances under certain circumstances and not under others. 
In this study, I argue that alliance making can be more fully explained in these cases by 
examining the nature of group constituencies and the nature of the alliance. This is a new 
and unique way of looking at alliances as it incorporates both the effect of preexisting 
conditions and the groups’ agency in making alliances possible.  
In this study, I define an opposition group as a political organization or movement 
active in opposing and/or cooperating with the regime. The group may be a legally 
recognized political party, an organization not officially recognized by the state, or a 
social movement
27
. In Pakistan, the state imposes fewer restrictions on recognizing 
political parties leading to the emergence of several such groups. In Egypt, the Mubarak 
regime imposes a high level of restriction on the formation of political parties. The 
process of becoming recognized as a political party is riddled by red tape with the CPPA 
(Committee for Political Parties Affairs) vested with absolute discretionary powers in 
approving or disapproving applications. Given the difficulty in setting up a party, trade 
unions, religious groups and student organizations have become important vehicles for 
expressing dissent. The Muslim Brotherhood, for example, is one of the most important 
voices of opposition in Egypt, although it is not legally recognized by the government. 
Some groups, such as Kifaya, have decided not to seek legal recognition, preferring to 
function informally as social movements. Through my research, I found that Kifaya’s 
purpose in remaining a movement rather than a seeking legal recognition is to circumvent 
the structural limitation of working as a political party in Egypt. A political party with a 
declared leadership, membership roster and premises of operation is more likely to be 
                                                 




systematically targeted by the regime and can not easily regroup. The purpose of these 
groups is to express dissent or cooperate with the regime and in doing so they have to 
interact with others who work within the same field.  
While opposition groups may have many different goals and objectives, their 
identity, strategy and indeed long-term survival depends on their ability to attract and 
keep constituencies. A constituent is broadly defined as an individual who supports the 
groups by providing membership dues and/or other financial support, participating in the 
group’s activities when called upon and/or voting for the group. Groups spend 
considerable time, energy and resources making themselves visible to current and 
potential constituents. 
In countries such as Pakistan and Egypt, national voting data is often not a 
reliable way to assess constituencies. In Egypt, elections are often rigged in favor of the 
ruling regime. However, trade union and student body elections provide reliable 
information about the groups that dominate these strata of the population. Further, 
constituencies can be assessed by the kinds of individuals that attend the groups’ 
activities, for example protests. Groups with divided constituencies show consistent 
support bases over time, that is, the same groups of people attend their protests and vote 
for them during elections. While for groups with fluid constituencies, the support basis 
tends to vary considerably over time and is often unclear.  
 In Pakistan voting data provides somewhat greater understanding of 
constituencies as elections tend to be relatively more free and fair. Further group 
constituencies can be assessed by the issues they address during their campaigns (are 
these more national or regional/ethnic in nature?) and attendance at protests.  
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While many considerations come into play when groups decide to form an 
alliance, protecting current constituents is a key concern as an alliance provides the 
partners with significant access to the group’s constituency. Some groups may be in a 
better position to engage in such “member poaching” but alliances often do not 
materialize as other groups become doubtful of their partner’s ability to attract their 
supporters.   
Constituencies are divided when different opposition groups receive support from 
specific sections of the population. The constituencies may be located in a particular 
geographical area and/or class, ethnic group or race such that their boundaries are clear. 
Constituencies are fluid when different opposition groups have no clear basis for support. 
They may receive support from different sections of the population at different times. The 
boundaries of the constituency are therefore not defined.  
 An alliance is successfully formed when the actors agree on a plan of action and 
carry it through: for example, mobilizing constituents, informing members, signing a 
petition, making agreed upon public statements, and so on. Success does not depend on 
whether they achieve their objectives, but only on whether coordinated activities are 
carried out. As noted above, I identify two kinds of alliances: mobilization alliances, 
formed to engage in street politics by involving the constituents in a protest, sit-in, or 
civil disobedience; and elite alliances, formed among movement leaders or specific 
members to cooperate on a particular issue without engaging constituents.  
Scholars examining transnational social movements, networks, and norms have 
provided a similar distinction among transnational networks, transnational coalitions and 
transnational social movements. Khagram et. al. argue that transnational networks 
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emerge when movements share values and discourse across borders. Transnational 
coalitions form when a set of actors are linked across boundaries to coordinate strategies 
and tactics. A transnational social movement is formed when different groups mobilize 
their constituencies for collective action. The third kind of linkage is difficult to establish 
and rarely seen. Most often, specific members are linked to others across boundaries 
while the movement itself stays disconnected
28
. As they explain: 
These three forms can be viewed as ascending levels of transnational collective action: 
often a transnational coalition will emerge after a network of communication has first 





 They argue that groups may mobilize their constituencies once specific members 
have established communication linkages with each other. Yet, how do the linkages lead 
to successful alliance making among groups? My research takes their work further by 
examining instances in which groups seek to form alliances but fail.  
Groups can work together on two types of concerns: issue-based, in which case 
the focus is on a single policy concern, for example the production quotas imposed on 
textile mills, or value based, in which case they focus on broader issues such as 
government intervention in the economy.  
I explain the mechanisms and processes behind the main argument through the 
following hypotheses:  
 
H1: Opposition groups form mobilization alliances when their constituencies are divided. 
 
H2: Opposition groups are unable to form mobilization alliances when their 
constituencies are fluid.  
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 While mobilization alliances are useful in showing the collective might of the 
opposition to the regime, they also expose group constituencies to poaching by their 
allied partners. Through the mobilization alliance, each group has easy access to the other 
group’s constituency at a particular venue and time. Each group can therefore use the 
mobilization event to present itself as a better alternative and make itself visible to 
members of the other group. In countries where opposition groups have limited space to 
hold campaign activities and gain access to the public, a joint protest can be potentially 
gainfully used to engage in “member poaching.” Groups may try to attract each other’s 
constituents by using the joint mobilization event to present themselves as a better 
alternative with a clear line of difference with their allied partner and in this way gain 
access to a new constituency. 
Since divided constituencies are located in a specific section of the population and 
are stable over time, groups are assured that their supporters are unlikely to defect and 
change their loyalties to other groups. Also, groups realize that their chances of gaining 
additional support and expanding their constituency are limited since supporters of other 
groups are unlikely to change their loyalties. This situation is particularly true when 
constituencies are divided by ethnicity or race. For example, Punjabis in Pakistan are less 
likely to support a Baluchi based opposition group even if they agree with its ideology or 
politics.  
 When constituencies are divided, the mobilization event is unlikely to be used as a 
staging ground for each group to present itself as a better alternative since the chances of 
gaining support from another group’s constituents is very low. Instead, the alliance 
partners can safely pool their constituents and show greater might to the regime, call 
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attention to themselves and in some cases, successfully destabilize the regime by forming 
an alliance. Groups with divided constituencies may form both issue-based or value-
based mobilization alliances.  
 Fluid constituencies are not consistently located in a specific section of the 
population and may overlap in sections with other groups. Such constituencies are 
therefore likely to vary considerably over time as many supporters defect to new or 
existing groups. Under such circumstances, each group is not only concerned about 
protecting its own constituency, but also expanding its support base by presenting itself 
as a better alternative to other groups or appealing to fence sitters. Supporters of other 
groups may become convinced to change their loyalties when new groups emerge or 
when existing groups present a new face and become increasingly visible on the political 
scene.  
 Mobilization alliances require groups to pool their constituents through a protest, 
sit-in or other forms of street politics. When the constituency base is not consistent, 
forming a mobilization alliance with another group will expose existing supporters to 
poaching by the other group, who will use the event to make themselves visible or 
present themselves as a better alternative. Mobilization alliances are therefore risky for 
groups who have a less clear basis for support. Mobilizing constituents alone presents a 
better opportunity to increase group visibility and gain additional supporters while also 
protecting existing supporters from poaching by other groups. 
 Even though groups with fluid constituencies are unable to form mobilization 
alliances, they may form issue-based elite alliances. This argument is presented in the 




H3: Opposition groups are able to form issue-based elite alliances when their 
constituencies are fluid. 
 
H4: Opposition groups are unable to form value-based elite alliances when their 
constituencies are fluid. 
 
Elite alliances are formed among leaders of different groups when they agree to 
work together without engaging their constituencies. An elite alliance may involve joint 
statements, symbolic office closings or writing an article critical of the regime. Elite 
alliances only involve group leaders or specific members or officers. These alliances do 
not put group constituents at risk by providing other groups with opportunities to poach 
by presenting themselves as a better alternative. Group leaders already have established 
careers in a particular group and are therefore not likely to change their loyalties to their 
allied partners. The non-engagement of constituents allows the group leaders to work 
together even when there are ideological and other differences among them. 
 Groups with fluid constituencies are able to form elite alliances as these allow 
them to work together without putting their constituents at risk. Specific individuals can 
work together without exposing their constituency base. However, an elite alliance may 
be difficult to contain and may lead to mobilization, especially when the nature of the 
concern is very sensitive. If the concern incites constituents, they may start mobilizing, 
thus creating opportunities for poaching by other groups. For this reason, groups with 
fluid constituencies form successful elite alliances only when they are issue-based. The 
alliance must be formed focused on a specific policy of concern, for example, a law that 
imposes fines on newspapers that print incorrect information. Such specific and focused 
concerns are unlikely to draw the attention of the masses and therefore will not lead to 
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mobilization in the future, assuring the groups that their constituencies will not be at risk. 
An issue-based elite alliance therefore emerges. 
 Groups with fluid constituencies are unable to form value-based elite alliances as 
these have a broad agenda and focus, for example, freedom of speech and expression, 
free market economy or women’s rights. Forming an elite alliance on such a broad and 
sensitive concern does not assure the groups that the elite alliance will not lead to  
mobilization in the future. Such sensitive concerns may instigate constituents to engage 
in collective action exposing them to poaching by the alliance partners. As I will show in 
the case studies, since groups with fluid constituencies want to prevent the emergence of 
a mobilization alliance, they are unlikely to form value-based elite alliances. 
 Even though groups with divided constituencies may form mobilization alliances, 
they may engage in elite alliances from time to time. They may form both issue-based 
and value-based elite alliances. I explain in the hypotheses H5 and H6: 
 
H5: Opposition groups form issue-based elite alliances when their constituencies are 
divided. 
 
H6: Opposition groups form value-based elite alliances when their constituencies are 
divided.  
 
While mobilization alliances receive greater attention and visibility on the 
political landscape, elite alliances may be useful under certain circumstances. Groups 
may engage in elite alliances when there are logistical issues associated with organizing a 
mobilization event together. Mobilization alliances are also more taxing on group 
resources. Even if groups have the resources to mobilize together, the nature of the 
concern may be too technical to draw the attention of their constituents. For these 
39 
 
reasons, groups with divided constituencies may sometimes prefer to form elite alliances, 
even if they are able to form mobilization alliances. 
 Groups with divided constituencies may form both issue-based and value-based 
elite alliances. Group leaders cooperate with each other without mobilizing their 
constituencies by publishing an article critical of the regime, issuing a public statement or 
symbolic office closing. Issue-based alliances allow groups to focus on a specific area of 
mutual concern without engaging their constituents. The alliances can sometimes be a 
useful starting point for more extensive cooperation in the future, especially when groups 
are unable to engage in street politics at the time because of material or other limitations.  
Forming value-based elite alliances requires groups to work together on a more 
general and often sensitive issue. These elite alliances can often lead to mobilization 
alliances as the nature of the concern is likely to incite constituents. Yet, groups with 
divided constituencies are able to form value-based elite alliances, because they are not as 
concerned about engaging in a mobilization alliance in the future. Since their 
constituencies have been stable over time, they do not fear that other groups will use the 
mobilization alliance to poach their constituents. Therefore, they may also form value-
based elite alliances which have the prospect of drawing in constituents and leading to 
mobilization in the future. 
Pakistan is a clear case of divided constituencies. The country’s ethnic and 
regional diversity and experiences with democracy and political freedom in the past have 
enabled the formation of a variety of political parties and organizations that command 
constituencies among a certain ethnic group, region or class. Frequent regime change, the 
personalized nature of political parties and lack of leadership and vision has prevented 
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national level parties from emerging. No political party can succeed in gaining significant 
political ground against the regime by mobilizing its constituents alone. Unlikely 
alliances, both mobilization and elite, have therefore become an important facet of 
Pakistani politics. 
As I will demonstrate in the case studies, Egypt is a case of fluid constituencies. 
Relative cultural homogeneity has prevented the emergence of ethnic and regional based 
political parties. Decades of authoritarian rule accompanied by limited, state controlled 
political openings has enabled the formation of some opposition parties, but prevented 
them from commanding base constituencies. New political movements (Kifaya) and 
splinter groups (Wasat) have not emerged because of demands from an existing 
constituency, but are born out of an idea that still needs additional adherents. The Muslim 
Brotherhood has the highest and most stable membership base including students and 
professional associations. Other parties are trying to increase their support base by 
projecting themselves as a better alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood. Moblization 
alliances prevent opposition actors from solidifying their base constituency. The 
formation of mobilization political alliances is therefore unlikely in the Egyptian case, 
but groups have been able to work together through issue-based elite alliances.  
 
Case Comparability, Method and Evidence: 
 
This study has been conducted through a comparative analysis of Egypt and 
Pakistan over a 10 year period (1995-2005). While I examine empirical data primarily 
within this time period, I take a historical approach in the case studies to explain trends 
over time which are necessary to understand developments within this last decade. From 
1995 – 1999 Pakistan experienced democratic rule with power being exchanged between 
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PPP and PML. No government was allowed to complete its term during this time as the 
President toppled the 1995 PPP government in 1997 and the 1999 coup removed the 
PML government headed by Nawaz Sharif. Egypt experienced the rule of Mubarak 
during the entire time period, although his policies towards the opposition changed in 
2005. 
Pakistan and Egypt have similarities and differences that allow for various 
refutable hypotheses to be constructed and tested. A rich comparative analysis is 
therefore possible.  Both countries face high levels of social and economic disruptions. In 
Pakistan, rising unemployment and inflation have led to severe social unrest. Ethnic 
factionalism has emerged with Sindhis and Baluchis threatening the government. More 
recently the United States has also pressured the country to democratize. Egypt has faced 
rising discontent from Islamists, nationalists, liberals as well as leftists who have been 
vocal in critiquing the neoliberal reforms initiated under the guidance of the IMF. 
Mubarak was also wary of the discontent against the Sadat regime in 1978 after the 
signing the peace treaty with Israel. Both countries have long standing Islamist political 
movements that have played the role of opposition actors: Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamaat-e-
Ulema-Islami in Pakistan and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Further, leftists, liberal and 
newer parties are also prevalent.  
 Both Egypt and Pakistan have experienced heavy involvement of the military in 
politics. In fact, in Pakistan the military has been instrumental in bringing down several 
popularly elected governments. In Egypt, all regimes have made extensive use of the 
military to maintain complete control over social and political life. In fact, one scholar 
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The regimes are also different in several ways. Pakistan has had some experiences 
with democracy in the past. In fact the 1999 coup displaced the democratically elected 
government of Nawaz Sharif. However, elections in Pakistan should not be overvalued. 
The country has had only three short spells of democratic rule since its inception in 1947. 
Most elected governments have been unable to complete their terms in officer, either 
being dismissed by the President or overthrown in a military coup. In fact, military 
governments have lasted much longer than democratically elected ones. Under 
Musharraf, the value of elections has been further eroded as the 1999 referendum, 2002 
parliamentary elections and 2005 local bodies elections were held clearly to legitimate 
the ruling regime and to generate elected parliaments rather than to broker a change over 
of power.  
Similarly, in Egypt, political parties and other groups do not participate in 
elections to win, but to use the political opening to present a challenge to the regime 
through boycotts, street protests and winning a high number of parliamentary seats. 
Alliances can help show the might of the opposition to the regime. Not only can this 
collective power destabilize the regime, but as I will demonstrate, bring certain important 
issues to light, for example, state repression, lack of press freedom or corruption. I will 
show how with the 2005 political opening, different opposition parties in Egypt did try to 
form various alliances, but achieved limited success.  
Pakistan has experienced frequent regime change. Egypt has experienced 
relatively fewer instances of regime change with Nasser’s long regime being replaced by 
                                                 




Sadat and Mubarak coming to power after Sadat’s assassination. While regime change in 
the past may increase perceptions of regime weakness in the case of Pakistan and 
therefore motivate different actors to coalesce, as I have argued earlier, this factor is not 
theoretically or empirically decisive in predicting alliances in the cases. 
 Pakistan is also ethnically and linguistically diverse while Egypt is relatively 
much more linguistically and ethnically homogenous. Both countries have small minority 
populations. The prevalence of ethnic and linguistic diversity has contributed to the 
formation of several factionalized political parties with divided but limited constituencies 
in Pakistan. The Mubarak regime is also widely known to use more repression against the 
opposition as compared to governments in Pakistan. Event though repression was high 
under the Mubarak regime, the opposition did engage in risk taking behavior. Elite 
alliances among the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups did form to make claims 
against the regime. Further, groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Kifaya engaged 
in high levels of protest activity individually, but did not form alliances with each other. 
The differences in state repression are therefore not a significant confounding variable. 
I conducted the research using both primary and secondary data. Financial 
constraints prevented me from conducting field research in the two countries, but I 
gathered extensive government documents, party documents and publications, magazine 
and newspaper coverage. I conducted 20 on the record interviews, approximately equal 
numbers for both countries through phone and email. The interviewees consist of  
scholars, policy experts, journalists, historians and party members who have extensive 
field experience in the subject matter. Due to the lack of face to face interaction, many of 
my interviewees were uncomfortable revealing sensitive information about their allies. I 
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therefore had limited access to their thoughts on specific alliances and how they 
evaluated other groups. 
While these circumstances have limited the extent to which I can present an 
explanation of how different actors evaluated the role of constituencies in forming 
alliances, I present substantial data collected through party websites, press releases and 
internet discussion groups that explain the circumstances that facilitated or constrained 
alliance making. Several interviewees also referred me to newspaper and magazine 
articles that document events better than their recollection. Some interviewees asked that 
I do not reveal their name or the name of their organization. In such cases, I have 
followed the wishes of my sources  
I used secondary studies, interviews as well as election data, when available, to 
assess the nature of constituencies in each country. The case studies are organized as 
analyses of specific instances of alliance making and the circumstances that led to their 
success or failure. I assessed the impact of the variables outlined above to identify 
common threads running through the alliances that emerged or did not emerge. I 
examined the groups that were able to form alliances, their constituencies, the nature of 
the concern, as well as several of the alternative variables outlined earlier.  
 
Outline of the Study: 
 
The study is thematically organized into five chapters. The case studies are 
explored within the frame work of the themes. Chapter II examines the nature of the party 
system in both countries. I explain the history of political opposition, its development 
over time and its current state. I provide a detailed analysis of major opposition actors in 
both countries. Chapter III explores the formation of elite alliances providing examples of 
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how particular alliances were achieved or not achieved in both countries. I present a 
detailed analysis of the anti-press law activism in Egypt in 1995 and the anti-Kalabagh 
dam activism in Pakistan in 1998. Chapter IV examines the formation of mobilization 
alliances. I present an analysis of several instances of failed and successful alliances in 
both countries examining their political and social circumstances. Chapter V concludes 
the study by reestablishing the link between the distribution of constituencies, the nature 






Chapter II: Political Parties, Organizations and Groups in Egypt and 
Pakistan 
 
This research project explores why groups in Pakistan were able to engage in high 
levels of alliance building, regardless of regime policies and their ideological and other 
divides, while such alliance patterns did not emerge in Egypt. I argue that the nature of 
group constituencies (divided and fluid) and the nature of the alliance (mobilization or 
elite) has have significant impact on the formation of alliances. 
Politics in both Egypt and Pakistan is characterized by many different kinds of 
opposition groups with varying history, ideology and strategies. Some are long standing 
social movements: In Egypt, Hasan al-Banna created the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, 
while other political groups have emerged more recently, for example, Kifaya. As 
regimes have tried to divide and rule the opposition, splinter groups that have emerged to 
cooperate with the government, and/or to form their own political identity, for example, 
PML(q) and PPP(s) in Pakistan. Opposition parties in both countries resemble social 
movements. They show low levels of internal cohesiveness and while powerful on the 
street, often they are unable to convert their ground support into electoral victories. Many 
perform functions of the government such as providing law and order and other social 
services. I provide a group by group analysis.  
In this chapter, I provide a detailed discussion of opposition groups in both 
countries. I begin with a history of the political system and developments over time. I 
then discuss the nature of the party system, the major actors, and their constituencies. I 
argue that while both countries have been unable to form viable national level parties, 
there are important differences in the nature of the party system. As I will demonstrate, 
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political parties in Pakistan have highly divided constituencies. In Egypt, while several 
opposition groups have emerged over time, many do not have clearly defined 
constituencies or are trying to expand their base within other groups’ supporters. Only the 
Muslim Brotherhood  and al-Wafd have a fairly clearly established constituencies that are 
divided in comparison to each other, but because other groups do not, all parties are 
concerned about other groups poaching their constituency.  
 
Opposition Parties in Pakistan: 
 
History of the political system 
 
Pakistan’s political history began with the partition from India and the formation 
of a homeland for Indian Muslims in 1947. Since the country’s inception, questions 
surrounding national identity, the role of Islam in the polity and the place of the military 
in governance have taken center stage in the social and political climate.  
Soon after independence, citizens, scholars and policy makers alike questioned 
the justification of the existence of the state of Pakistan as ethnic and regional 
factionalism broke out. In 1971, the war with India and the subsequent succession of East 
Pakistan into Bangladesh was a national disaster that led to an identity crisis for the 
nation comparable to the 1967 Arab defeat by Israel. The founding fathers of the country, 
such Mohammed Ali Jinnah, were well known secularists, and therefore there was no 
clear answer as to whether and how Pakistan was to be governed as an Islamic state. 
Debates about Pakistan’s Islamic and national identity continue to date.  
In the 1970s, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the PPP came to power and implemented 
socialist ideals. To address rising discontent from the Islamists, however, Bhutto chose to 
legitimize his rule and counter economic and social problems through a state sponsored 
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agenda of “moderate Islam.” He tried to reconcile socialism with Islam, similar to the 
rhetoric of Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt. However the state’s Islamization ideology was 
not successful because Bhutto did not have credentials as an Islamic scholar; perhaps 
more importantly, as one scholar argues, Islamization did not trump the social and 
economic problems that plagued the country
1
. Subsequent civilian governments have 
paid lip service to Islam, seeking to use religiosity selectively for personal gain. In 1991, 
for example, the Sharif government introduced the Sharia Bill to placate the growing 
animosity from Islamist allies. While the bill aimed to Islamize several social and 
political aspects of the polity, as Mumtaz Ahmed describes: 
Given the strength of the Islamic parties and their demand for a Shariah bill, Sharif 
introduced his own Shariah bill, which was a much more moderate and vague version of 
the original. It is a package of legislative and administrative measures to Islamize 
education, the mass media, economy, bureaucracy, and the legal system. A miscellany of 
pious hopes and noble intentions, the Shariah bill can be considered, at best, a symbolic 




In 1977 General Zia came to power by overthrowing the Bhutto government in a 
military coup. Zia’s legacy is best remembered through his initiation of widespread 
Islamization in the country. In order to counter political and social unrest, Zia Islamized 
the country under the auspices of Pakistan’s oldest Islamist movement Jamaat-e-Islami. 
While Jamaat became the “Islamic pillar” for the Zia regime, the alliance between the 
two was short lived. Jamaat, along with other Islamist parties continually pushed the 
regime for elections and agitated against Zia’s antidemocratic policies. Even under Zia, 
there was no agreement on the role of Islam in Pakistan’s polity.   
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Pakistan’s system of government is often described as a “troika” among the President, 
the Prime Minister and the Army
3
. There is wide agreement among observers that the 
single most powerful institution in Pakistan is the military. Pakistan’s strategic 
geographical location made the country an attractive partner to the United States during 
the cold war. Pakistan received large amounts of military aid from the United States, thus 
greatly increasing the strength of the military. The military has continued to have high 
levels of influence on both foreign policy and domestic affairs. Civilian governments 
have been fully aware that their durability depends on keeping the generals satisfied. 
Even when civilian governments have not been displaced directly though a military coup, 
the President (under the auspices of the military) has dissolved the parliament and called 
for fresh elections (for example in 1993, 1995 and 1997).  
Pakistan has had three spells of democratic rule: the first in 1947-1958; the second in 
1971-1977; and the third in 1988-1999. Thus, in Pakistan’s 57 years of history, 
democratically elected political parties have been in power for only 27 years. The 
remaining 30 years have either been of military rule, or quasi-democratic dispensation, 
allowing very limited space to political parties. Even though the 17
th
 amendment to the 
constitution provides for the formation of political parties, other amendments, such as 
Revival of Constitutional Order 1985, Legal Framework Order (LFO) 2002, Conduct of 
General Elections Order 2002, have restricted the political space for parties. 
Since the 1980s, two parties have dominated politics in Pakistan – the PPP, 
formed by the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and the PML, which had originally led the 
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movement for Pakistan’s succession from India.  Both the parties have refrained from 
forwarding a religious agenda that pits them against Islamist parties. Rather, they have 
provided Islamists with political space and used them to legitimize their rule. Under the 
leadership of Nawaz Sharif, PML has maintained a close relationship with the Islamists. 
PPP, under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s daughter Benazir Bhutto has had greater problems with 
Islamist owing to the Party’s leftist history. However, given the country’s enormous 
ethnic and regional disintegration problems, governments have preferred not to take a 
confrontational stance with the Islamists.  
In 1990, the President dismissed the PPP government led by Benazir Bhutto on 
grounds of corruption. In the elections that followed, an alliance among Islamists and the 
right-wing PML won the majority of the seats. Nawaz Sharif, a businessman from Punjab 
became the new Prime Minister of the country. After coming to power, Sharif continued 
appeasing the Islamists by introducing the Shariah bill. At the same time, he embarked on 
a program of liberalization that would entail close cooperation with the west, Japan, and 
various international institutions. An economic crisis soon engulfed the country and 
serious social turbulence, crime and lawlessness prevailed. To add to the insecurities, the 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International collapsed revealing a corruption scandal 
involving high ranking officers in the military, the President as well as Nawaz Sharif. 
Once again the President dissolved the government in 1993 and new elections were held, 
but no party achieved a clear majority. The PPP formed a coalition with the ethnically 
based Mohajir Quomi Movement (MQM) and gained control over the government. The 
PPP- MQM alliance proved to be short lived as rising violence in Karachi and other 
economic problems forced the President to dissolve the government once again. In the 
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1997 elections, Nawaz Sharif and the PML came back to power. His government was 
dismissed in October 1999 in a military coup under General Musharraf. 
  The military stated its goal as bringing order and stability back to the nation, 
indicating that they had no intentions of staying in power long-term. Several opposition 
parties as well as the public welcomed the coup as they considered the imposition of 
martial law a welcome relief from corruption and general social and political disorder. 
However, subsequent electoral engineering and manipulation of the opposition convinced 
several observers that Musharraf was going to be a part of the political system for some 
time to come
4
. Upon coming to power, Musharraf approved the Provisional Constitution 
Order (PCO) which allowed him to pass legislation overriding all existing laws, including 
the constitution. These Presidential legislations can not be challenged in the courts. He 
also allied himself with the United States “war on terror,” which proved to be a useful 
step in preventing international scrutiny of his undemocratic strategies. In 2002, he 
initiated a national referendum where the population was asked to vote “yes” or “no” on 
allowing him to continue in office. The regime reported wide turnout and over 97% of the 
population voting “yes.” International elections monitoring agencies and other observers, 
however, widely reported that the numbers had been fabricated and that the polling 
stations remained empty all day
5
. All opposition parties, with the exception of the pro-
government PML(q) boycotted the referendum. Despite strong protests from opposition 
parties, Musharraf passed the Legal Framework Order (LFO) in 2002 which allowed him 
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to continue in office for another 5 years. Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto were both 
convicted of corruption charges and exiled from the country. Even though both parties 
have elected new leaders, the PPP and the PML continue to be under their exiled leaders’ 
guidance.  
Political Parties in Pakistan 
 Pakistan’s political parties are highly fragmented owing to their regional and clan- 
based nature and to the lack of internal democracy and cohesion within groups. 
Pakistan’s erratic experience with democracy has often been linked to the lack of viable 
alternatives to military rule
6
. Civilian governments have not been able to establish 
effective control over the entire country and have been prone to ethnic and regional 
rebellion. As Ahmed Nazeer notes: 
[Thus] political parties have never had the chance to learn the art of governance by 
staying in office long enough. Nor could the opposition parties play their due role in 
sustained democratic process. Hence political parties in Pakistan largely operated while 




Pakistan’s relatively low levels of restriction on the formation of political parties has 
led to the emergence of several parties, but most are regional, ethnically based, or class 
based. Many have never tried to appeal to a broader constituency, limiting themselves to 
their ethnic or clan base, others have tried to appeal to a national level constituency, but 
failed.  Even Islamist parties have been limited in their electoral success unless they have 
formed clan or regional bases
8
. The “localization” of politics in Pakistan has proven to be 
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detrimental to the development of national based all inclusive political formations. The 
2002 elections witnessed campaigning that was centered primarily on regional and clan 
based issues and not national concerns. Nazeer argues in relation to the 2002 election, 
“Local patronage has always been an important determinant in voting, but broader issues 




Many parties are centered around a charismatic leader and lack internal democracy. 
For example, the Tehrik-e-Insaaf party was formed based mostly on the personal 
following of Imran Khan, the former captain of the Pakistani cricket team. The Mojahir 
Qumi Movement (MQM) has been formed based on the cult-like following of its leader, 
Altaf Hussain. Disagreements about group goals and objectives therefore often result in 
factionalism and expulsions. Most political parties have seen several break-off groups 
form over the years as a result of these internal divisions. These groups are identified by a 
abbreviation at the end of the party name, for example, PPP(s) referring to the Sherpao 
group of the PPP, and PML(q) referring to the Quaid-e-Azam group of the PML. 
According to the statistics revealed by the Election Commission of Pakistan, all major 




In 2002 the Musharraf government passed the Political Parties Order (PPO) that made 
it mandatory for parties to seek formal registration with the Election Commission. 129 
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parties submitted their papers, of which 71 qualified as full-fledged parties, including 4 
alliances. The PPO also stipulated that parties must conduct internal elections and not 
seek international support or affiliation
11
. While the Musharraf government has portrayed 
the PPO as an effort to reform the fragmented party system, many political parties see it 
instead as a concerted effort to control opposition to his regime. Several parties did hold 
internal elections, but the leaders ran unopposed. The Awami National Party and some 
other religious parties refused to hold elections as they said their leaders were already 
democratically elected. 
Musharraf has offered political parties many incentives in exchange for their loyalty 
to his regime. Parties that supported him did well in the elections, their leaders had their 
corruption charges dropped and they did not face constant harassment from the regime. 
These incentives created tensions within parties and some factions favored cooperating 
with the regime while others prefer to continue their opposition. The disagreements 
resulted in break up of existing parties. For example, PML broke up into PML(n) – 
Nawaz Sharif group and PML(q) – Quaid-e-Azam group. PML(q) cooperated with the 
Musharraf regime had its leaders received several benefits in exchange. PML(q) was the 
only party to do well in the 2002 parliamentary election and many of its leaders had their 
corruption charges dropped.  
 
The Two Party System Between PML and PPP: Pakistan’s politics is officially dominated 
by two parties – the PML and the PPP. The PML has historical roots in the Indian 
freedom struggle and the demands for the Pakistani state. PML was the only party 






equipped enough to lead Pakistan after independence. Its leader, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, 
is known as Quaid-e-Azam, the founding father of the country. However, Jinnah’s 
untimely death just seven years after independence put both the party and the newly 
formed country in a leadership crisis. Internal divisions emerged around a number of 
important issues, including the national language, ethnicity, the role of Islam, and the 
provisions of the new constitution. Many small dissenting factions emerged, and the new 
leadership responded by expelling these groups. Many then formed their own political 
parties and raised a creditable challenge to the PML in the 1954 elections through an 
alliance known as the “United Front.” The fragmentation of the party system in Pakistan 
had already begun. 
 In 1958, Ayub Khan led a military coup that banned all political parties. A young 
army officer under his command led the resistance movement to his regime. Zulfirak Ali 
Bhutto defected from the Ayub Khan government and formed the People’s Party of 
Pakistan. Bhutto was Sindi by descent and highly influenced by anti-imperialist ideals 
which he wrote about in his book, The Myth of Independence
12
. He founded the PPP on 
socialist principles reconciled with Islamism. He outlined his thoughts in the form of four 
ideals that became the foundation of the PPP: Islam is our faith, Democracy is out 
politics, Socialism is our economy, and finally, All power to the people. He declared the 
elimination of feudalism as the main goal and presented the party’s motto as “roti, kapra 
aur makan,” literally, bread, clothing and shelter
13
. In 1971, the PPP formed the 
government with Bhutto as the prime minister. He nationalized many banks and 
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educational institutions and turned Pakistan’s attention to the Middle East, especially the 
Gulf states, where oil rents had become a significant source of income for the country.  
 In 1977, Bhutto was ousted and executed in a military coup led by General Zia, 
who then initiated a large scale Islamization program in the country. The PPP’s 
leadership was transferred to Zulfikar Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir Bhutto. After Zia’s 
death, two main rival factions stood to control the politics of the country – the PPP under 
Benazir Bhutto and PML and its Islamist allies under Nawaz Sharif. In many ways 
Sharif’s group represented the continuation of the Zia order; he was an officer under Zia 
and was openly sympathetic to the Islamists. PPP had earned the hostility of the Islamists 
because of Zulfikar Bhutto’s socialism and the fact that the party was now headed by a 
woman. PML formed an official alliance with the Islamists under the banner, Islamic 
Democratic Alliance (IDA). 
 In the elections that followed, no party won a clear majority, although PPP 
received the highest number of votes. The PPP formed an unlikely alliance with the 
ethnically based MQM party and gained enough seats to form the government. Benazir 
Bhutto became the first woman to lead the country. However, the fragmented nature of 
Pakistan’s party system had become clear: no party commanded a national-level 
constituency, and in order to form the government or a viable opposition, unlikely 
alliances would have to be forged. PPP’s alliance with MQM proved to be unstable from 
the very beginning. In order to pressure the government to agree to its demands, MQM 
engaged in guerilla warfare in the port city of Karachi, leading to widespread lawlessness 
and bringing businesses to a virtual standstill. The resulting mayhem led the President to 
dismiss the government. The next decade saw a seesaw of power between the PML and 
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the PPP, each trying to oust the other from power. An intense rivalry was underway 
between the two parties and their leaders. 
 In 1992, Benazir Bhutto revealed the new face of the PPP: its new party manifesto 
would stress privatization and decentralization rather than socialist principles
14
. The turn 
away from socialism was largely the result of the abysmal state of the economy and its 
growing debt. Even though the PPP is no longer considered an ideologically leftist 
political party, the legacy of the past remains a strong determinant of its support base 
until today. 
 While the PML and the PPP come closest to the level of national parties in 
Pakistan, neither has been able to establish a constituency beyond certain specific regions 
or class. The PML receives most of its support from the Punjab province. While the PML 
has typically been able to secure at least some seats in other provinces also, studies of 
Pakistani electoral politics and several observers have noted that PML has its strongest 
support base among upper classes, especially landlords, feudal lords and business 
leaders
15
. The historical legacy of PPP being a leftist party and PML being right-wing 
may have contributed to the development of this constituency. Studies have shown that 
the PML’s support base has remained stable over several elections
16
. 
The PPP’s support comes from labor and peasants, particularly in the rural sectors of 
the Sind province, and the party is widely considered the “party of the poor.” Under 
Benazir Bhutto, even though the government assured the business industry that leftist 
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policies will not be followed, the industrial sector still remained cautious. The 
government and businesses clashed on many issues, including increased taxes. The two 
also clashed on the issue of the deteriorating rule of law in Karachi, Pakistan’s important 
port city and commercial center. With the election of Nawaz Sharif and the IDA 
government in 1990s, the business community found a new partner. Sharif was a former 
industrialist himself and this gave a major boost to the morale of the business community. 
He rejected socialist and statist rhetoric and quickly initiated liberalization, deregulation 
and privatization policies. In 1993 Benazir came back to power, but the business sector 
had lost faith in her government because of rampant inflation, economic stagnation, and 
poor economic management. They began to openly challenge the Bhutto government at 
every turn.  
Regionally, PPP has not been able to expand its base beyond the Sind province. Both 
Zulfikar Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto are from Sind and therefore have a strong electoral 
support base among the Sindi community. Overtime, however, due to economic growth 
and urbanization, more people from rural sectors are moving to the cities and being 
catapulted into the middle class. The business community has also become politically 
involved and powerful. Such demographic changes have meant shrinking electoral 
support for the PPP, although the basis for its constituency has remained the same
17
. The 
extent of the division of constituencies among PPP and PML became extremely clear in 
Pakistan’s last democratic election, held in 1997. PML won this election in a landslide as 
Benazir Bhutto was dealing with serious corruption allegations that put the party into 
disarray. According to electoral analysis conducted by a Karachi-based news magazine, 
                                                 
17
 ———. 2004. "Pakistan: Economic Challenges for a New Millennium." In Pakistan on the Brink: 




PML did not win because the party received PPP’s share of the votes, rather, PPP 
supporters largely stayed away from the polls. The election turnout was a historical low 
of 35%. There was a wide difference between the votes lost by the PPP and the votes 
gained by PML in every province. Overall PPP received 16% less votes than the 1993 
elections while PML showed a gain of 6%
18
. While PML did gain some additional vote, 
the party won the elections because of PPP poor performance. PPP supporters simply did 
not vote, while PML constituents came to the polling stations in large numbers. The data 
confirms that the PPP and the PML have highly divided constituencies.  
Overall, even though the PML and the PPP are national-level parties and the only two 
that have formed the government in the past, their bases of support remain largely 
regional and class based. The PPP receives support in the Sind province and mostly in the 
rural sections and among labor classes while the PML receives support from the business 
community and the middle class, mostly in the Punjab province. Overtime the two parties 
have developed an intense political rivalry often leading to violence among supporters.  
    
Islamist Parties: Pakistan has several long-standing Islamist parties, many of whom were 
formed pre independence. Many observers consider Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamaat-e-
ulema-e-Islami (JUI) and Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) the most influential of the 
Islamist parties in the political scene. Unlike countries such as Algeria and Egypt, where 
Islamists have done well in electoral politics and formed large opposition blocs, Islamists 
in Pakistan have not been able to translate street strength into electoral victories, leading 
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some observers to conclude that Islamists do not have a strong presence in Pakistan
19
. 
This is not the case. voting patterns in Pakistan reveal that Islamist parties are strongly 
disadvantaged in the country’s two party system. The electorate is more likely to vote for 
the party that can win, rather than the party they would prefer in power
20
. Islamists have 
therefore wavered between aligning themselves with the PML and contesting elections as 
their own political force.  
 There is really no one way to describe Islamists in Pakistan. Political Islam takes 
many forms in the country, including its majority Sunni form and the minority Shi’i form. 
Within the Sunnis, Islamists have various sectarian divisions among the Deobandis, 
Wahhabis and Ahl al-Hadith groups. Sectarianism and regionalism is a common feature 
of political Islam in Pakistan
21
. Some of the oldest and most influential Islamist parties – 
JI, JUI and JUP-gained political ground during the Zulfikar Bhutto years, when they were 
the main pillars of resistance against his leftist regime. In the 1977 elections under 
Bhutto, the Islamists joined PML in contesting Bhutto under the banner “Pakistan 
National Alliance” (PNA). PNA’s demands represented many different interests – both 
secular and Islamist
22
. The supreme guide of the JI, the highly influential Islamic scholar 
Maulana Mawdudi, provided the leadership of the PNA. But the PNA could never come 
to power in Pakistan, because the government was taken over by General Zia soon after 
the election results were announced. 
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 Under Zia, JI became one of the most influential Islamist parties in Pakistan 
enjoying the most cooperative relations with the government in its history. Zia’s 
Islamization program meant giving JI members important positions in the government 
and co-opting them as a pillar of support for the military regime. However, as Zia’s 
policies became more and more personalistic and elections were continually postponed, 
JI took on an oppositional stance to the regime and joined the resistance movement 
against him. With the fall of Zia, JI was once again in an alliance with the PML. JI and 
PML together were now called the “Islamic Democratic Alliance” (IDA), or in Urdu, 
Islami Jamhoori Ittehad. The IDA won the elections in 1990 bringing Nawaz Sharif to 
power. JI members became influential particularly in matters of foreign policy. They 
declared their agenda as the liberation of Kashmir and increased religiosity in Pakistan. 
 After the Sharif government fell and Pakistan found itself in the midst of another 
election in 1993, JI experienced a significant change in organizational structure, goals 
and objectives. It decided to break its cooperation with the Sharif regime and contest the 
elections in partnership with other Islamists. This was a significant change for JI, as the 
group was well aware that it did not command high levels of electoral strength and 
therefore could not come to power without an allied partner. Contesting elections also 
meant significant internal changes. A new group by the name “Pakistan Islamic Front” 
was set up as the political wing. JI also relaxed its membership criteria to include more 
members beyond the community of devout Muslims to constituents who believed in 
Islamism in principle. The inclusion of more members was necessary to build a 
constituency beyond the devout. The wider socio political base, however, did not mean 
that JI relaxed its hard line agenda. Their 1993 campaign was full of anti-American 
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slogans and was fiercely religious. The changes in the organizational structure led to 
internal dissent in the group. JI’s former leader, Mian Tufail Muhammed disagreed with 
the new policies and felt that JI had becomes an opportunist movement and therefore not 
true to its original goals as envisioned by its founder Maulana Mawdudi.   
JI declared its main reasons for leaving the alliance with PML as dissatisfaction 
with Sharif’s Islamization policies, particularly the Shariah Bill and that the Sharif 
government had not given JI members the portfolios they deserve
23
. However, according 
to one scholar, JI had profited tremendously from its IDA membership. They had 
considerable freedom as the voice of Islamism in the country and also had high levels of 
influence on policies
24
. Why did JI decide to leave IDA and contests elections on its 
own? Some scholars argue that the main impetus came from the change in leadership 
from Main Tufail to Qazi Hussain Ahmed. Ahmed has been an activist in the student 
wing of JI and therefore had his own agenda for the group. He felt strongly about 
mobilizing international support for Afghanistan. He had also become morally committed 
to Islamist resistance in Palestine and Kashmir
25
. But how did Ahmed succeed in 
changing JI as an organization and restructuring its goals and objectives? 
According to a current JI member, Ahmed’s success in reorienting Jamaat came 
from the rising tide of anti-American sentiment in Pakistan with the Gulf war. The 
growing feelings of nationalism and religious fervor among the population needed an 
outlet, and Qazi Hussain saw this as an opportunity for JI to carve out its own 
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. Due to its close association with PML, JI did not have a 
distinct and independent constituency and its own program of action in achieving its 
goals. The prospects of establishing its own political space and turning divided Islamists 
into their own force convinced JI members to contest the 1993 elections alone. As Moten 
notes: 
Jamaat had tried to bring about the desired transformation of the society by adopting the 
politics of alliance but it had failed. It made an alliance with the Muslim League, and 
went from door to door asking for votes on their behalf. The Jamaa leaders were 
promised an Islamic system would be promulgated in the country, that Kashmir would be 
freed, and that justice provided to the people. The Muslim League betrayed the trust and 
honoured none of these promises. The alliance politics, instead of helping the Jamaat 
realize its goals, created confusion in the minds of the people about the message and the 
struggle of the organization. The Jamaat therefore decided to shun the politics of alliance 




The 1993 election campaign was mostly led by JI’s student wing. While the 
rallies and demonstrations saw large turnouts, these did not result in an electoral victory 
for JI: PIF only received 3 national assembly seats. Yet, the change in JI’s organizational 
structure and objectives had already solidified. Despite the electoral loss, JI members 
reelected Qazi Hussain Ahmed as their leader. In his subsequent writings and speeches, 
Qazi Hussain reaffirmed that in order to remain in politics, JI must be a mass based 
movement. However, he refused to form electoral alliances with those whose objectives 
and characters did not meet even the minimum requirements of JI, arguing that this 
would both create confusion among the public and leave the JI’s objectives unrealized
28
. 
Elections were held again in 1997. JI decided to boycott these elections to work 
on expanding its constituency. In 1999 Musharraf came to power in a coup. By now, JI 
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had taken on the leadership role in uniting all Islamist parties in the country. JI led the 
initiative that formed Majlis-e-Muttahida-e-Amal (MMA), an alliance of 5 Islamist 
parties. The main members of MMA are JI and JUI. Other members are small “one man” 
parties that have little political clout. Some scholars speculate that MMA was formed 
with the assistance of the military to weaken PPP and PML. As Andrew Wilder notes 
“The establishment strategy in Pakistan has always been to use the religious parties 
against the leftist and ethnic parties who were viewed to be the major threat”
29
. Whatever 
the circumstances surrounding MMA’s formation, the alliance has not been sustained on 
the basis of mutually shared ideals. In fact, there are deep ideological differences between 
JI’s Qazi Ahmed and JUI’s Fazlur Rahman
30
.  
JUI’s constituency lies among the deeply conservative elements of Pakistani 
society. JUI’s pro-Taliban rhetoric has alienated the group from several sections of the 
society, while it has attracted others. By comparison, JI’s base is much more 
mainstream
31
. The distinct nature of their constituencies has enabled these groups to work 
together to seek more from the Musharraf government. The results of the 2002 elections, 
for example, astonished many observers. MMA did exceedingly well, particularly in the 
NWFP, where they proceeded to form the provincial government.  The Islamists have 
together been able to form a regional base in the country, separate from the PML. This 
has been their most significant win since 1970. Some scholars explain MMA’s victory as 
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largely a result of the weakness of PPP and PML and support from the military
32
. One 
scholar has argued that the votes from the NWFP region (geographically close to 
Afghanistan and ethnically Pakhtun) may be an indication of rising Pakhtun nationalism, 
especially against the US invasion of Afghanistan
33
. Once again JI has capitalized on 
anti-American sentiment to seek its own political constituency, only this time they have 
been successful in forming a regional base. The military may have assisted the MMA in 
winning, but the military’s gamble with MMA had reached further than they had hoped. 
After forming a base in NWFP, MMA challenged the Musharraf government’s policies 
on the war, its treatment of madrasas, and issues concerning Kashmir and relations with 
India. 
Pakistan’s most influential Islamist party – JI -broke its profitable alliance with 
the PML to seek its own political constituency. Over the years, it has taken the lead role 
in uniting diverse Islamist parties and has succeeded in forming a regional base in 
NWFP, separate from PML and PPP.   
 
Regional and Ethnic Parties: 
 
The foundation of Pakistan was based on Islam. Religion was a great unifying factor for 
the Muslims in the pre-independence era and resulted in the two-nation theory and the 
birth of Pakistan. The ethnic factor gained importance after the creation of Pakistan. 
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 Pakistan is divided into four regions or provinces – Punjab, Sind, NWFP and 
Baluchistan. Each region has a unique ethnic composition. Some regions are ethnically 
homogeneous, while others are divided into sub-regional groupings. Not only are the 
regions ethnically separated, they also have linguistic divisions. The major industrialized 
cities, especially in the more advanced provinces of Sind and Punjab, are ethnically 
diverse with increased migrations from other less-developed provinces; outside the cities, 
however, regional divisions are very obvious. Nearly all the regions are represented by a 
dominant party, either a group formed on the basis of ethnicity, or one formed on a 
national basis, but unable to expand its constituency beyond a particular region. 
The dominance of regionalism over religious nationalism in Pakistan became clear 
after the succession of East Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh. East Pakistan 
suffered significant economic disadvantaged as compared to West Pakistan. Further, 
West Pakistani elites were determined to squash Bengali identity and impose a Pakistani 
identity. Bengalis were berated as “not true Muslims” because of their cultural affinity 
with West Bengali culture in India. Urdu was imposed as the national language, which 
was only spoken by 3.7% of the population at the time. Bengalis, extremely proud of 
their language and heritage, strongly protested this measure. Bengalis protested other 
cultural assimilation measures, such as banning of Bengali poetry on the radio, were they 
saw as the cultural hegemony of West Pakistan. 
In 1957, East Bengal came to be represented by the Awami League. Awami League 
became the champion of Bengali nationalism and did very well in the elections in 1971. 
Soon after the elections, however, troops from West Pakistan launched an offensive 
against Bangladeshi separatism that led to a large-scale civil war, ultimately ending in 
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Indian intervention and the formation of Bangladesh.  This outcome was a national 
disaster for Pakistan. Not only did the reason d’etre for the existence of the state of 
Pakistan come into question, but Mohajirs, Sindis and Baluchis also began asserting their 
own nationalist aspirations. In this section, I discuss the ethnic composition of each of the 
regions in Pakistan and explain their political representation. I argue that ethnic diversity 
in Pakistan has led to the creation of political parties that command regional and/ or 
ethnically based constituencies. 
Punjab: Punjab is one of the most prosperous regions of Pakistan, and Punjabis are well 
represented in the civil service and industry. Punjabis have become the dominant ethnic 
group in Pakistan because they inherited power from the British. The Pakistani army is 
also heavily Punjabi in ethnic composition. Often the region of Punjab is perceived as 
Pakistan alone as Punjabis are known to have the highest degree of loyalty to the nation
35
. 
The Punjabis’ favored status has often brought them into conflict with other groups. 
Punjab is not represented by an ethnic party as such, but the PML has a very strong base 
in the region and has repeatedly done well in the provincial elections. Even though PML 
is considered a national-level party, the regional nature of its constituency is revealed by 
its strong performance in Punjab and weak performance in other provinces.  
 
Sind: Sind consists of two main ethnic groups – the Sindis, who are considered the 
natives of the region, and the Mujahirs, Urdu-speaking Indian Muslims who migrated to 
Pakistan after its creation. The Mujahirs consider themselves to be a distinct nationality 
and are linguistically divided from the Sindis and other groups. Mujahirs see themselves 
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as disadvantaged in relation to the Sindis and have therefore created their own political 
party, Muhajir Quomi Movement (MQM) or Muhajir Nationalist Party.  
MQM was formed in 1984 under the leadership of Altaf Hussain. The goal of the 
MQM has been the protection and advancement of the Mujahir community in Pakistan. 
MQM has high levels of support, especially in the urban centers of Karachi and 
Hyderabad where the immigrant ghettos have been located. Overtime, MQM has been 
able to gain seats in the Sind provincial assembly. Despite its representation in the 
parliament, MQM became an urban terrorist group, transforming Karachi and Hyderabad 
into the most dangerous cities in the country. MQM has a sizable number of hardcore 
criminals in its ranks, who with support from party leaders terrorized and murdered those 
that did not make their contribution to the party fund as well as others who stood in their 
way – even journalists and newspaper offices.  
In the 1988 elections, the PPP tried to form an alliance with the MQM. MQM 
presented the party with 25 demands that reflected its aims and aspirations, including: a 
separate identity for the Mojahirs by a separate nationality, arms licenses to Mojahirs, 
provision of housing plots to residents of Sind, and an end to inter-provincial migration 
and the allotment of local Sindi plots to non locals
36
. Desperate for additional support, 
Benazir Bhutto accepted these demands, but the alliance broke in 1989; in 1990, MQM 
formed an alliance with PML. MQM continued its violence despite the fact that it 
received high-level government portfolios.  
In 1992, the Nawaz Sharif government launched “operation cleanup” to counter 
the MQM threat. Many MQM leaders went underground to avoid arrests. In 1994, MQM 
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came up with another set of demands as preconditions to forming an alliance with PPP or 
PML. The nature of the demands made it difficult for both parties to accept the alliance. 
Most of the demands were highly anti-Sindi. They demanded that the local governor and 
Chief Minister be rotated between Sindis and Mohajirs – which was a complete disregard 
of majority rule. They also demanded an increase in urban quotas by showing 
exaggerated figures of increase in the urban populations. They also asked that Karachi be 
separated from Sind
37
. Yet despite its ideological radicalism, MQM remains a popular 
alliance partner because of its electoral dominance in Urban Sind. Overtime, the group 
has realized that its limited ethnic constituency alone would never be enough to gain 
influence on national politics. Therefore, MQM became more open to forming alliances, 
even with PPP, a party widely supported by the Sindi ethnic group.  
 Similar to the Punjabis, the Sindis are not represented by a separate ethnic party. 
The PPP, even though formed on national principles, is the party of choice among Sindis. 
The Sindi roots of its founding family, the Bhuttos, and the Party’s favors to the Sindi 
community in the past, have contributed to the emergence of a strong ethnic constituency 
for the PPP. The PPP has had limited success in gaining constituents outside Sind. 
 
NWFP: The geographical remoteness of the North West Frontier Province and its 
proximity to Afghanistan have given the region its own unique political environment. 
The dominant ethnic group occupying the region is the Pushtun
38
. The Pashtuns have 
ethnic similarities with Afghanis, who many Pashtuns regard as their kin. The region has 









its own rich cultural history. The Pashtuns resisted the British rule through the Khudai 
Khidmadgar Movement (Red Shirts) and agreed to be a part of Pakistan without giving up 
provincial autonomy. Their history of the Pushtun resistance to the British gave the group 
their own sense of history and identity.  
The Pashtuns are the second most dominant group in the Pakistani army and civil 
service. Despite the remoteness of the NWFP, the Pashtuns have become well integrated 
in the economy of the country. However, they have had nationalist aspirations in the past. 
After the formation of Bangladesh, the Pashtuns intensified their demands for succession 
and for the formation of Pashtunistan though the Awami National Party (ANP). However, 
several factors have put a damper on these demands. Many Pashtun elites have 
investments in Sind and Punjab and therefore have not supported independence from 
Pakistan. The independence movement also does not find support among the petty 
bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie because many of them are agents or contactors in 
other parts of the country. Many have attended universities in Sind and Punjab and 
therefore do not bear any particular allegiance to Pashto as opposed to Bengalis or Sindis. 
ANP therefore has limited appeal among Pashtuns on the national question and has lost 
the majority of Pashtun support
39
. ANP has now become a pressure group with its politics 
largely revolving around bargaining for portfolios, government permits for its leaders to 
set up factories. Until 1998, ANPs major issues of mobilization were: opposition to the 
Kalabagh dam project and demands to change the name of the province to Pukhtunkhwa.  
 The 2002 election revealed that a new party has formed a strong political 
constituency in the NWFP – the MMA. MMA received wide support in the region and 
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now runs the provincial government. The success of the MMA in NWFP can be seen as 
the result of decline in support for ANP, the relative weakness of PML and PPP in the 
region, support from the army and, as one author has argued, the rise in religio-nationalist 
sentiment among the Pashtuns with the US-invasion of Afghanistan
40
. The MMA has 
carved a regional constituency in the NWFP among the Pashtuns, even though religious 
parties have had limited electoral success in contesting elections without an alliance 
partner such as the PML (as seen in the 1993 elections). 
 
Baluchistan: Baluchistan is the largest province in Pakistan and shares is border with Iran 
and Afghanistan. The Baluchis are a group of 17 tribes that consider themselves 
ethnically related to the Kurds. While Baluchi nationalism has intensified during certain 
periods in Pakistan’s history, overall the internal tribal divisions within the group have 
prevented a unified movement from emerging. During the Zulfikar Bhutto years, the 
Baluchis engaged in guerilla warfare to press their demands on the government, but were 
repressed with assistance from the armed forces and the Shah of Iran. The Baluchi 
provincial assembly was dissolved and Bhutto imposed his direct rule. Although the 
Baluchi People’s Liberation Front (BPLF) claims to represent the nationalist aspirations 
of the group, the 1993 elections revealed that as many as 10 Baluchi parties and 9 
independent candidates ran for the provincial elections. The political composition of 
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Summary of Party System in Pakistan: 
 
In the above sections I have provided a detained analysis of the two party system, 
Islamist parties, and regional and ethnic parties in Pakistan. I argue that political parties 
have developed divided political constituencies based on ethnicity or regional affinities. 
The following observations emerge: 
 
• NATIONAL PARTIES ARE MORE REGIONAL IN CHARACTER: National 
level parties PML and PPP are mostly regionally based and have failed to expand 
their constituency to other parts of the country. PML has its constituency in 
Punjab while PPP in Sind. Their regional basis is largely determined by the 
ethnicity of their leaders, PML is headed by Sharif who is Punjabi and PPP has 
been founded and led by the Bhuttos, who are Sindi. 
• ISLAMIST PARTIES HAVE SUCCEEDED IN FORMING REGIONAL 
CONSTITUENCY: Since breaking its alliance and seeking its own political 
constituency in 1993, Jamaat-e-Islami has succeeded in forming a regional-basis 
in NWFP through the MMA. The formation of the MMA and their subsequent 
electoral success in 2002 in the NWFP region has been an important development 
in Pakistani politics. Previously, Islamists had limited electoral success, even 
though they received high levels of street support. In 2002, the Islamists 
succeeded in carving out a regional constituency in NWFP. 




• NUMEROUS REGIONAL PARTIES HAVE EMERGED OVER TIME: There 
are a variety of regional organizations in Pakistan – each representing the 
nationalist aspirations of racially, culturally and ethnically divided ethnic groups. 
Some parties such as the MQM have used violence to advance their agenda, while 
others such as the ANP have dropped secessionist ambitions over time. Some 
regions, such as Baluchistan, while ethnically homogenous, have subregional, 
tribal based divisions that have come to be represented by their own political 
groups. 
 
Opposition Parties in Egypt: 
 
History of the political system  
From Nasser to Sadat to Mubarak, Egypt’s political history has been characterized 
by socialism, economic liberalization, state sponsored political openings and subsequent 
closings. Egypt gained its independence in 1922, but the British continued to have a large 
influence in the running of the economy and polity. The successor government to the 
British rule consisted of a monarchical, western-oriented elite group. The Free Officers 
coup in 1952 brought Nasser to power with much popular support, including the close 
cooperation of Islamists. Nasser declared the goals of the coup as ending imperialism, 
eradicating feudalism, establishing social justice, founding a democratic polity, and 
creating a powerful army. A few years after coming to power, Nasser initiated “Arab 
socialism.” He nationalized key industries, banks and schools including the controversial 
nationalization of the Suez canal in 1956. 
Nasser was initially conciliatory towards Islamist groups, particularly the Muslim 
Brotherhood, but soon used harsh repressive tactics towards them as he worked to 
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consolidate his power. Nasser’s quest for political supremacy had led to the 
personalization of power. Brotherhood members allegedly attempted to assassinate him 
in 1954, but their attempt was foiled and many of the group’s members were 
consequently jailed. The group itself was outlawed, a policy that continues to this day.  
With all political parties and other forms of mass participation banned, Nasser soon 
became the nucleus of power. He established a regime of military technocrats, thus 
strengthening the role of the military in politics. He also strove for regional dominance by 
playing a major role in establishing the “Non-Aligned Movement” and seeking 
unification with Syria. While all political opposition remained banned, Nasser provided 
state-controlled organizations of grassroots participation. Three such organizations were 
created: the Liberation Rally, whose purpose was to represent popular forces; LR was 
replaced by National Union (NU), with the purpose of encouraging decision making from 
the village upwards; and the NU was reinvented as the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in 
1961. The purpose of the ASU was to work with groups such as workers, intellectuals, 
capitalists and soldiers. Nasser used political organizations alongside the army, the police 
and the secret service to establish a mukhabarat (police) state. As Ninette Fahmy 
explains: 
Although such arrangements [ASU] appear on the surface to conform with Nasser’s slogan of 
‘true democracy,’ a closer look reveals that the ASU’s penetration in the different spheres of 
activity and work provided the central government with an efficient tool of control and regulation 
otherwise denied to it, over the whole Egyptian society. In this respect the ASU did not differ 




Sadat succeeded Nasser in 1970. As an officer under Nasser, Sadat had been 
under Nasser’s shadow. Upon assuming the presidency, he had to establish his own 
identity in the face of his larger than life predecessor. He declared amnesty with the 
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Muslim Brotherhood, liberalized the polity and initiated a program of economic 
openness, infitah.  He appeased the Islamists through a limited Islamization program. He 
took on the title of “the believer President” and in 1971 he declared shariah as the main 
source of legislation in Egypt. He released from prison several MB leaders, including 
leader Omar Telmasani. He initiated a private meeting with Telmasani soon after his 
release, the details of which were declassified only after Sadat’s death. In this meeting 
Sadat promised increased freedom to the MB including registering with the Ministry of 
Social Affairs, in exchange for their loyalty to the regime. Telmasani agreed and from 
1971 up to Sadat’s death in 1981, MB kept a low profile in its activism
43
. Sadat’s truce 
with the Islamists was aimed towards curbing the power of the radical left, which was 
becoming increasingly agitated by his economic liberalization policies. Sadat was also 
aware of the growing power of the radical Islamists and felt that moderates such as MB 
could be successfully used to counter their power. 
In 1976, Sadat initiated a new set of liberalization reforms. He engineered multiple 
parties based on three political platforms known as manabir: the right wing, the center 
(pro government) and the left. These were allowed to participate in the 1976 elections, 
leading to a victory for the center. Since the result of the elections was favorable to the 
government, Sadat decided to convert the platforms into political parties. The following 
political parties were created: Liberal Party: Hizb al-Ahrah (right wing), National 
Unionist Progressive Party (NPUP): Hizb al-Tagammu (left) and National Democratic 
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Pary (NDP). Later two other parties were also legalized, The New Wafd (liberal right) 
and Socialist Labor Party (Center Left). 
Sadat began a new era of economic liberalization known as the “open door policy.” 
The radical shift from a socialist to a liberalizing economy brought several economic 
problems including increasing debt and unemployment. In 1977 Cairo was engulfed in 
violent food riots. Sadat blamed the riots on the left, especially the NPUP. Prime Minister 
Salem charged that the NPUP contained communists who aimed to overthrow the regime.  
Sadat emphasized the suppression of the conspiracy and ordered the arrest of students, 
workers and intellectuals, especially leftists and sympathizers of NPUP. Within days, the 
jails were full of NPUP members. Sadat banned communists and unbelievers from 
political activity and state employment. Their paper al-Ahli was also banned. Sadat also 
helped the formation of the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), a new party to the left of NDP in 
the hope that it would drain NPUP of its support
44
. Leftist party members accused Sadat 
of treating the riots simply as a security threat rather than a symptom of social and 
economic problems in the country. They also alleged that the government was 
encouraging Islamic groups as a political counterweight.  
Sadat’s troubles were further exacerbated with the signing of the Camp David 
peace treaty with Israel. With growing economic and political turmoil, the influence of 
Islamist groups increased. Radical Islamist groups launched an anti-regime campaign. 
The polity became deeply divided among those who completely disagreed with Camp 
David, other who disagreed with the way Sadat conducted the negotiations with Israel 
and yet others who felt feelings of humiliation comparable to Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 
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war. In 1981 Sadat was assassinated by a member of the al-Jihad group while inspecting 
an army gathering. He was succeeded by another army officer – Hosni Mubarak. 
Mubarak came to power knowing full well the growing influence of the Islamists 
and rising discontent among the masses. His politics marked a shift in Egyptian politics 
when he announced political liberalization reforms in addition to the economic reforms 
initiated under Sadat. He began a semi-official press consisting of several newspapers 
such as al-Akhbar and al-Ahram. In addition, he also tried to counter the soft power of 
the Islamists by promoting al-Azhar mosque and university as an alternate voice of state 
sponsored moderate Islam
45
. At the same time he instructed army paratroopers to crush 
militant Islam. 
Liberalization reforms in semi-authoritarian contexts are often described as the 
regime’s strategy to counter the opposition, while maintaining its power and position. 
State controlled liberalization most often forestalls rather than encourages 
democratization
46
. The Mubarak regime held six set of elections since coming to power 
(1984, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005). In 1984, Mubarak held elections but 
disallowed groups based on religion from participating. The rules required that parties 
receive a minimum of 8% of the vote nationally to win seats in any constituency. If any 
party received less than 8%, their votes would be added to those of the ruling party. An 
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alliance between al-Wafd and MB was the only opposition grouping able to cross the 8% 
threshold. Together they received 15% of the vote and 13% of the seats. al-Tagammu and 
SLP did not cross the threshold and their votes were taken by NDP. In the 1987 elections, 
Muslim Brotherhood formed an alliance with the SLP and al-Ahrar. The alliance with 
SLP was largely a product of the party’s Islamist turn at the time. The MB-SLP-al-Ahrar 
alliance did well in the elections, but the newly found understanding between MB and 
SLP remained shaky as several SLP leaders resented Muslim Brotherhood’s dominance 
in their party and resigned. Aboul Fadlal, a prominent SLP leader who was also a lawyer, 
raised a legal case against the alliance, declaring it unconstitutional.  
The judiciary declared the results of the 1987 elections unconstitutional as several 
candidates sued the government for not being allowed to contest. Fresh elections were 
held in 1990, but several political parties boycotted the polls because the regime did not 
allow foreign observers to ensure transparency in the process. In 1995, the Mubarak 
regime took an additional step towards liberalization. The government approved several 
new political parties and agreed to double the air time allotted to the opposition for 
campaigning. In the 2000 elections, despite repression and intimidation from the 
government, the Muslim Brotherhood won 17 seats in the parliament, making it the 
largest opposition group in Egypt.  
The 2005 elections have been the most remarkable of Mubarak’s reign. In 
February 2005, the constitution was amended to allow for multiparty elections; however, 
the new laws made it difficult for independent candidates to participate. Critics urged that 
79 
 
this requirement was designed specifically to hurt MB
47
. Not only were parliamentary 
elections held in November as planned, Mubarak also announced that presidential 
elections would also be held in September. Nine political parties announced Presidential 
candidates including several prominent public figures like Ayman Nour from al-Ghad 
Party and Noman Gomaa from al-Wafd. Some parties boycotted the elections while other 
groups, such as Kifaya, discouraged their members from voting. The presidential election 
provided opposition parties with additional political space and opportunities to campaign 
and have their voices heard. The parliamentary elections in November 2005 were 
accompanied by high levels of activism by political parties as they considered it the first 
“real” opportunity to gain political ground
48
. 
 The 2005 opening in Egypt was encouraged by a younger cadre of mid-career 
public officials within NDP. The changes within the party have led some observers to 
believe that the NDP may be experiencing internal factionalism, especially because of the 
emergence of Mubarak’s western educated son Gamal Mubarak as a major public 
figure
49
. Speculations abound in the media that Mubarak may step down and that his son 
will take over the reins of the party. A change in leadership may mean that additional 
developments in the Egyptian political scene, especially since Mubarak has been in 
power for over two decades and there is widespread opposition to his rule. 
While Mubarak has initiated unprecedented liberalization efforts, the scope of the 
reforms remain limited. The formation of opposition parties is limited by a series of laws. 
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The procedure for approving political parties is long and complicated. Parties must not be 
too similar to already existing parties, they must not have any members who ruled before 
the 1952 revolution (this law specifically targets Wafd’s leader Fouad Siraj al-Din.), they 
must not oppose peace with Isreal, they may not have foreign contacts or funding, and 
they must seek approval from Committee for Political Parties Affairs (CPPA). 
 
Political Parties/ Opposition Groups in Egypt 
 
 Egypt has a rich history of mobilization and collective action as evidenced by the 
anti-colonial struggle and the mass politics that brought Nasser to power in 1952. The 
paradox of Egyptian socio-political life is that while civil society is teeming with NGOs, 
professional associations and other civic and welfare based groups, this associational 
richness has not been translated into organized opposition parties with both street and 
electoral strength
50
. Even well established (albeit weak) legally recognized parties 
resemble spontaneous social movements with few internal procedures in place.  
 There are several reasons for the weakness of political parties in Egypt. One of 
the most important is the restrictions imposed on the political opposition by the regime 
and the channeling of dissent. Egypt’s inconsistent experience with democracy has 
prevented the emergence of viable parties with pragmatic platforms. Most do not 
participate in elections with the hopes of actually taking over the government. Elections 
are political opportunities to build a constituency, inform the public about their agenda 
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and raise socio-political consciousness
51
. The strict rules about recognizing legal parties 
have encouraged opposition groups to contest elections through independents. While 
independent candidacy does provide opportunities for gaining seats in the parliament, in 
the long-run, it prevents the development of the party as an organization, especially the 
emergence of internal cohesiveness and a clear platform. 
 In comparison to Pakistan, electoral support for each party varies considerably 
between elections. Muslim Brotherhood has done consistently well in elections, but most 
other parties receive as many as 6 seats in parliament in some elections (for example al-
Tagammu in 1990 when other parties had boycotted the election) while receiving no seats 
in the next. While electoral results in Egypt are often manipulated in favor of the regime, 
the wide disparities show that groups do not have well established constituencies and 
voters tend to change their loyalties from one election to the next. In comparison, as 
discussed in the previous section, analyses of Pakistani electoral data has shown 
considerably consistent constituencies over time.  
I found that identifying each group’s constituency in Egypt is a difficult task 
largely because of their fluid nature. When asked to identify where the constituency for 
some of the major groups lie, one of my interviewees explained that it is impossible to 
identify a support base, because for most groups these vary considerably over time. Other 
groups are too new to have any constituency base, while for others the base is too small 
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to be significant. The Muslim Brotherhood is the only group that has been able to 
establish an identifiable grassroots support base
52
.  
 In order to function as a legal entity, many aspiring political parties settle for legal 
recognition as NGOs. In 1996, a new group by the name of al-Wasat (Center Party) broke 
off from the Muslim Brotherhood and sought legal recognition as a political party. The 
CPPA denied its application on the grounds that its platform did not represent a 
significant departure from other existing legal parties. Al-Wasat submitted a revised 
platform, which was once again rejected. Unable to gain legal recognition as a political 
party, the group decided to change its strategy and seek NGO status, which was 
approved. As an NGO, al-Wasat’s ability to engage in political activism is severely 
limited. The Mubarak regime has channeled opposition towards the NGO and voluntary 
sector thus preventing the emergence of political parties. 
Scholars have also pointed to organizational weaknesses within opposition 
parties, stemming from personalized leadership, lack of internal democracy, and petty 
rivalries. Fahmy argues: 
Political parties in Egypt are “parties of persons” that is, they revolve around the 
prominent personalities of their leaders rather than around a specific ideology or the 
embodiment of the demands and interests of various groups in the society, which also 




Parties have been sustained by the dynamic personalities of individuals such as 
Fuad Siraj al-Din (al-Wafd) and Ayman Nour (al-Ghad), rather than by internal cohesion 
and commitment to a political vision. Petty rivalries among leaders have resulted in 
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squabbling among parties. For example, in 1990 several parties collectively decided to 
boycott the elections. All major parties with the exception of al-Tagammu followed the 
agreement. al-Tagammu’s defection is believed to be the result of an ego clash resulting 
from a personal rivalry
54
. 
Ideologically, opposition parties in Egypt are divided among leftists, liberals, and 
Islamists. Islamists and leftists are known to have a history of intense ideological 
division, especially because of MB persecution during Nasser’s reign. Yet, as Nazih 
Ayubi has pointed out, the rivalry among leftists and Islamists is not as ideological as 
some may think. Given their support among the lower middle class, Islamists can not 
ignore issues such as social justice and welfare politics. It would be a mistake to assume 
that Islamists by their nature are economically rightists. While in Egypt, Islamists have 
been much more successful in establishing a constituency among the lower middle class, 
leftists essentially try to attract the same constituency
55
.  
Islamists in Egypt span the spectrum from radical to moderate/conservative. 
While radical Islamists have been greatly weakened in Egypt with military assistance, 
street support for the moderate/conservatives remains strong. Leftists have also been a 
historically active group in Egypt. Some try to revive the legacy of Nasser and Arab 
Socialism, while others, like the SLP, have taken a more Islamist turn over time. Liberals 
represent right-wing or center-right groups.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I examine in detail the different political 
opposition groups in Egypt. I have divided the groups into four broad categories based on 
their ideological roots: The Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood; Liberals, which 
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includes the longstanding al-Wafd party, the newer al-Ghad party and al-Ahrar; Leftists, 
including NPUP, SLP and Nasserites. Finally I discuss the emergence of the Kifaya 
movement, which does not fit into a category owing to its fluid nature as a social 
movement rather than a traditional political organization. I discuss the history and 
organization of each group, examining their recruitment efforts, their constituencies (or 
lack of constituencies), and agenda.  
I conclude that while several political opposition movements have emerged in 
Egypt over time, many do not have a core constituency. Past election results have 
revealed that most opposition parties receive support from urban Egypt, while the ruling 
NDP receives most of its votes from rural regions
56
. The Muslim Brotherhood has 
received support from students and professional associations. Other groups are still trying 
to establish themselves among the population by presenting a better alternative, 
especially to the MB. 
Islamist Groups : Egypt is often referred to as the birthplace of modern political Islam in 
the Arab world. It is here that Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 
with the goal to return to core Islamic beliefs as a solution to Egypt growing social and 
economic problems, exacerbated by the depression era. Overtime, Egypt has also seen the 
emergence of radical groups that seek the overthrow of the regime through violent means. 
Another manifestation of political Islam is its institutionalized form represented by al-
Azhar mosque and university
57
. Al-Azhar became an influential force in Egyptian politics 
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under Mubarak, who used its “soft power” to counter the discourse of the radical 
Islamists and legitimize this own power. The relationship between the regime and al-
Azhar is however not as smooth as some scholars purport, rather, with the growth of 
petro-dollar funding, particularly from Saudi Arabia, al-Azhar has relied less on the 
government for financial support and has often engaged the government in open 
confrontation on social and political issues. Al-Azhar can therefore also be though of as 
one of the forms of Islamist opposition in Egypt. The focus of this study is on mainstream 
Islamists as they have been most involved in seeking allies and coordinating strategies 
with other groups. I therefore focus my analysis here on the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, The 
Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
The Face of Moderate Islam in Egypt- The Muslim Brotherhood : The Muslim 
Brotherhood is currently one of the oldest organized moderate social movements in 
Egypt. The group has shared a tumultuous relationship with the regimes of Nasser, Sadat 
and Mubarak. As an organization, the groups has preferred moderate activities, but cadres 
of secret paramilitary units emerged from time to time, especially when the group was 
being directly targeted by the regime. The movement finds wide support among students, 
professional associations and trade unions, especially in urban centers. A network of 




Organizationally, the Muslim Brotherhood continues to follow the rules and by- 
laws put together by its founder. The movement is headed by a General Guide, who has 
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considerable influence on strategies and orientation. Two main offices work within the 
movement – Maktab al-Irshad al-Aam, or the Office of General Guidance, which is the 
executive body and the Shura Council, which serves as the legislative body. The 
movement remains highly centralized. A change in the General Guide can result in the 
transformation of the movement. For example, with the emergence of more moderate 
leaders such as Mamum Hodaybi (became the leader of the group in 2002) and 
Mohammed Akef (took over after Hodaybi’s death in 2004) following Sayyid Qutb’s 
execution in 1966, the Muslim Brotherhood has shown greater inclinations towards 
presenting itself as moderate and responsible opposition open to working with other 
groups (see also Wickham). Some scholars have noted the emergence of a younger cadre 
within the movement led by Isam al-Aryan and Abu-al-Futuh who have forwarded the 
Brotherhood’s calls for freedom, liberty and democracy since the late 1990s
59
.  
The Brotherhood’s confrontation with the regime began under Nasser’s reign. 
Nasser and the Free Officers came to power with the support of the Brotherhood in 1952, 
but soon he began to imprison thousands of members after the regime accused the group 
of trying to assassinate Nasser and Prime Minister al-Nuqarsh. The government declared 
the movement illegal in 1954. Yet, it continued its clandestine activities and imprisoned 
members a cohesive group. Sayyid Qutb, one of the most influential leaders of the 
movement at the time, was hanged in account of conspiracy against the government. 
During his prison sentence, Qutub because increasingly radical and removed form al-
Banna’s original vision for the MB. Qutub’s thinking became central to the emergence of 
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militant Islamist groups such as al-Jihad and Jamaa-al-Islamiya. The 1928 through 1952 
period makes the highest level of mobilization for the Muslim Brotherhood
60
.  
The Muslim Brotherhood gained new recognition under Sadat, who sought to use 
moderate Islamists as a buffer against the growing power of the leftists. Sadat released 
hundreds of Brotherhood members from prison, and asked that the movement support the 
regime in its endeavors. During the 1976 food riots, the Brotherhood showed restraint as 
the NPUP bore the brunt from the government. The seeds of mistrust between the 
Islamists and the leftists were sown as this time. During the 1980s political opening, A 
leftist newspaper referred to the Islamists as “the second danger,” the first being the 
regime
61
. The Leftists looked upon the Islamists as dangerous to socio-political and 
intellectual freedom. 
Under Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood has received waxing and waning  
access to governmental institutions and space to spread its message. Yet, the regime 
remains wary of any viable secular or religious opposition. MB members have therefore 
been targeted through arrests and intimidation, especially during election times. The 
Muslim Brotherhood can not receive recognition as a legal party because of its religious 
orientation. Therefore, MB contested the 1984 and 1987 elections in coalitions with other 
groups. In 1984, an alliance with al-Wafd party proved profitable to both in gaining a 
high number of parliamentary seats. In 1987 MB formed an alliance with Socialist Labor 
Party and al-Ahrar. Together, the alliance was known as “The Islamic Front.”  
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The elections held during the 1990s have been especially eventful for the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The group has continued to stress its commitment to working within the 
system while the regime has cracked down severely on its members, accusing them of 
anti-government activity. A new law governing the 1990 election stated that candidates 
from non-recognized parties contest elections as independents rather than in coalition 
with other parties. The Brotherhood saw this as a major onslaught by the government 
because running candidates as independents would weaken their visibility as a groups and 
affect party cohesiveness in the long run.  The Muslim Brotherhood, along with several 
other opposition parties decided to boycott the parliamentary election. The group did 
however contest the local elections in 1992, but the turnout was low and they did not 
succeed in gaining a high level of seats. 
 In July 1994 Mubarak invited legal parties to a conference in order to garner their 
support in the regime’s anti-terrorism campaign. The goal of the conference was also to 
prevent other groups from working with the Muslim Brotherhood
62
. 276 representatives 
from nine parties and trade unions, business community and intellectual circles attended 
the conference, but the public response was widely believed to be apathetic. The MB 
participated in the subsequent parliamentary elections held in 1995, 2000 and 2005. Each 
election has been preceded by a major government offensive again the Brethren. 
Throughout the decade, the Brotherhood continued to affirm that it is not engaged in anti-
regime activities. In an interview with the opposition newspaper al-Ahli, Supreme Guide 
Mustafa Mashour said that the group had asked the government to engage in a dialogue 
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on many occasions, but the government had refused. He also spoke about the 




In the midst of the government crackdown an internal rift surfaced within the 
Muslim Brotherhood. On January 12
th
 1996, al-Shaab reported that the Party Affairs 
Commission had received an application from some younger MB members to form their 
own political party under the name of al-Wasat. In addition to MB members, the 
application included 2 Copts and 4 women. al-Shaab article presented the formation of 
the group as an initiative to establish a Brotherhood political party separate from the main 
group as a means to create a transparent political arm, similar to the Islamic Action Front 
party’s relationship to the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. However in a later article in 
the same publication, Counselor Hudaybi denied that the Brotherhood had any links with 
al-Wasat. Al-Wasat member Abu al-Ula Madi also denied having links with the Muslim 
Brotherhood
64
. The emergence of this group came as a major shock to the Brotherhood. 
General Guide Hudaybi made it clear that the group had defied the rules of the 
organization, but that they could still remain associated with the Muslim Brotherhood as 
their chances of receiving recognition as a legal party were very slim
65
.  
Despite heavy repression and the succession of several members to form al-
Wasat, the Brotherhood launched an enthusiastic campaign for the 2000 elections. The 
regime countered the campaign with arrests, intimidation and harassment. To add to 
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MB’s difficulties, one of its closest allies, the Socialist Labor Party, became embroiled in 
an internal leadership dispute. The Parties’ Committee suspended the SLP and halted the 
publication of its newspaper al-Shaab until the party resolved its internal problems. 
Despite the difficulties, the MB made an impressive showing in the elections through its 
independent candidates and won seventeen of 282 seats in the parliament. Abu-al-Futuh 
declared that in the light of the election results, MB would once again seek legal 
recognition as a political party. He added that the resulting party would not be a European 
style religious party, but a civil one that stipulates that shariah is the main source of 
legislation in the country
66
. 
 The 2005 election was highly eventful for the Brotherhood. The group came out 
of its non-confrontational stance with the regime and openly protested many of the 
regime’s policies. The MB welcomed Mubarak’s initiative for presidential elections, but 
with the subsequent detention of many members a series of protests were held throughout 
the country. On March 28
th
, the MB asked for permission to organize a peaceful protest 
outside the Egyptian national assembly. The permission was refused and the protesters 
were denied access to the People’s Assembly. The protesters then gathered at Ramses 
Square and Zaynab Square, as pro-reform slogans began others joined in and the 
protestors soon grew to thousands
67
. The regime responded by arresting 48 members and 
detaining them. The arrests led to outrage in the MB, and soon several other protests were 
organized outside key locations, such as the Press Syndicate Office in Cairo
68
.  
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 The high turnout at Muslim Brotherhood protests shows that the group has 
considerable grassroots support. Overtime, the MB has expanded its influence to 
professional associations and trade unions as well as at universities. In 1991, MB 
members participated in a conference at Zagazig University where they spoke against the 
emergency law and restrictions on civil liberties. Subsequently, the MB members 
competed successfully in the student association elections at Zagazig in 1993. The 
University faculty club also became dominated by Brotherhood members. In addition to 
Zagazig, the MB commands a strong constituency among students and faculty members 
at Cairo Univeristy and Asyut University
69
. MB is often in fierce competition with 
Leftists who are also actively recruiting constituents among university students.  
 Since the mid 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood has also increased its influence in 
trade unions. The lack of open competition for People’s Assembly seats has led the group 
to seek representation in trade unions as an alternative political arena. As Tal explains: 
 
Because of the ban against the Brotherhood’s movement as an independent party, the 
trade unions served the Muslim Brotherhood as an alternative arena for political activity 
once banned from the People’s Assembly. Thus, the regime’s attempts to neutralize 
Muslim Brotherhood opposition inadvertently pushed the Brotherhood towards trade 




The MB gained control over several trade unions, for example, Engineer’s Union in 
1987, Doctors Union in 1988 and the Lawyer’s Union in 1992. Boycotting the 1990 
elections proved to be useful in focusing the group’s energies on trade union elections. 
The increase in the Brotherhood’s influence in trade unions alarmed the regime and in 
1993, the Mubarak government passed Law Number 100. The purpose of the new law 
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was to regulate trade union elections by stipulating that for an election to be valid, at least 
50% of the members must vote. Further, the court would monitor the conduct of the 
elections. Many trade union members were severely critical of Law Number 100. In the 
1993 elections, the Brotherhood once again gained control over several unions despite the 
newly imposed restrictions.  
 In addition to socio-economic groups such as students and professionals, the 
Muslim Brotherhood has expanded its influence among the urban middle class through a 
network of Islamic clinics and other welfare activities. Often more efficient that 
government clinics, these institutions serve as a constant reminder of the failure of 
Egyptian regime in providing for the basic needs of the polity
71
. Despite state repression, 
both through its security apparatus and laws restricting the political space, the Muslim 
Brotherhood has been successful in achieving representation in several sectors in the 
society. Not only is it the largest represented opposition in the parliament, it also 
commands constituents among students and in professional associations. The group’s 
social welfare and charity activities have also allowed them to spread their message 
among the urban middle class. The Muslim Brotherhood is considered the most well 
entrenched political opposition group in Egypt.  
 
 
Liberals: Liberal parties in Egypt are mostly secular groups that seek democratic reforms 
in the country. The major groups include al-Wafd, al-Ghad and al-Ahrah. Al-Wafd has 
historically been strongly supported among the upper classes while al-Ghad and al-Ahrar 
have very limited support.  
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The New Wafd: Al-Wafd al-Jadid or The New Wafd Party is one of the most historically 
significant liberal parties in the country. Al-Wafd was formed in 1919 to serve as a 
mobilization platform against imperialist rule. The party continues to be politically active 
and currently represents the liberal right. Fahmy explains,“Of all the parties that evolved 
under Sadat, the New Wafd was perhaps the only one that had a chance to build strong 
roots with the public”
72
. The party was abolished under Nasser in 1954, but reemerged as 
a legal party during Sadat’s rule under the new parties law passed in 1978. In order to 
become legal, al-Wafd had to seek approval from 20 members in the parliament. Through 
patience and perseverance, al-Wafd members were able to meet this goal. Many members 
of the liberal party al-Ahrar left and joined al-Wafd at this point. Al-Wafd members saw 
al-Ahrar as a political rival for the loyalties of the middle and upper class
73
. Al-Wafd 
leadership attacked al-Ahrar as an artificial creation headed by Army officers and 
undeserving of liberal support.  
Al-Wafd targeted the Sadat regime and his regime created “loyal opposition.” The 
party pressured Sadat to make al-Azhar a separate and independent institution and to 
modernize Islamic law. The strength of al-Wafd and the fan following of its leader Fouad 
Siraj al-Din earned it the wrath of the regime.  In 1978, Sadat cracked down on the Wafd 
by passing a law that did not allow politically active citizens before 1952 to lead parties. 
This new law directly targeted al-Wafd’s leader Siraj al-Din. Faced with the difficult 
choice of purging its leadership or dissolving the group, the party disbanded, although 
some of its members continued their political activism as independents.  
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The party remerged in the 1984 elections under Mubarak. They contested the 1984 
election in alliance with MB, despite the different ideological stances of both groups. The 
alliance was a unilateral decision made by Fouad Siraj al-Din and MB leader Omar 
Telmesany. No other party members were consulted
74
. Al-Wafd confronted the divisive 
issue of the proper relation between Islam and the state and more specifically how and 
with what thoroughness shariah should be adopted. For al-Wafd however, the Islamic 
challenge has been comparatively easy to confront because of the party’s long association 
with secularism
75
. The electoral alliance with the MB allowed al-Wafd to endorse the call 
for the application of shariah and then do as little as possible to pressure the government 
to that end. This approach led to the breakdown of the alliance and in 1986, even though 
together the two parties acquired 57 seats in the parliament. Al-Wafd began to search for 
a new electoral partner. In the 1987 elections, al-Wafd tried to access the Coptic vote and 
deemphasized the need for application of the Shariah. However, al-Wafd’s representation 
went down to 35 seats.  
By 1986 many internal divisions had emerged in the Wafd party. The structural and 
ideological conflict within the party continues to be a major challenge. In the 1995 
elections, al-Wafd gained only 6 seats but retained its position as an opposition party. In 
2005 al-Wafd once again showed some proclivity to work with the Brotherhood, 
especially towards joining the Brotherhood led group, “National Alliance for Restoration 
and Change.” The election results, however did not prove favorable as al-Wafd only won 
7 seats. The decline in the number of seats is attributed to the death of Siraj al-Din. The 
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new leader, Nouman Jummah proved inexperienced in planning strategically for the 
election. Fahmy argues, “The extent to which the party will manage in the future to pull 
itself together under the leadership of Go’ma depends on the extent to which the latter 
will either concentrate on party issues or alternatively will become entangled in personal 
disputes with other party members”
76
.  
Al-Wafd, along with leftist parties Tagammu and Arab Nasserrites, decided to 
boycott the 2005 presidential elections. However, the party later decided that it was in its 
best interest to participate. Nouman Jummah stood for elections along with Ayman Nour 
from al-Ghad and Talat Sadat (nephew of Anwar Sadat) from al-Ahrar and Hosni 
Mubarak from the NDP. Al-Wafd ran a highly controversial election campaign. Its 
campaign slogan roughly translated from Arabic as “We have been suffocated.
77
” The 
party’s use of the slogan points to the extent to which Egyptian are ready for change. At a 
campaign rally at Port Said, as Jummah spoke, the crowd chanted: ''We have been 
strangled. We have been stolen. We have been embezzled. It is not fair! Enough. Enough. 
Enough. We want a free government. Life is bitter”
78
.  
   In the parliamentary elections, al-Wafd could only secure 14 seats, showing the 
inability of the party to use its historical roots and legacy to command electoral strength. 
Jummah stood third in the presidential race after Mubarak and al-Ghad leader Ayman 
Nour. Compared to other parties and opposition groups, Wafd has a somewhat well 
defined class constituency. Al- Wafd is led by landed professional and commercial elite, 
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especially those associated with the private sector. Membership consists of intellegencia 
that support right wing ideology, especially people with property and special skills such 
as law
79
. Copts are also given representation in proportion to their numbers in the 
population. Further, al-Wafd is one of the only opposition parties in Egypt to receive 
some support in rural areas. Al-Wafd relies on patron-client relations among local 
families in the countryside. Since al-Wafd’s class appeal is confined to the upper 
echelons and among some Coptic communities, its mass support, especially in urban 
areas, is limited. al-Wafd has never been successful in expanding its middle class base. 
Wafd’s lack of support among the masses may have been instrumental in the formation of 
the 1984 electoral alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. In its recruitment, al-Wafd is in 




Hizb al-Ahrar (Liberal Party): Liberal Party was one of Sadat’s creations as a party of the 
liberalization reforms in 1976. Sadat originally envisioned al-Ahrar as a loyal opposition. 
Al-Ahrah tried to combine ideologies of capitalism and God but did not gain much 
electoral success, probably because of the odd combination of ideologies. With the 
formation of the New Wafd in 1978, 12 Ahrar deputies defected to the new party. One 
author speculates that Sadat legalized al-Wafd to create competition between the two 
liberal parties and prevent either of them from becoming a strong presence
81
.  
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Under Mubarak, the Ahrah became more religious in its orientation and started an 
anti-Christian newspaper called al-Nur. It formed an alliance with the MB and SLP in the 
1987 elections. The alliance had strong Islamist leanings. Al-Ahrar has had modest 
showings in elections – winning one seat in the 1995 elections and again in the 2000 
elections. Neither al-Ahrar nor al-Wafd have succeeded in gaining a strong foothold in 
Egyptian electoral politics. Al-Ahrar leader Talat Sadat contested the presidential 
elections, but did not have a good showing. The party did not win a single seat in the 
parliamentary elections. As Springboard argues, “By the spring of 1987 it was apparent 
that none of the secular opposition parties was attracting significant numbers of new 
votes or members. Indeed they were struggling to hold on to those they had”
82
. 
Al–Ghad (Tomorrow Party): Al-Ghad is one of the newest parties to be licensed in 
Egypt. The Committee for Party Affairs approved al-Ghad’s papers in October 2005. The 
party describes itself as “liberal, democratic and aiming to represent the youth
83
.” Some 
prominent leaders such as the scholar Mona Markam Ebeid have joined the party as its 
founding members. The party does not yet command a base constituency or support, yet 
its leader Ayman Nour, an independent member of parliament for over 10 years has been 
embroiled in a controversy that has reached international levels. On January 29
th
 2005, 
Ayman Nour was arrested on the charge of forging signatures needed for party approval. 
According to the charges, at least 14 of the 2000 signatures had been forged. The party 
newspaper was also suspended.  
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 Nour’s arrest sparked severe criticism from human rights organizations and 
opposition newspapers. The London based newspaper, al-Quds al-Arabi released a 
scathing criticism of the arrest arguing that these developments are a major set back to 
democracy in Egypt. The newspaper alleged that Nour had been arrested because he was 
opposing Jamal Mubarak succeeding Hosni Mubarak
84
. Reporters Sans Frontiers also 
became actively involved with this issue. Nour’s arrest turned him into a martyr of sorts. 
A Whitehouse spokesperson released a statement disapproving of the arrest and US 
Secretary of State Condolezza Rice visited with Nour during her trip to Egypt in June 
2005.  
 Nour went on a hunger strike in prison to protest the lack of democracy in Egypt. 
His wife became his main advocate and spokesperson for al-Ghad. The party was finally 
allowed to publish its first newspaper issue in March 2005. After an international uproar 
on the issue, Ayman Nour was released from prison on bail in March. He decided to put 
in his papers for presidential candidacy. Several other prominent groups such as SLP, 
Tagammu, and al-Wafd had decided to boycott the elections, but after Nour announced 
his intention to run, al-Wafd leader Nouman Jummah decided to participate as well.  
 The results of the 2005 presidential and parliamentary election did not bode well 
for al-Ghad. Nour won a distant second in the presidential election and lost his seat in the 
parliament to an NDP candidate. After the elections, Nour was arrested once again and 
given a 5-year prison sentence. Through these measures, the Mubarak regime effectively 
neutralized al-Ghad even before it could establish itself as a political group and develop a 
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core constituency. Even the enormous international publicity surrounding Nour’s arrest 
did not give the party the support it needed. 
 
Leftists: Leftist parties have a historical roots in Egypt dating back to the socialist era 
under Nasser, but many did not become formal institutions until Sadat’s reign. The two 
oldest parties are the NPUP, or Tagammu, and the Socialist Labor Party (SLP).  
 
NPUP/ Tagammu and Arab Democratic Nasserite Party: NPUP/ Tagammu was created 
by Sadat in 1976 to represent the left. The party was formed by grouping together wide 
factions such as Arab Nationalists, Nasserites, Social Democrats and liberals. From the 
outset, internal factionalism has always been a hindering factor for NPUP. In 1976, Egypt 
was engulfed in widespread food riots. NPUP took the brunt of the blame for inciting and 
organizing the riots. Sadat dismissed the party and its publications and labeled its 
members “communists” and “atheists.” Other opposition parties, most prominently the 
Muslim Brotherhood supported the regime and therefore earned the wrath and mistrust of 
NPUP that continues till date. 
Under Mubarak, NPUP was reinstated. In 1990 all political parties with the 
exception of NPUP decided to boycott the elections. The NPUP became the only party to 
participate and won 6 seats. The party has been able to keep its representation between 5 
and 6 seats in subsequent elections. In 1992, Mubarak legalized the Arab Democratic 
Nasserite Party. The formation of the new party came as a severe blow to NPUP as they 
feared losing their members as well as their constituents. NPUP and the Nasserite party 
compete for constituencies in the same socio-economic group and therefore have many 
similarities in their party program and vision. Both NPUP and the Nasserites receive 
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some support from students and the lower middle class including artisans, peasants and 
laborers. NPUP has received high levels of support from the industrial districts in Cario 
in the past. However, NPUP faces a key organizational dilemma with regard to its 
support base. In order to adequately represent the interests of the lower echelons of 
society, NPUP must take a much more populist and radical leftist stance than it is 
currently willing to undertake. In order to retain its support base, NPUP must find the 
means to reconcile its ideology with a social base that it wide enough to for it to survive 
as a viable political party. As Mona el-Mikaway explains: 
Having a social base tied to the lower echelons of the manufacturing and service sectors, 
the Tagammu had to stand against privatization and rationalization of the public sector 
and the state bureaucracy to respond to the fears and demands of such as social base. 




Socialist Labor Party: Sadat legalized the Socialist Labor Party after the food riots  in 
1977 as a replacement for NPUP. Springborg argues that SLP is more cohesive than 
NPUP because it has been reconstituted from a single ancient regime political 
organization – Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt) formed in 1930s as a neo fascist 
movement
86
. Even though Sadat envisioned SLP to be a loyal opposition party to prevent 
the havoc created by NPUP, his hopes were soon bellied. Far from serving as a loyal 
opposition, SLP critiqued Sadat on many fronts, including – normalization of relations 
with Israel, economic liberalization, corruption and abuse of power. The party 
publication, al-Shaab became one of the most popular opposition newspapers in Egypt 
and abroad. 
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SLP soon started taking an ultra nationalist and religious turn in its ideology. In 1987, 
the party formed an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. SLP invited al-Tagammu to 
the negotiations to form the alliance, but the party decided not to attend.  The alliance 
gave the Muslim Brotherhood the legal channel it needed to contest elections and SLP 
gained the mass support it lacked. The alliance won a total of 60 seats, including 30 for 
MB, 27 for Labor and 3 for Liberals. Other than the number of seats won, the alliance 
managed to raise the visibility of the opposition in the parliament. 
Even though the alliance was profitable to all the parties, the growing influence of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in the SLP and its Islamist orientation led to a split in the SLP 
between its Islamist wing and those that disagreed with the new turn in ideology. SLP has 
remained a close ally of the Muslim Brotherhood since. In 2000, the SLP became 
embroiled in an internal leadership dispute and the Mubarak regime dismissed the party 
and shut down its paper. In December 2004, SLP won an appeal in court to republish al-
Shaab.  
 
The Emergence of Kifaya: Kifaya is one of the newest political movements in Egypt. Its 
unique nature as a movement and not a political organization or party warrants separate 
discussion. Its dynamism, vision and goals have given the group much international 
attention. The group was originally formed in response to the Palestinian uprising and 
picked up momentum during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq as an anti-war mobilization 
effort. Since then, the group has evolved its activities into pro-reform and anti-Mubarak 
activism in Egypt.  
102 
 
 The group is an amalgam of members with several different political ideologies – 
communists, Islamists as well as liberals and Copts. The group does not have a formal 
organization structure or a designated leader. The members hold meetings in each other’s 
houses, as the group does not have a central office. The only semblance of a formal 
structure representing the movement is its website. The absence of SMO style 
functioning enables the movement to work within the Egyptian power structure, 
especially avoiding being crushed by the security forces. One of my interviewees, Calude 
Salhani related an incident that occurred while he was at Kifaya spokesperson George 
Issac’s house in Cairo: 
The phone rang, and it was a police person asking George Issac to cancel the 
demonstration to be held the next day. George Issac tried to explain to the police person 
that he did not have the authority to do that because he is not the leader of the movement. 
The police person could not understand this, he kept insisting that Issac cancel the 
demonstration. Issac kept insisting that he can’t even if he wanted to. The extent of the 




Kifaya has organized several protests in Cairo asking Mubarak to step down and severely 
criticizing plans to let Jamal Mubarak take over as President. The regime has reacted to 
these protests by arresting demonstrators, preventing them for reaching protest cites, and 
targeting individual members of Kifaya. The group does not have a vision beyond the end 
of Mubarak’s regime. Their purpose, as expressed by spokesperson George Issac is to 
“break the culture of fear around political activity in Egypt”
88
. 
Kifaya members have shown a wiliness to work with other groups, even the 
Muslim Brotherhood, provided the Brotherhood behaves like a political and not a 
religious organization. Kifaya has stressed that they have been born out of the weakness 
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of the opposition parties in Egypt, but do not aim to replace them. In fact Kifaya has no 
plans for seeking legal recognition. Other parties, while welcoming Kifaya, have also 
expressed some weariness about competing with the new group.  Tagammu Secretary 
General Abdul Razaq was quoted in Gulf News, “We welcome this group as an addition 
to out endeavors for change in Egypt.” He continued, “But it should be wary of falling 
into the trap of seeking itself as an alternative to others.
89
” 
  Kifaya’s members are mostly intellectuals, leftists and liberals. However, given 
that Kifaya is still very new on the political scene, it has not formed a constituency base. 
Even though spokespersons for the movement claim members in thousands, according to 
one scholar, Kifaya’s grassroots support is limited as best as judged by the few hundred 
people that have participated in their protests
90
. 
After the 2005 anti-Mubarak/pro-democracy campaign died down, Kifaya has 
tried to reinvent its agenda towards foreign policy issues. The group has become 
increasingly anti-US and anti-Israel in its message. In 2006, Kifaya launched a million-
signature campaign to pressure the regime into withdrawing from the Camp David accord 
with Israel. Their new populist rhetoric received mixed response from many of their 
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OK. Well, setting aside my deep respect for Kifaya and my belief in their sincerity aside, 
I was not surprised at this move. The group is mainly composed of Leftists and a 
significant number of Nasserites, those who still believe in Nasser’s ideology (how a 
supporter of a ruthless dictator such as Nasser be in a democracy advocacy group, I have 
no idea). Anyway, so the Nasserites in Kifaya want us to abandon Sadat’s “shameful 
peace” and once again adopt Nasser’s way, because you know ladies and gentlemen , 





Summary of the Party System in Egypt: 
 
 In the above sections, I have provided a detailed analysis of the party system in 
Egypt. I have shown that most parties do not have well defined constituencies. Many are 
struggling to keep their members while others are trying to spread awareness about their 
existence. The following observations emerge: 
 
 ONLY MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND AL-WAFD PARTIES HAVE A 
DIVIDED CONSTITUENCIES IN RELATION TO EACH OTHER: The Muslim 
Brotherhood receives support from students and trade unions in urban areas. Al-
Wafd has a smaller base among the wealthy sections of the population, especially 
in the lawyer’s professional association. 
 
 NEWER PARTIES AND GROUPS DO NOT YET HAVE A STRONG BASIS 
FOR SUPPORT: al-Ghad party and Kifaya group have been formed recently. 
Their formation has been guided by an idea rather than an already existing 
constituency. Although these parties have received high levels of publicity owing 
to controversies surrounding their leaders and activities, they have yet to establish 
a grass roots base. 
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 LEFTIST PARTIES ARE HIGHLY FRAGMENTED AND HAVE BEEN 
UNABLE TO ESTABLISH THEIR CONSTITUENCY BASE: Leftist parties are 
divided among al-Tagammu, SLP and the Nasserist party. All three parties have 










Chapter III: Elite Alliances 
 
 Opposition activity is often conceptualized and measured as rebellion, protest, 
violent rioting and civil disobedience in the contentious politics literature
1
. While 
explaining these forms of claim making is certainly very relevant to both academia and 
policy making, opposition activity can also take more subtle forms such as publishing an 
article critical of the regime, symbolic office closings, releasing open letters and 
petitions. These do not involve street politics, but are important forms of claim making as 
they provide different avenues for conflict and cooperation among actors. 
In this chapter, I examine the formation of elite alliances. These are formed 
among leaders of various political groups to engage in opposition activity through non-
mobilization means. The elites form an alliance without engaging their constituencies in 
protest or other forms of collective action, instead they may work together through joint 
petitioning or office closing. Elite alliances may be of two kinds: issue-based or value-
based. Issue-based elite alliances focus on a particular policy concern, for example the 
imposition of quotas on textile mills whereas value-based elite alliances focus on more 
general concerns such as women’s rights, free market economy and freedom. While 
issue-based concerns often stem from larger values, groups can often form an alliance on 
a specific issue of mutual concern even when they don’t agree on the larger more 
contentious and sensitive value.  
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 I argue that both groups with fluid and divided constituencies may form elite 
alliances. Groups with fluid constituencies form issue-based elite alliances as these have 
a clear non-mobilization agenda. Engaging in mobilization requires groups to pool their 
constituents at a particular place and time. This exposes each actor’s constituency to 
poaching as other groups may use the event to make themselves visible as a better 
alternative and gain supporters. While some groups are in a better position to engage in 
such “member poaching” as compared to others, fluid constituencies make each group 
wary of the possibility of losing supporters.  
Groups with fluid constituencies can form elite alliances as these do not require 
engaging constituencies. Yet, elite alliances can easily lead to mobilization in the future, 
especially when dealing with socially and politically sensitive concerns such as freedom, 
democracy and free market economy. Constituents can start putting pressure on the group 
to mobilize or start mobilizing spontaneously exposing them to poaching by other groups. 
For this reason, groups with fluid constituencies form issue-based rather than value-based 
elite alliances, as these are focused on a specific concern and are unlikely to lead to 
mobilization in the future. The focused and technical nature of the issue makes it less 
likely to catch the attention of constituents. Value-based elite alliances do not offer 
groups such assurances and are therefore unlikely to emerge.  
Groups with divided constituencies may form both issue-based and value-based 
elite alliances. Since constituencies are well defined, losing popular support to other 
groups is not of prime concern. Even though groups with divided constituencies are able 
to form mobilization alliances, often elite alliances are more suitable because of high 
levels of regime repression, material constraints or the technical nature of the concern at 
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hand. Both value and issue-based elite alliances may  form as groups are not as concerned 
about engaging in joint mobilization in the future.   
I begin this chapter by briefly explaining how different literatures in political 
science have observed the formation of elite alliances but not explained how and why 
they emerge. I then explain my argument in greater detail followed by two case studies. 
The first case study analyses the 1995 anti-press law opposition activism in Egypt. I 
examine how several groups with fluid constituencies worked together through issue-
based elite alliances although given the social and political circumstances at the time and 
the ideological and other divisions among the groups, an alliance seemed unlikely. I also 
show how the same groups were unable to form value-based alliances to oppose the 
regime after the results of the 1995 parliamentary elections were announced.  The second 
case study examines how two groups with divided constituencies formed both issue-
based and value-based alliances to express opposition to the construction of the Kalabagh 
dam in Pakistan. This issue-based elite alliance soon expanded  to  include more partners 
leading to the emergence of a widespread anti-regime campaign that culminated in the 
October 1999 coup led by General Pervez Musharraf. I explain regime repression, 
stability or selective inclusion of certain moderate groups do not adequately explain the 
formation of alliances in these cases and demonstrate how the alliance outcomes fit my 
model.  
While I found several cases of elite alliances in my research, I focused on these 
campaigns because they clearly demonstrate the effect of divided and fluid 
constituencies. Both instances of opposition activity and alliance making have received 
very little attention in the scholarly literature on social movements, with most scholars 
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choosing to focus on large protest events instead. These alliances provide important 
insights into why alliances form under certain circumstances, but not under others.  
  The Egypt case study demonstrates how groups operating under fluid 
constituencies can in fact form alliances under specific circumstances. While Egyptian 
opposition groups are notorious for their dividedness and bickering, they were able to 
successfully form an alliance to convince the Mubarak regime to repeal the 1995 Press 
Law. This incident of opposition alliance making has received very little or no attention 
in the scholarly literature. 
The firm entrenchment of the Mubarak regime at the time, combined with 
widespread use of repression and inclusion of select moderate groups through state 
controlled elections made the emergence of an opposition alliance seemingly unlikely, 
but as I propose, the issue-based nature of the elite alliance allowed the groups to work 
together. Each group participated in the alliance without mobilizing its constituents. In 
this way, the groups were able to protect their constituencies but yet also address a 
concern that affected them all. The same groups could not form an alliance when the 
nature of the concern expanded to an anti-elections campaign. Groups brought up their 
differences and expressed concerns about others’ dominance among constituents. 
 The Kalabagh dam project case in Pakistan shows that groups with divided 
constituencies can work together through elite alliances. The technical nature of the 
concern and, as I will show, PPPs unique position at the time prevented the emergence of 
a mobilization alliance but the groups were able to form an issue-based elite alliance. 
Unlike the case of Egypt, the anti-Kalabagh alliance soon expanded to include more 
members and became an anti-regime mobilization effort. I propose that the prevalence of 
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divided constituencies encouraged the formation of a mobilization alliance as each group 
knew that the only way to effectively challenge the Sharif government was to pool their 
constituents.  
 
Elite Alliances in the Literature: 
Elite alliances have emerged as a major explanatory variable in several literatures 
– the political parties literature, transitions to democracy and social movements. While 
each body of literature is vast, in this section I discuss specific arguments that are 
relevant to this research. These arguments have made a significant contribution within 
their field, but as I argue the current research leaves gaps in our understanding of why 
elite alliances emerge in some circumstances but not in others.  
The agency based approach in the transitions to democracy literature has stressed 
the role of elite based “pacts” as central to the transition process. Various groups 
involved in the political process bargain and decide the rules of the game. They mutually 
agree not to harm each other’s interests and to cooperate with each other. The result is an 
explicit agreement known as a “pact
2
.” Pacts reduce uncertainty as they allow elites to 
negotiate and come to a mutually accepted agreement. Over time these pacts become 
institutionalized as the rules of the game come to be further defined
3
. Pacts include many 
different kinds of actors – elites in the government, the military and the opposition. 
Guerllimo O’Donnell and Philleppe Schmitter argue that two groups emerge within the 
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government – hardliners, who do not wish to reform the regime and softliners, who are 
more open to changes within the ruling structure. The opposition is divided into radicals, 
who do not want to cooperate with the regime and moderates, who are open to working 
within existing institutional structures for initiating reform
4
. Pacts emerge between 
softliners in the regime and moderates in the opposition and then can be extended to 
hardliners in the form of guarantees.  
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s approach has been severely critiqued for being overly 
simplistic and teleological without keeping in mind the complexities that define everyday 
politics in several transition countries
5
. The model fails to be useful when trying to 
understand how a “moderate opposition” emerges to negotiate with the regime.  
Schwedler has argued that the typology of moderates and radicals in the opposition is not 
useful because there are many different kinds of groups that are lumped together as 
“moderates.” In reality, these groups are very different in nature. Further, the same group 
may be moderate on some issues and radical on others.  Simply labeling some groups as 
“moderates” does not provide much analytical leverage
6
. The moderate opposition in 
most countries consists of several squabbling groups, many of whom may never work 
together. How do the opposition groups come to cooperate with each other such that they 
are able to present a united front to the regime? 
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From a social movements perspective, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikknik argue 
that the “boomerang pattern” is central to the success of social movements. They define 
the boomerang pattern as situations where social movement leaders gain additional 
support from activist elites in other countries. The newly formed alliance then pressures 
the government for change
7
. Such alliances emerged in several instances of activism 
around the world. But how are these alliances formed? How are elites able to put aside 
their differences and engage each other such that an alliance emerges?  
Game theoretical perspectives have conceptualized the problem of cooperation 
among elites as a prisoner’s dilemma. The classic prisoner’s dilemma postulates at the 
problem of cooperation is one of collective action. Incentives to participate in an alliance 
are few as the outcome is shared by all regardless of individual cooperation. Therefore 
incentives to defect are high. However, cooperation is possible under prisoner’s dilemma 
under certain circumstances. Robert Axelrod argues that cooperation is likely when the 
players may continue to interact with each other in the future. The “shadow of the future” 
then motivates elites not to defect from the alliance
8
. Borrowing from this literature, 
Angrist has argued that political parties emerge when elites interact with each other in an 
institutional setting
9
. In this study, “shadow of the future” arguments do not provide 
much leverage in explaining elite alliances as the chances of long-term interaction are 
always present among politically involved elites, yet they are able to cooperate under 
some circumstances but not under others. How can we explain this difference? I now turn 
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to a more detailed conceptualization of my theoretical argument explaining the formation 
of elite alliances. 
Formation of Issue-Based and Value-Based Elite Alliances: 
 I have argued that the nature of elite alliances is substantively different from 
mobilization alliances. Groups with fluid constituencies are unable to form mobilization 
alliances, but may work together through elite alliances. When constituencies are fluid 
mobilization alliances expose supporters to poaching by other groups. The mobilization 
event provides other groups with easy access to each others constituency at a particular 
venue and time. The mobilization event can therefore be conveniently used to poach 
constituents as groups can make themselves and their message visible to others’ 
constituents and present themselves as a better alternative. 
Since groups with fluid constituencies have no consistent basis for support, 
mobilizing alone provides a better opportunity to expand and solidify a support base. 
Elite alliances do not require groups to engage their constituencies since groups cooperate 
through their leaders. In this way, groups are able to address a mutual concern without 
exposing their constituents to poaching by other actors.  
 However elite alliances may lead to mobilization in the future, especially if the 
nature of the concern being addressed is socially and politically sensitive. Groups may 
come under pressure from their constituents to mobilize or members may start organizing 
spontaneous protests. These events will expose constituents to poaching by other groups, 
defeating the purpose of forming an elite alliance. For this reason, groups with fluid 
constituencies may form issue-based elite alliances. These are focused on a specific 
concern and are unlikely to lead to mobilization in the future because of their technical 
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and focused nature. Value-based issues are likely to be more volatile and prone to future 
mobilization.  
Groups with divided constituencies may also engage in elite alliances, even 
though they are able to form mobilization alliances. Elite alliances may be beneficial for 
such groups under certain circumstances. Elite based activism is less likely to be 
repressed by the regime. Also, mobilization may not be possible because of resource 
constraints or the concern may be too technical to achieve a significant turnout at protests 
and rallies. Groups with divided constituencies may form issue-based or value-based elite 
alliances as they are unconcerned about engaging in mobilization in the future. Since 
their constituencies are divided, supporters are unlikely to defect and offer their loyalties 
to other groups. To sum up, I present the argument is in the following table: 
 
Table II: Formation of Elite Alliances 
 
Constituency Elite Alliances 
Fluid Yes: Issue-based 




I now go on to present the case studies. I examine cases of successful and 
unsuccessful elite alliance making in Egypt and Pakistan that illustrate that the alliance 
outcomes were consistent with my model. Since many of these events were not well 
reported in the scholarly literature, I relied mostly on interviews and data collected 
through party websites and news publications to reconstruct the story. I show how in the 
case of Egypt, a successful issue-based elite alliance formed  but the same groups were 
unable to form value-based or mobilization alliances. In the case of Pakistan, I examine 
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how groups with divided constituencies formed both value and issue-based elite alliances 
which soon expanded into an anti-regime mobilization campaign.  
 
1995 Anti Press Law Activism in Egypt: 
 Egyptian opposition politics is well known for its ideological divisions, personal 
rivalries and vast differences in strategies among groups. Yet the history of opposition 
activism reveals that the groups can form alliances under certain circumstances. In this 
section, I discuss the formation of the 1995 anti-Press Law activism alliance among 
groups, despite their various ideological leanings and the Mubarak regime’s repressive 
policies. The alliance succeeded in convincing the Mubarak regime to repeal the law, 
despite the government being highly wary of the growing strength of the opposition, 
especially trade unions, leftists and Islamists. The alliance survived under a volatile 
election year political environment, with the Mubarak regime imposing several 
restrictions on freedom and widely repressing voices of dissent, Further, this was the first 
election with meaningful opposition participation since 1985. For over five years most 
legal opposition parties and other mainstream groups such as The Muslim Brotherhood 
had no formal avenues for participation in the government. The Mubarak regime was 
firmly entrenched.  
These circumstances would hardly be considered propitious for the emergence of 
an opposition alliance. Yet, as I demonstrate, contrary to the predictions of other models, 
a successful issue-based elite alliance emerged. The groups were able to address a mutual 
concern while also protecting their constituencies. Since the groups did not mobilize their 
constituencies, my conjecture is that they were unconcerned about losing support to other 
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groups. However, the same groups were unable to cooperate with each other to oppose 
the results of the 1995 election. The nature of the concern was value-based as it attacked 
the very ethos of a regime that holds elections without intending to broker a change of 
power. The data suggests that the possibility of forming an alliance with groups with 
fluid constituencies raised fears of member poaching. Concerns about protecting their 
constituencies prevented the groups from forming alliances with each other.  
 In 1995 the Mubarak government announced parliamentary elections to be held in 
November. All opposition parties with the exception of al-Tagammu had boycotted the 
1990 parliamentary elections because of the Mubarak regime’s refusal to allow judiciary 
oversight. Therefore between 1990 through 1995, only al-Tagammu party had some 
voice in the parliament while other groups remained outside the official channels. Some 
groups, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood had used this time period to expand their 
support base in an alternative field of political contestation –  professional associations, 
such as the doctor’s syndicate. Yet, for most groups the 1995 elections were crucial in 
gaining back lost ground in the parliament. 
The Muslim Brotherhood declared that it would contest the elections through 
independents and would be looking to form new alliances with other groups. al-Wafd, 
SLP and several smaller parties also made public announcements declaring their 
intentions to participate in the elections to be held later in the year. In addition to 
parliamentary elections, professional syndicate elections were also scheduled for the 
same year. Since 1990 the Muslim Brotherhood had greatly increased its power and 
influence over professional associations making the group a formidable presence for the 
regime. The Mubarak regime was also suffering from “Algeria complex” jitters, 
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especially with regard to the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters. In the 1991 
elections in Algeria, the Islamist party gained tremendous ground and was reportedly on 
the verge of victory when the army launched a coup. Both the opposition and the regime 
were poised for an eventful year to come. 
 Wary of the opposition’s increasing strength, both in professional associations 
and on the street, the Mubarak regime launched an offensive against the three largest 
groups – the Muslim Brotherhood, SLP and al-Wafd. In January security officials 
arrested the National Chairman of the SLP, Adel Hussain for having ties to Islamist 
extremist groups. Husssain’s arrest sparked a public outrage. Ibrahim Nafei, editor of the 
semi-official al-Ahram sent a letter to the public prosecutor’s office protesting the 
arrest
10
. Many party members reported that the arrest was actually aimed at weakening 
the close alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the SLP. Yet, SLP President 
Ibrahim Shukri declared that the regime’s coercion tactics would not break the 
cooperative understanding between the SLP and the Brotherhood
11
.  The regime was 
making it amply clear that they would punish any groups that cooperated with the 
Muslim Brotherhood, making it even more unlikely that alliances would emerge.  
The Muslim Brotherhood also reported arrests of its members after their homes 
and offices were raided by security officials. On January 23
rd
 1995, the Deputy Secretary 
General of the Doctor’s syndicate and a prominent Brotherhood leader Essam el-Aryan 
was arrested along with several other prominent professionals. Even al-Wafd was not 
spared in the government’s campaign against the opposition. In August, al-Wafd’s 
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newspaper editor-in-chief al-Badawai was beaten and arrested leading to outcry from the 
journalists’ community.  
The arrest of prominent personalities ensured high levels of news coverage both 
in domestic and international sources and sent a clear signal to the opposition that the 
regime would do everything possible to maintain its hold on power. The Mubarak 
government justified its offensive as necessary in the face of rising Islamic extremism. 
Frequent police clashes among security officials and Jamaa-al-Islamiyya, especially in 
upper Egypt were making headlines in domestic newspapers. Within the month of 
January, the death toll resulting from the clashes rose to 80
12
. Jamaa and al-Jihad also 
targeted tourists and in November claimed responsibility for attacking the Pakistani 
embassy in Cairo. The growing influence of these movements in Egyptian politics led the 
Muslim Brotherhood to release an open letter to Mubarak restating that the group had 
renounced violence and was most willing to work under accepted institutional channels
13
. 
The Mubarak regime’s policy of excluding and repressing radical Islamists while 
providing moderate groups with an opportunity to participate in the parliament was 
clearly designed to keep the opposition within his grip by making moderates less likely to 
challenge the regime. According to some models, these circumstances should have 
prevented groups from forming alliances against the regime
14
. 
With the upcoming elections and rising Islamic extremism, the Mubarak 
government passed new measures to maintain control over the polity. On January 24
th
, 
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while addressing a group of police officers in Cairo, Mubarak praised them for their work 
in curbing Islamic militancy and accused the opposition newspapers of waging an anti-
government campaign by publishing criticism and slander against the militants’ arrests
15
. 
Mubarak’s statement was a harbinger of the new restrictions on freedom of expression 
and assembly in Egypt that were to follow. In February 1995, the government passed law 
100. As per the new law, the government would have increased oversight of the union 
and professional association elections. Government oversight over union elections would 
mean that the opposition would lose its strong hold over these arenas of political 
activism. Since 1990 the professional associations in Egypt had become largely Muslim 
Brotherhood dominated. Instead of focusing their energies on winning a place in the 
parliament, which they saw as a rubber stamp, the Brothers had changed their strategy to 
increase their power and influence in the professional associations. Taking note of the 
new strategy, in 1993, the Mubarak regime passed a new law that declared union 
elections null and void if the turnout was less than 50%. Law 100 was the regime’s latest 
effort to reclaim dominance over the associations. SLP newspaper al-Shaab released a 
vehement critique of the new law and accused the government of waging war against the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Labor Party. The deputy leader of the Labor Party 
Mohammad Hilmi Murad declared the law illegal as it was passed without consulting the 
unions
16
. While several unions including lawyers, pharmacists, doctors and engineers 
staged sit-ins at their headquarters and observed strike days, they refrained from 
organizing protests fearing police retaliation. 
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 In May 1995, the government introduced a new press law, officially known as 
Law Number 93 and commonly nicknamed “Press Assassination Law.” The law 
stipulated  that the government would hold newspapers liable for publishing any 
information that was found to be slanderous and false. Publishing false information or 
rumors could lead to a three to five year prison sentence and a fine of E 5,000 – 20,0000. 
The higher limit would be imposed if the information threatened public order. The law 
was passed with very little debate in the parliament and was promulgated immediately. 
The actual text of the law was deliberately vague to allow the government to use its 
provisions to prosecute journalists as needed. The semi-official newspaper al-Ahram 
noted that the role of the new law is to promote responsible journalism
17
.  
The government’s attempt to muzzle the press came as a shock to journalists and 
opposition leaders all over the country. While Egypt has a history of state incursions in 
freedom of speech and expression, the country has the most advanced press in the Arab 
world. Cairo is considered the largest publishing centers in the region. Opposition parties 
have been allowed to publish their own newspapers since the 1977 Parties Law passed by 
the Sadat regime. Newspapers such as the Liberal al-Ahrar and the Leftist al-Ahli have 
engaged in lively debate on domestic and foreign policy issues since 1978. Not only do 
opposition newspapers report on the activities of the party, they also provide analysis of 
current events and are often the main mouthpiece of the party to reach its constituents.  
al-Wafd and al-Shaab (belonging to the Labor Party) are some of the most commonly 
read opposition newspapers.  
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Journalism is seen as a highly respectable profession and has attracted some of the 
most educated sections of society
18
. Egyptian journalists come from a variety of political 
convictions and perceptions and each publication reflects these views – from Marxists to 
conservative. The state has always had a tumultuous relationship with the journalists. 
While on one hand, there has been considerable press freedom in Egypt, on the other 
hand governments since Nasser have targeted outspoken critics of the government 
through threats and intimidation and promoted loyalists to important public offices. As 
one author explains: 
The dynamics of government – media relations are based on the interplay between the 
regime attempting to mobilize public opinion by using the journalists, and the latter 
attempting to write and say what they want. The result of this interplay depends on 




The goal of both the trade union law (number 100) and the press law (number 93) 
was to prevent the opposition from gaining additional supporters. The new press law hurt 
every opposition party in Egypt was a major onslaught on the journalistic profession 
more generally. By the first anniversary of the law, nearly 100 journalists, contributors 
and editors had been interrogated in connection with “crimes of publication.” 33 of those 
investigated were officially charged
20
. While some official newspapers such as al-Ahram 
remained quiet on the issue, al-Akhbar published articles critical of the new law. 
Renowned journalist Mustafa Ameen wrote sarcastically, “We must be grateful to the 
government for not including the death penalty among the new punishments it has 
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imposed on journalists, and for sufficing with mere 15-year prison terms and fines of 
only a paltry 20,000 pounds
21
.” Opposition newspapers including al-Wafd and al-Shaab 
were rife with articles critical of the law. However, given that the Mubarak regime was 
firmly in place, the high levels of repression against major groups and severe curbs on 
freedom, the appearance of an alliance seemed unlikely.  
 Yet, an organized campaign against the press law emerged in May when al-Wafd, 
al-Ahrar and al-Arabi, three of the main opposition newspaper hit the newsstands with a 
black frame on the front page as a symbolic gesture against the press law. While the 
expression of opposition was subtle, many prominent journalists felt that this was a 
powerful way to express the extreme disillusionment with the status of freedom of press 
in Egypt
22
. Representatives from several opposition parties met at the journalists 
syndicate to coordinate strategies on how best to oppose the law. Representatives of the 
semi-official al-Akhbar al-Youm also participated. According to one party member, the 
group discussed many possibilities including boycotting the upcoming elections. Yet 
since most opposition parties had already boycotted the elections in 1990, this idea was 
dropped
23
. Even though the government incursion on freedom of speech and expression 
is an extremely important issue for opposition groups in Egypt, the emerging cooperation 
among the groups was limited to party leaders only. 
 All participating opposition parties agreed to suspend one issue of their 
newspapers. Al-Wafd, al-Ahrah and al-Shaab did not publish on Friday while al-Hakika, 
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al-Khudr, al-Arabi and al-Ahli did not publish the week after. Suspending newspapers is 
a highly significant form of protest for opposition groups because in a country where 
freedom of assembly tends to be restricted, opposition parties use publications as their 
major mouthpiece to reach out to the public. It is notable that even al-Tagammu party 
participated in the activism. Al-Tagammu has a history of non-cooperation with other 
opposition parties in Egypt. In 1990, al-Tagammu was one of the only major parties who 
decided not to comply with the opposition’s call for an election boycott.  
 On June 7
th
, approximately 1, 000 journalists organized a protest in their 
syndicate premises in Cairo. Both journalists from the opposition press and the semi-
official press participated in the protest. The protest occurred with heavy police patrol 
both in and around the premises. The protesters wore prison clothes so symbolize the 
extent to which the law had imprisoned their profession and the suffocation they felt. 
Several members from other professional unions also attended to express sympathy with 
the journalists. The journalists raised slogans denouncing the government and the 
parliament and declaring that the new legislation would effectively kill press freedom in 
Egypt. While members from different opposition groups were present at the protest, this 
was not a joint effort organized by the political parties. The primary organizers and 
participants were members of the journalists union. 
 The opposition parties did organize one protest on June 18
th
 at al-Wafd’s 
headquarters. Nearly 8,000 people attended the protests. The organizers and participants 
included al-Wafd and Muslim Brotherhood. Members of the journalists’ union also 
attended. Opposition leaders made speeches against the law and asked that Mubrak repeal 
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its provisions. The demonstration occurred under heavy police patrol, but officers did not 
intervene in the peaceful protest
24
.  
 The government retaliated against the widespread opposition claim making before 
the elections by imprisoning several prominent party members. In August, armed men 
attacked the editor of al-Wafd, who was deeply critical of the press law. al-Wafd claimed 
that the armed men were security officials, but the interior ministry denied the charge and 
ordered an investigation into the event
25
. Muslim Brotherhood members continued to face 
arrests. In July the Interior Ministry reported that they had imprisoned 200 Muslim 
Brotherhood members
26
. This was the largest regime onslaught against the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the year. The widespread coercion campaigns further agitated the 
opposition parties and on August 30
th
, members of al-Wafd, al-Tagammu, SLP, 
Nasserites, the Muslim Brotherhood along with several other smaller parties sent a memo 
to President Mubarak asking him to either repeal his restrictive measures or step down
27
. 
The memo was highly significant because not only had the major opposition parties 
challenged Mubarak directly on a particular policy concern but also in collaboration with 
each other despite regime repression, inclusion of selected moderate groups and deep 
ideological differences among the actors.  
 The alliance among opposition parties and between the parties and professional 
syndicates soon expanded to include participation by human rights organizations. The 
Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) became of the major champions of 
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press freedom in the country. With assistance from its international network and domestic 
offices, EOHR drafted several appeals to the Mubarak regime asking him to repeal the 
new press law. In their reports and publications, EOHR referred to the 1995 press law as 
the “Press Assassination Law” and charged that the new restrictions would essentially 
criminalize any expression of a political viewpoint
28
. EOHR gave extensive support to 
the journalists union by publicizing their opposition to the law internationally through the 
IFEX (International Freedom of Expression Exchange) website. The International Press 
Institute also became involved in the campaign. On May 29
th
 1996, IPS director Johann 
Fritz wrote an open letter to President Hosni Mubarak expressing grave concern that the 
new press law would stifle freedom of speech and expression in Egypt
29
.  
 Faced with increasing criticism from the journalists syndicate, international 
human rights organizations and the opposition parties and groups, the Mubarak regime 
decided to refer the press law to the constitutional court and then finally rescinded the 
law in June 1996, thirteen months after the law was promulgated. Law 93 remains the 
only repressive measure passed in the 1990s to be abandoned. The new law that replaced 
93 was much more liberal. Prison sentences and fines imposed were reduced and the 
conditions under which the law could be applied were also limited to spreading false 
information with malicious intent
30
. The repealing of the law came as a victory to those 
that had campaigned against it, however the story of government incursions into civic 
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freedoms in Egypt continued with additional laws restricting speech, expression and 
assembly in the future.  
Even though the press law was eventually repealed, it did succeed in preventing 
the opposition from spreading its message in an election year and intimidating leading 
critics of the regime. Nearly one month before the election, security officials arrested 
Magdi Hussein, editor of al-Shaab newspaper for liable under the new law. Hussein’s 
articles against the regime, and particularly against the press law had featured 
prominently in the pages of al-Shaab. Hussein was arrested for publishing a report in July 
alleging that a high ranking public official’s son had avoided paying the bill at a 
restaurant. In an interview with the New York Times, Hussein declared, “What this is 
about is an attempt by the Government to punish the newspaper for its explicitness in 
criticizing the Government and for our Islamic conviction
31
.”   
 The 1995 elections were held under less than optimal circumstances for the 
opposition. Many prominent leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were in jail, including 
Esam al-Aryan, who had filed his papers to run as an independent from his prison cell. 
Others had been harassed and intimidated, including SLP leader Adel Hussein who was 
arrested and released earlier in the year for suspected ties to Islamist extremists. 
Nonetheless this was the first chance in 10 years for the opposition to expand its 
influence in the parliament as nearly all parties had boycotted the 1990 election. The 
Muslim Brotherhood contested through independents in alliance with its traditional 
partners, the SLP and the Liberal Party. Together these parties were known as the 
“Islamist bloc.”  
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 The elections were marked by high levels of violence between government 
supporters and the opposition and within the opposition. Nearly 75% of the candidates 
ran as independents with no official party affiliation
32
. The results of the election bore 
heavily in favor of the ruling regime. The NDP was able to hold on to all its seats in the 
parliament. The opposition gained only 14 seats, of which al-Wafd won 6, making it the 
largest party to be represented in the parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood gained one 
seat. The opposition cried foul and accused the government of rigging and stuffing the 
ballot boxes in addition to intimidating and stifling the opposition. al-Wafd party’s 
newspaper headlines read, “The triumph of thievery!”, while al-Ahrah’s newspaper 
declared, “A black day for democracy
33
.” Police scuffles with opposition members broke 
out in several districts in Cairo as the state run television and newspapers announced the 
results.  
 Regime attacks against the opposition did not end with the election victory. Soon 
after the results of the first round of elections became public, the regime arrested 94 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood for trying to incite a riot after the elections. An 
unknown assailant shot Ayman Nour, a popular candidate of the Wafd party at the time
34
. 
Nour survived the attack and decided not to press with an investigation, but party 
members alleged that this was a plot to further intimidate the opposition.  
The charged political atmosphere created another opportunity for the opposition 
to form an alliance and launch a campaign against the Mubarak regime. This was the first 
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opportunity for opposition parties to have a say in the government since 1985. The 
widespread election fraud had created public outrage. Egyptian opposition parties had 
already worked together in an alliance to successfully rescind the Press Law. They were 
in an excellent position to take their agenda forward. With their poor showing in the 
election and many prominent leaders already in jail, opposition parties had nothing more 




, opposition groups 
including al-Wafd, the Muslim Brotherhood, SLP, the Liberal Party and the Nasserites 
released a statement stating their position on the elections and a program of action. The 
statement was widely published in opposition newspapers such as al-Wafd and al-Shaab 
and read that the groups would cooperate to lobby for fresh elections monitored by the 
judiciary and independent observers. The statement also appealed to trade unions and 
other professional associations for their support
35
. Even though the opposition seemed 
poised to form another elite alliance, surprisingly no joint campaign emerged after the 
statement was released.  
al-Tagammu broke ranks with the alliance accusing the Muslim Brotherhood of 
monopolizing the professional associations and preventing other parties from a free and 
fair chance of gaining constituents. Since 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood has dominated 
in professional associations in Egypt. Their “take-over” of this important constituency is 
a major loss for the leftist al-Tagammu, who is trying to expand its support base in the 
same strata of society. al-Tagammu’s statement suggests that working jointly with the 
Muslim Brotherhood on a value-based concern had raised fears of losing further support 
to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Nasserite Party accused al-Tagammu of hypocrisy for 
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agreeing to demand the presence of foreign observers at the elections as they considered 
such a presence foreign intervention
36
. Groups had put aside these controversial divisions 
to form an alliance again the Press Law, but in campaigning against the results of the 
elections, these aspects because of paramount concern. Even though the members made 
individual statements that they had agreed to put aside their differences and work 
together, no joint campaign emerged. My conjecture is that the value-based nature of the 
concern prevented the alliances from emerging as each group became concerned about 
other groups attracting their supporters.  
While members of the “alliance” did launch independent campaigns, for example, 
al-Wafd party made extensive use of the internet to make appeals for international 
support, no elite or mobilization alliance materialized. The level of regime repression 
towards the opposition remained largely the same since before the election and the 
political atmosphere was similarly charged with wide public outrage on the issue. 
Structural conditions, ideological differences among groups and regime policies remained 
the same, yet while an alliance formed to protest the Press Law, groups were unable to 
form an alliance against the elections result. My model explains the lack of alliance 
building as a result of the nature of the concern.  
The emergence of alliance making among opposition groups in the 1995 press law 
activism and the lack of alliances post-elections suggests that groups with fluid 
constituencies may form issue-based elite alliances but not value-based elite alliances or 
mobilization alliances. The anti-press law activism was nearly entirely conducted through 
non-mobilization means. Elites from different parties agreed to participate through the 
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medium of their newspapers. The success of the campaign depended on all major parties 
participating and such cooperation did emerge and succeed in gaining the attention of the 
regime. The opposition did organize one large protest against the law, but this protest was 
organized by MB and al-Wafd. As explained in Chapter II, these groups have divided 
constituencies in relation to each other as al-Wafd receives support from the upper strata 
of society, especially in rural areas, while MB receives the core of its support from 
students and professional unions in urban areas. Given that the campaign against the 
Press Law lasted for one year, the emergence of no other mobilization alliances further 
points to the extent to which the groups limited their efforts to issue-based elite alliances.  
The same group of parties, however, could not cooperate in a post-election anti-
Mubarak alliance. Protesting the results of the election and demanding free and impartial 
re-polling is a value-based concern as it questions the very basis of Egyptian politics 
where the results of the election always favor the regime. Groups with fluid 
constituencies are unable to form value-based alliances as these address sensitive issues 
and can incite constituents into mobilization creating opportunities for member poaching 
by other allies.  
Fears of losing their constituency to other groups keep parties from cooperating. 
Therefore no elite alliance emerged to protest the results of the 1995 elections. Parties 
such as al-Tagammu became fearful of MB dominance in their constituencies and 
competition with other leftist parties. When asked why his party did not cooperate with 
other groups to protest the 1995 election results, one group member told me, “This is a 
very big issue. In Egypt. whenever there is an election, there is always a question if the 
131 
 




 I now examine the case of Pakistan where groups with divided constituencies 
formed an elite alliance against the Kalabagh Dam project activism in Pakistan. The 
alliance soon expanded to a large-scale mobilization campaign against the government.  
 
Kalabagh Dam and Anti-Sharif Activism in Pakistan 1998-1999 
 
 The Kalabagh dam elite alliance in Pakistan and the subsequent anti-Sharif 
campaign illustrates that groups with divided constituencies can form elite as well as 
mobilization alliances on issue or value-based concerns. When constituencies are divided, 
members are less likely to defect to other groups. Mobilization alliances that pool the 
constituencies of the groups therefore emerge.  
 Despite being able to form mobilization alliances, which are more visible and 
therefore attract greater attention, groups with divided constituencies may sometimes 
form elite alliances. These are less likely to be crushed by the regime, use fewer group 
resources and are often useful when the nature of the concern is too technical to draw the 
attention of a large number of constituents.  
 When forming an elite alliance, groups with divided constituencies may focus 
both on an issue or value-based concern as forming a mobilization alliance in the future is 
always a possibility. As I show in the case of the Kalabagh dam project – PPP’s unique 
position at the time, combined with the technical nature of the concern prevented a 
mobilization alliance, but the party did form an elite alliance with the regional ANP. With 
rising discontent against the Sharif regime the issue-based elite alliance evolved into 
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value-based. More partners joined the alliance ultimately leading to the emergence of a 
massive anti-Sharif campaign ending with the 1999 coup.  
 Kalabagh dam was first conceived in 1984 as a solution to the country’s growing 
water and electricity needs. The proposed dam would be constructed across one of 
Pakistan’s major rivers – the Indus. The location of the dam would be on the border of 
Punjab and NWFP. The paperwork for the dam was finalized with the assistance of the 
World Bank and United National Development Program in coordination with the Water 
and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) authority in Pakistan. Large scale 
development projects such as dams have caused controversy in several countries due to 
their environmental and humanitarian impacts. In Pakistan, the issues surrounding the 
Kalabagh dam project have stirred the nationalist sentiments of several provinces, most 
notably in Sind and NWFP regions.  
As I explained in Chapter II, Pakistan is divided into 4 provinces – Punjab, Sind, 
Baluchistan and NWFP. Ethnic tensions have been central to Pakistan’s politics and have 
often given rise to secessionist demands leading to mistrust among the different regions 
and ethnic groups. Nawaz Sharif and the PML have a strong constituency in Punjab. 
Since the government was dominated by Punjabis at the time and the military has always 
had a strong Punjabi presence, other provinces made accusations of Punjabi hegemony 
over the country. The Kalabagh dam project is seen as another way for the PML to 
impose Punjabi will on the country. Other provinces, most notably NWFP and Sind 
alleged that Punjab will benefit disproportionately from the construction of the dam while 
they will bear the brunt of its ill effects such as floods and desertification.  Sind and 
Baluchistan alleged that they will receive less water and therefore will not be able to 
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sustain their economy while NWFP argued that the dam will lead to widespread flooding 
in the region with cities central to the economy becoming submerged.  Punjab would 
benefit greatly from the dam at it is considered the granary of Pakistan. Increased 
irrigation facilities will help assist Punjab’s agriculture while the electricity produced will 
help fuel its urban economy.  
   
Emergence of the Kalabagh Dam Campaign:  
 Sharif came to power after fresh elections were announced in early 1997. The 
elections were a result of the dismissal of the Bhutto government in 1996 due to financial 
mismanagement and mass corruption. PML won an overwhelming majority and received 
solid support from provincial parties such as ANP (NWFP) and BNP (Baluchistan) and 
the urban Sind ethnic based MQM party. Sharif also received high levels of support from 
his traditional constituency among the business elite and traders. The business 
community had become disillusioned with the Bhutto government’s lack of effective 
economic policies and had hoped that Sharif would be the answer to the growing 
economic problems in the country. Sharif political career is preceded by his background 
as an industrialist and therefore he is often seen as partial to business interests. The stock 
market in Pakistan showed a rise of nearly 7% when trades became confident that Sharif 
would be taking over the government.  
Another major victory for the Sharif regime emerged when his government 
succeeded in abolishing the 8
th
 amendment to the constitution that allows the President to 
dismiss the parliament. The President Farooq Leghari resigned in December 1997 over 
growing tensions with the regime creating an opportunity for Sharif to strategically place 
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a candidate of his own choice as the President. The new President Rafiq Tarar was 
blatantly handpicked by the Sharif government. Media analysts and other observers 
openly referred to Tarar a “puppet” of the regime and accused Sharif of exercising 
absolute power. A well known journalist Zarraf Abbas wrote: 
Having successfully reversed the cycle of attacks and accusations, first he [Nawaz Sharif] 
forced President Farooq Leghari to step down. Then he saw to it that Chief Justice Sajjad 
Ali Shah was shown the door. And then a finishing touch, he presented to the nation his 




Tarar’s credentials as a hard line Islamist activist led several analysts to speculate that the 
government was trying to appease the Islamists who had so far refrained from giving 
their support to the regime
39
. Sharif’s position as the prime minister seemed more secure 
that any previous democratically elected regime in Pakistan. With the Sharif regime 
looking more stable that ever, no observer could have predicted the anti – regime 
alliances that would soon emerge.  
 Sharif’s strong position in the government was accompanied by internal crisis in 
the PPP. Benazir Bhutto had become embroiled in a corruption scandal with several 
investigations probing her off shore bank accounts and domestic assets. In the 1997 
elections, PPP gained very few seats concentrated mostly in rural Sind. In fact, the 1997 
elections had effectively reduced the PPP to the role of a provincial party.  The Sharif 
government took full advantage of the PPP’s weak position by taking on direct 
supervision of the corruption investigations against Bhutto. On request by the 
government, Bhutto’s Swiss bank accounts were frozen. Further, her husband was 
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already in jail over allegations of receiving kickbacks from various industries. Bhutto 
accused the government of “victimization” as tensions between the PPP and PML came 
to an all time high.  
 The first sign of opposition against Nawaz Sharif came with the defection of the 
ANP from the Sharif government in February 1998. ANP had been a close ally of the 
PML for over nine years. While the defection came as a shock to the PML, the regime 
still maintained a comfortable majority in the parliament. ANP broke its alliance with the 
PML over the refusal of the Sharif government to allow an official name change for the 
NWFP to “Pukhtoonkhwa.” ANP had asked for the change because the new name would 
better reflect the ethnic and linguistic composition of the region. Party members argued 
that every other province in Pakistan had been named after its major ethnicity, for 
example Punjab being composed of Punjabis and Baluchistan of Baluchis. NWFP should 
therefore have the same right to protect its ethnic identity. Pakistani news media reported 
rumors that Sharif had promised ANP the name change prior to the elections
40
. After 
deliberations the ruling PML government refused ANP’s demand as they feared a name 
change would encourage ethnic based demands on the government from other provinces. 
The ruling regime argued that the name change would adversely affect the nation’s unity 
and internal sovereignty. The Hazara regions in NWFP, who form the main opposition to 
the ANP and stood firmly against the name change. The regime’s refusal to change the 
name of the province came as a shock to ANP leaders. In February The ANP formally 
took on the role of the opposition along with the PPP in the parliament.  
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 In May 1998, India successfully conducted several underground nuclear tests. 
Nawaz Sharif’s regime faced tremendous domestic pressure to match India’s nuclear 
capabilities even though the country was in tremendous economic crisis. Caving to the 
pressure, Pakistan also tested its nuclear capabilities. The result was increased economic 
difficulties due to sanctions from the United States. The government declared a state of 
emergency after the tests and waived all fundamental rights. Sharif announced economic 
austerity measures to counter the financial crisis that had engulfed the country. In 
addition to new tax evasion rules and other ways to increase the government’s revenue, 
the government announced an economic development program which included building 
the Kalabagh dam on the Indus river. The construction of the dam would encourage 
domestic industry and agriculture and increase the productivity of the economy. The dam 
had been first proposed in the 1980s, but tabled at the time due to major controversies 
surrounding the project. Sind and NWFP had alleged that Punjab would benefit 
disproportionately from the construction of the dam while other provinces would face 
desertification and flooding. This time, the Sharif government was determined to see the 
project through. Sharif made extensive use of state run media to embark on a publicity 
blitz to assure people of the benefits of Kalabagh. A smear campaign labeled all those 
opposed to the dam as “unpatriotic
41
.” Sharif’s brother, the Chief Minister of Punjab, 
Shahbaz Sharif became a major proponent of the dam. On June 16
th
 1998, he declared 
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 ANP stood firmly against the project and saw thus as another attack on its identity 
as a region. ANP Chief Begum Wali Kahn accused the regime of wanting to build the 
dam for the good of the generals and aristocrats who had bought land east of the Indus 
River. She explained, “For us Pakistan exists on both sides of the river
43
”. ANP found a 
ready partner in the PPP to launch an anti-dam campaign. Representing the interests of 
Sind, PPP’s main opposition to the dam was on the account of the mistrust and suspicion 
with which Sind views the efforts by Punjab to tap its waters
44
.  
An ANP – PPP alliance soon emerged on the issue. However, the two parties 
faced many obstacles to mobilizing against the Sharif government. The PPP was very 
weak after its poor showing in the elections and the Sharif government was firmly 
entrenched after abolishing the 8
th
 Amendment and handpicking Tarar as the new 
President. Further ANP is a regional party, limited to the relatively geographically 
isolated NWFP region. ANP and PPP also represent different ethnic groups. Given these 
circumstances, the emergence of a ANP-PPP alliance seemed unlikely. Yet, the two 
groups formed an issue-based elite alliance to protests the Kalabagh dam project.   
On June 13
th
, in an expression of their opposition and solidarity, ANP and PPP 
members walked out of the budget session of the parliament. The speaker of the house 
had disallowed the discussion of the Kalabagh dam because he argued that the issue was 
technical and not political. After not being allowed to raise the issue as a point of order in 
the parliament, the two parties’ MPs began to thump their desks in protest. Their 
complaints were not met with any response which led to each of them leaving their 
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copies of the proposed budget on the speaker’s desk and walking out. The MPs attacked 
the speaker while walking out raising slogans such as “agent of the Punjabis.” ANP chief 
Begum Wali Khan declared, “Now we regret our alliance with the man who looks like 
the Prime Minister of the Punjab
45
”.  The ANP – PPP alliance was formed despite the 
ethnic differences between the two parties. The divided nature of the constituencies made 
the alliance possible.   
The walkout was accompanied by protests and strikes organized by each party in 
their respective regions. Joint mobilization did not occur because of the logistical 
problems related to organizing a cross-province protest. Further, the PPP was at its 
weakest point at the time while the ruling PML was in a much stronger position. In his 
article in a Pakistani news magazine, Ali Hasan argued that PPP took a cautious approach 
to Kalabagh not only because of Punjab’s hegemony in the national assembly but also 
because of its unique position as a national level party. While PPP had been reduced to a 
Sind based provincial party in the 1997 elections, the party did not want to alienate its 
pockets of support in Punjab who may stand on the other side of the issue. PPP is a 
national level party, therefore it was hesitant to take a strong position on an issue that 
provokes different responses from different regions.  Further, Hasan argues that the 
inciting public emotions on the dam have proven difficult for the PPP. He explains: 
It seems people are more prone to respond to issues such as law and order, 
unemployment, support pricing for agricultural products and so forth. The Kalabagh dam 
seems to come lower in the public’s list of immediate concerns. However the dam never 
ceases to be controversial and remains an issue that can trigger of (sic) nationalist 
sentiment. The crucial question is, with the PPP reduced, at least in the assemblies to a 
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Even though PPP faced a dilemma in coming out openly against the dam, the party could 
not keep quiet on the issue, given the importance of the project for Sind. The joint efforts 
by the two groups were therefore limited to non-mobilization strategies. Further, even 
though the dam project stirs nationalist emotions in Pakistan, ANP and PPP did not try to 
frame the concern as a question of ethnic identity to attract constituents to the street. The 
nature of the alliance was purposefully focused on the issue-based concern of the 
Kalabagh dam. 
 Both groups organized separate protests in their own provinces. On June 17
th
, 
PPP organized a strike in Sind. ANP used its website to raise awareness about the effort 
and called upon the people of Sind to put aside their ethnic and nationalist differences 
and participate. On August 10
th
 1998 ANP organized a massive rally in NWFP while PPP 
gathered its supporters in Sindi cities.  
The two parties made several joint statements to the press on the issue. On June 
17
th
 in a press conference, PPP and ANP leaders urged that they would stand firmly 
against the construction of the dam and against Punjabi domination. They expressed 
solidarity with each other and urged other provinces to put aside regional mistrust and 
join them in their efforts
47
. Sharif’s provincial supporters BNP and MQM urged the 
government to consider the opinion of the provinces in making decisions about the dam
48
.  
The anti-dam activism was accompanied by heavy handed repression by the 
government in the wake of the continuing emergency laws. Widespread arrests of anti-
dam activists, raids and searches became commonplace. In addition Bhutto faced 
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additional corruption allegations and related investigations. In an open statement to PPP 
supporters, she urged party members to show restraint in organizing protest on the issue 
of her likely arrest
49
. Despite high levels of regime repression, the alliance persisted. 
Ultimately, given the widespread opposition to the Kalabagh dam, the Sharif government 
decided to table the issue.  
By the end of the summer, Karachi had become embroiled by strife among MQM 
supporters. Internal dissent in the MQM had led to the defection of some members and 
the formation of a new group – MQM – Haqiqi, commonly referred to as MQM(h). The 
rising violence between supporters of both groups led to the imposition of direct rule by 
the government in November 1998. The imposition of direct rule angered both the PPP 
and the MQM, two parties who are otherwise staunch ethnic rivals. ANP had also begun 
raising concerns about the general competence of the Nawaz Sharif government on its 
website
50
. The result was the emergence of a wider anti-Sharif campaign.  
 
Emergence of the Anti-Sharif Campaign: 
 The Sharif government had come to power with solid support in the provinces and 
a President who seemed subservient to the regime’s interests. The foundation for the 
government started to weaken when ANP defected and MQM also started showing its 
dissatisfaction with the ruling alliance. MQM finally ended its alliance with the 
government on August 26
th
 1998. In order to garner support from the Islamists, the 
government introduced Islamic law in August 1998. As per the law, Pakistan was to be 
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ruled by the provisions of the Shariah. The new legislation, however, failed to impress 
the Islamists who blamed the government for trying to mislead the public on the recent 
US strikes in Afghanistan
51
. Editorials in major Pakistani newspapers and news 
magazines showed that most people could look through Sharif’s populist tactics
52
.  
 In 1999 Pakistan had become embroiled in another border dispute in the Kargil 
region of Kashmir with India. The lack of international support, especially from the 
United States forced Nawaz Sharif to order a pull back of troops and mercenaries from 
the disputed territories. The pull back did not bode well with the Islamist parties who 
chided the government for giving up on the cause of the Kashmiri people. Once again, 
the government began to undertake repressive measured to protect their position. One of 
the major targets was the press. The Sharif government tried to muzzle the press by 
targeting prominent journalists and trying them under anti-terrorism laws. One of the 
journalists arrested was Hussain Haqqani, now a leading analyst of Pakistani politics. The 
most prominent news companies in Pakistan, the Jang Group became embroiled in a 
major controversy with the government over tax evasion allegations. Jang editors and 
journalists cried foul and accused the government of trying to reign in opposition 
voices
53
. In May 1999, the government also passed a new anti-terrorism ordinance that 
set up military courts to try domestic terrorists. In addition, the new law imposed a seven 
year prison sentence for passing hand bills or writing graffiti. The Sharif government was 
clearly using extreme repressive measures to keep the opposition quiet. The 
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embarrassment over Kalabagh dam, combined with the strife in Karachi and lost war with 
India had weakened the regime. However, the opposition to the Sharif government 
consisted of several ideologically and regionally divided squabbling groups. Sharif had 




Instead of abating the fire, Nawaz Sharif’s draconian measures further fuelled the 
opposition’s rage against the government. An anti-Sharif campaign emerged in early 
1999. One of the first issues the parties took on was the new measured curbing press 
freedom. In February, several parties formed an alliance for press freedom that came to 
be known as APPFC – All Parties Press Freedom Committee. The Committee included 
PPP, MQM as well as Jamaat-e-Islami. PPP and MQM represent rival ethnic groups in 
Sind while JI has always had a relationship of mistrust with PPP. The committee held 
several meetings to release open letters against the Sharif regime’s incursions on freedom 
of the press in the country.  The opposition groups were now addressing value-based 
concerns by challenging not just a particular law or policy, but the basis of the Sharif 
regime. While initially APPFC limited its activities to an elite alliance, freedom of press 
had become a controversial and volatile value-based concern in the country. The 
journalists community and students had already become very active on the issue. The 
value-based elite alliance soon expanded to a mobilization alliance. The APPFC 
committee launched its first rally on February 8
th
 in cooperation with the journalist’s 
union. Opposition party members rallied in front of the parliament and demanded that the 
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While the PPP had become fully involved in the anti-Sharif campaign, Benazir 
Bhutto’s corruption allegations continued to haunt her political career. In April 1999, 
Bhutto was found guilty of the charges. She decided to appeal the verdict but was forced 
to leave the country to await the result. Bhutto’s departure left PPP in crisis as there was 
no leader to take over her position. With PPP taking a back seat for the moment, the 
Jamaat-e-Islami took on a more prominent position in the opposition campaign, 
especially on the issue of the Kargil war with India. In July, JI took the lead in organizing 
an all parties’ conference on the situation in Kargil. The conference was held in 
Islamabad and the opposition parties declared that Sharif’s irresponsible foreign policy 
had led to Pakistan’s isolation from the world community. Parties of various viewpoints 
decided that they would coordinate their strategies on how to depose Sharif. News media 




The government accused the JI, MQM and PPP of creating social instability and 
retaliated by arresting over 200 activists from all three parties. The arrests, raids and 
detentions did not deter the opposition in organizing a large-scale “go Nawaz” rally in 
September in the Punjabi city of Lahore. The opposition parties declared that this was the 
first of three scheduled events in the country. News media and observers reported that 
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over 40,000 people marched in the rally
57
. The fact that the mobilization was held in a 
Punjabi city, a traditional strong hold of the PML, showed the extent to which the 
opposition parties had succeeded in creating an anti-regime alliance. The protesters 
chanted “go Nawaz go” as they marched through the city before converging in the 
parliament area. MQM leader Sheikh Aftab warned that this is the beginning of a “big 
movement” against the regime
58
. The police reportedly fired at the crown and beat 
protesters in order to disperse them. In the days after the rally, security officials raided 
opposition headquarters, made arrests and other confiscations. Security officials reported 




The next strike came on September 4
th
 1999 when businesses in all major cities 
shut down to protest the government’s imposition of the general sales tax. Opposition 
parties cooperated closely with the traders to advertise and carry out the strike
60
. Some 
observers reported that opposition party members patrolled the streets forcing businesses 
to shut down to ensure compliance with the strike
61
. The opposition organized another 
major strike on September 11
th
 despite the fact that the government arrested several 
prominent members prior to the designated day to prevent the agitation.  
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The Nawaz Sharif government was clearly facing an uncontrollable tide of 
mobilization against his regime. Sharif referred to the opposition alliance against him as a 
“hotch-potch” of groups with different ideologies and no real leader or agenda
62
. In 
another effort to control the surge, Sharif banned demonstrations in Sind. The opposition 
parties responded by calling for a two day strike in Sind as a way to defy the new law. 
The strike was successful in spite of government arrests and baton charges in Karachi. 
Another rally was organized in Karachi on September 25
th
 leading to more arrests and 
detentions. 
The rising tide of opposition mobilization against the Sharif government 
culminated in the coup organized by General Pervez Musharraf on October 12
th
 1999. 
Sharif was taken into protective custody as the army took over the government. 
Pakistan’s fourth military coup did not lead to public outrage, in fact many opposition 
parties actually welcomed the new development as a means to address the country’s 
growing economic and political problems. The hope was the coup would bring some 
stability to the country.  
How were opposition groups in Pakistan able to form both elite and mobilization 
alliances despite high levels of regime repression and a history of sharp ideological 
divides ? Further, how were the groups able to form an alliance against a regime that 
once seemed more stable than any of its predecessors? I argue that even though 
opposition groups is Pakistan have many differences with each other, they are able to 
form alliances because they have divided constituencies. Many have constituencies 
within a certain ethnic group (for example, MQM) or region (for example PML and PPP). 
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The divided nature of the constituencies assures parties that their supporters will not 
defect and join other groups. I propose that since divided constituencies tend to remain 
stable over time, groups also realize that their chances of gaining additional popular 
support are limited and the only way to show their increased might to the regime is to 
pool resources with other groups
63
. In the case of Pakistan, groups with divided 
constituencies were able to form an alliance to oppose the Kalabagh dam project through 
an elite alliance and launch a mass movement against the Sharif government in 1999 
despite their ideological differences, internal weaknesses, government repression and 
regime stability.  
 
Elite Alliances- Why they are formed and how they work: 
 Elite alliances are often an effective means to express joint opposition to the 
regime. The allies engage in opposition activity through non-mobilization means such as 
releasing open statements, symbolic office closings or walkouts from the parliament. 
These forms of activism are organized by elites in various opposition groups and do not 
involve constituents.  In this chapter I argued that groups with fluid constituencies may 
form issue-based elite alliances regardless of ideological divisions or regime repression. 
These alliances are unlikely to lead to mobilization in the future and therefore allow the 
groups to address a mutual concern while protecting their constituencies from 
encroachment by others. I examined how diverse opposition groups in Egypt worked 
together though an elite alliance to oppose the 1995 press law in Egypt. The issue focus 
of this alliance was central to its success as just a few months later the same groups were 
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unable to cooperate to protest the flawed 1995 elections which was a value-based 
concern.  
 Groups with divided constituencies may also engage in elite alliances. I examined 
how the ANP and PPP formed an issue-based elite alliance which later expanded to a 
value-based alliance to express opposition to the Kalabagh dam project. The weak 
position of the PPP after the 1997 elections and the regionally limited nature of the ANP 
prevented the two parties from forming a mobilization alliance, although they each held 
separate protests in their own provinces. The ANP and PPP worked together through joint 
statements to the press and symbolic walkouts from the parliament. As other parties such 
as MQM and BNP became dissatisfied with the Sharif regime, a larger mobilization 
alliance emerged. The opposition parties together launched a massive campaign against 







Chapter IV: Mobilization Alliances 
 
Opposition groups operate in a dense network of adversaries and allies. Their 
interaction with each other is central to how they devise strategies in opposing the 
regime. While explanations stemming from the bridging of ideological differences, 
government divide and rule policies, and the role of cost benefit analysis make a 
significant contribution in explaining different aspects of alliance making, I found that 
they leave questions unanswered in explaining the mechanisms behind how such 
alliances come to be. I argue that examining the nature of group constituencies and the 
nature of the alliance provides a new and unique explanations of variance in alliance 
making and has so far been overlooked in the scholarly literature. In the last chapter, I 
explained how groups with fluid constituencies form issue-based elite alliances but are 
unable to engage in value-based elite alliances. I further demonstrated how groups with 
divided constituencies form value-based as well as issue-based elite alliances. This 
chapter focuses on the formation of mobilization alliances. Such alliances require the 
partners to mobilize their constituency jointly by engaging in street politics for example, 
protests or civil disobedience.  
While mobilization alliances are useful in showing the power of the opposition 
vis-à-vis the regime, they are also more risky as protesters can be easily intimidated 
through policing and repressive laws restricting freedom of assembly. I will show that in 
both Egypt and Pakistan, the regime has tried to prevent mobilization alliances among 
opposition parties through a variety of means: repression, intimidation, enticing some 
parties and groups into pro-regime agreements, and repressive laws. Despite the threat of 
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repression being very real in both countries, several mobilization alliances have emerged 
in Pakistan, while very few such cases have been recorded in Egypt. 
 In the case of Egypt, I show that even though groups have had the opportunity to 
work together and have tried to form alliances, very few mobilization alliances have 
actually materialized. I examine four cases in detail: 1) the referendum/ presidential 
election boycott campaign; 2) interaction between Kifaya and the Muslim Brotherhood; 
3) the National Alliance for Restoration and Change initiated by the Muslim 
Brotherhood; and 4) the National Front for Change, initiated by al-Wafd. None of these 
alliances worked to mobilize constituencies and challenge state power jointly. In most 
cases, opposition groups did not respond to each others’ call for an alliance. In some 
cases, while groups agreed to form an alliance, one or more of the alliance partners 
defected preventing the alliance from reaching its mobilization objectives. Even though 
each opposition group mobilized its constituency against Mubarak regime individually, 
especially during the 2005 political opening, no joint mobilization emerged during this 
time period. 
In contrast, I explain how mobilization alliances formed in Pakistan despite the 
ideological and other differences among parties and the regime enticing various groups to 
defect. Here I examine three cases: 1) the formation of Alliance for Restoration of 
Democracy, which included arch rivals PPP and PML and Majlis-e-Muttahida-e-Amal in 
2000, 2) the anti-Legal Framework Order (LFO) campaign in 2003-2004; and 3) the local 
bodies’ election campaign in 2005. I will show that while alliances were not always easy 
to achieve and were often difficult to maintain, opposition groups in Pakistan were still 
able to form mobilization alliances, while groups in Egypt were unable to do so.  
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 In both Egypt and Pakistan, opposition groups found themselves in similar social 
and political circumstances. They faced a resolute regime not afraid to use high levels of 
repression to throttle the opposition, low chances of actually gaining greater access to 
policy making in the government, and deep-set ideological as well as ethnic  differences 
(in Pakistan) dividing the groups. Further, in Pakistan, Musharraf seemed more 
entrenched than any of the country’s previous military or democratically elected 
governments. The strength of individual opposition groups was at an all-time low, with 
the government openly favoring pro-regime parties while repressing all forms of street 
politics.  
Formation of Mobilization Alliances: 
I argue that opposition groups may form two kinds of alliances – mobilization or 
elite. When forming elite alliances, groups need not directly engage their constituencies. 
For example, they may write a joint petition to the government, close their offices, or 
organize lobbying in the parliament; none of these activities require the mobilization or 
even informing of their broader constituencies. In contrast, mobilization alliances form 
when groups engage their constituents in the form of a joint protest, sit-in, or act of civil 
disobedience. These kinds of activities require groups to pool their constituencies and are 
therefore determined by a different dynamic and compared to elite alliances. 
  Mobilization alliances emerge under conditions of divided constituencies and are 
less unlikely under conditions of fluid constituencies. Under conditions of divided 
constituencies, groups receive consistent support from specific sections of the population. 
The constituencies may be determined by ethnicity, class or region. The chances of 
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expanding constituencies by attracting other groups’ supporters are very unlikely as the 
support bases for each group have been consistent over a period of time.  
 Under divided constituencies, groups are less concerned about their partners 
using the mobilization event to poach their supporters: since their constituencies are well 
established and distinct from each other, such attempts are unlikely to be successful. 
Instead, the mobilization event can be used to show collective might to the regime. 
Further, groups realize that their chances of increasing their support base beyond their 
current boundaries are limited, since other groups’ supporters are unlikely to defect to 
other groups. Therefore they can succeed in putting pressure on the government by 
showing additional street might  through pooling their constituencies with other groups 
without risking losing supporters.  
Under conditions of fluid constituencies, groups have no consistent support base 
among the citizenry. They may be trying to attract supporters who are currently 
supporting another group by presenting themselves as a better alternative, or may appeal 
to fence sitters. The chances of expanding constituencies by attracting other groups’ 
supporters are high, as the support bases for each group have not been consistent or fixed 
over time.  
Groups with fluid constituencies are less likely to engage in mobilization alliances 
because allied partners might use such events to poach their constituents. The 
mobilization alliance provides other groups with easy access to their support base at a 
particular venue and time, hence presenting a perfect opportunity to increase their own 
visibility and show themselves as a better alternative. Instead of launching an effective 
challenge to the regime, therefore, mobilization alliances can prevent groups from 
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solidifying their own support base by creating opportunities for poaching by other 
groups. Groups with divided constituencies, by comparison, may easily form 
mobilization alliances on both issue-based and value-based concerns.  
Instead of forming alliances, groups with fluid constituencies focus their energies 
on mobilizing alone, thereby increasing their support base without risking their current 
constituents. The argument is depicted in the following table:  
  
 
                         Table III:  Formation of Mobilization Alliances 
 
        Alliance Type 







 In now present an analysis of the emergence or non-emergence of specific 
mobilization alliances in Egypt and Pakistan.  
 
Mobilization Alliances in Egypt: 
 
2005 has probably been the most eventful year in Mubarak’s reign as the 
President of the country. In February 2005, the regime announced the country’s first 
multi-candidate presidential elections to be held in September. Parliamentary elections 
would be held as scheduled in November. The announcement led to speculations among 
analysts and citizens alike that the political situation could change in the county’s largely 
stagnant political system. Politics gained new energy as parties were allowed space to 
campaign and reach out to their constituents. As one analyst explained, “The elections 
themselves were a small step forward, but also were a part of a trend of political 










The election announcement however came under the shadow of al-Ghad party 
leader Ayman Nour’s arrest in January. As detailed in Chapter II, Nour was arrested on 
the charge of forging some of the signatures needed to form his al-Ghad party. He denied 
that any of the signatures were forged, and most members of al-Ghad as well as other 
groups saw his arrest as the regime’s newest attempt to muzzle the opposition. While 
there was great hope that the political opening could be the beginning of bigger changes  
in Egypt, most analysts and party members also realized the need to be realistic about 
what they could achieve in this political opening. Nour was released on bail in March.  
In May, the government announced a new law that would put restrictions on the 
candidates allowed to run for president. According to the new law, the candidate would 
have to secure support from at least 250 elected officials. The party fielding the candidate 
must be at least five-years old, and the candidate must have been a member for at least 
four years
2
.  These provisions would be added to Article 76, which lays out the procedure 
for the selection of the position of the president in the country. The new restrictions came 
as a major blow to several opposition leaders who had earlier welcomed the proposed 
amendment to Article 76. The government had planned to hold a referendum to approve 
the proposed change in May. If the referendum was approved, the elections would be 
held as planned in September and parliamentary elections in November.  
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The political opening and the subsequent restrictions on the candidates sparked a 
wave of political activity from several groups. The spikes in protests and demonstration 
led some parties to initiate alliances: different parties tried to form an alliance to boycott 
the referendum to approve the changes to Article 76 as well as the presidential election in 
September; the Muslim Brotherhood initiated the National Alliance for Restoration and 
Change; and al-Wafd tried to bring different groups together through the National United 
Front for Change. In addition there were opportunities for the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Kifaya to form an alliance. As I will show, however, none of these proposed alliances 
were actually borne out. In the following sections, I examine each of the cases of alliance 
building and explain why none of them materialized. I show how regime policies and 
ideological differences or similarities among groups had little influence on the success or 
failure of these alliances.  
 
Campaign for Referendum/ Election Boycott: 
 
The new restrictions on presidential candidates significantly dampened the hopes 
of several opposition parties that had initially welcomed the reforms. With the 
introduction of the new law, the groups began to think of how to best use the political 
opening to their advantage. The government announced that the proposed amendment to 
Article 76 would be put to a referendum in May and if the changes were approved, the 
presidential election would take place in September.  
Some parties debated boycotting the referendum. Al-Wafd, al-Tagammu, and the 
Arab Nasserite Party collectively announced that they had decided to boycott the 
referendum and would encourage their constituencies to stay home. They declared that 
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the restrictions imposed on the candidates were unfair and that they would also boycott 
the presidential election under these circumstances
3
. The alliance cross ideological 
divides given that al-Wafd is a right-wing party and al-Tagammu and the Arab Nasserites 
are staunchly left-wing. Despite the differences, al-Wafd’s alliance with the leftist parties 
had actually begun earlier in the year when in January the parties organized a rally at al- 
Wafd’s al-Mansoura headquarters. al-Wafd newspaper published several comments by 
prominent leaders from al-Tagammu and the Arab Nasserite Party showing that the 
parties were cooperating closely. However on the day of the rally, al-Tagammu and the 
Nasserites did not show. Overall, the turnout remained much lower than projected and the 
rally was deemed unsuccessful
4
. The referendum boycott was an attempt to revive this 
failed past alliance.  
The Muslim Brotherhood had initially welcomed the regime’s initiative to amend 
Article 76. Since the Brotherhood is not a legal party, it would not be allowed to field its 
own candidate; however, the group declared that it would be open to supporting any 
competent candidate in the presidential election. The Brotherhood’s stance changed after 
it held a protest at Zaynab and Ramses square in Cairo. Security officials cracked down 
on the protesters and as many as 50 people were arrested. Among those arrested were 
prominent leaders such as Mohammed Akif and Isam el-Aryan. The arrests were 
followed by individual raids of members’ offices and homes, leading to several more 
arrests. The crackdown angered the Brothers and, after the regime’s announcement 
imposing restrictions on the presidential candidates, the Muslim Brotherhood declared 
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that it would boycott the referendum. In a widely regionally televised statement, Muslim 
Brotherhood head Mohammed Akef announced that the group considered the restrictions 
outrageous and that it would think about organizing mass action against the regime as a 
response.  
Despite al-Wafd, al-Tagammu, Muslim Brotherhood and Nasserite parties’  joint 
calls for a boycott, the alliance did not proceed further to organize mobilization to 
actually engage in street politics. Some parties appealed to the courts to cancel the 
referendum given that the major parties would be asking their constituents to stay away 
from the polling stations, but the referendum was held as scheduled on May 25
th
. The 
turnout at the was low, but the referendum passed and the date for the presidential 
elections was set as September 7
th 
1995. 
While opposition parties did not succeed in gathering a critical mass to boycott 
the referendum, they now focused their efforts towards putting pressure on the 
government to hold the presidential elections in a free and fair manner. al-Wafd declared 
that the party would be coordinating its strategies significantly with Arab Nasserites and 
Tagammu
5
. The three parties met at al-Wafd’s headquarters and released their demands 
to the government. They asked for several provisions, reported in al-Wafd newspaper. 
The demands included lifting the state of emergency, judiciary oversight over the 
upcoming elections, dipping voter’s thumb in ink to prevent repeat voting, and printing 
electoral lists
6
. Since the parties did not receive a favorable response from the 
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government, they decided to boycott the elections. By July, Kifaya had also decided to 
boycott the elections, asking their supporters to stay home.  
While the presidential-election boycott consensus seemed to have gained the 
acquiescence of al-Wafd, al-Tagammu, Muslim Brotherhood and the Nasserite parties an 
alliance failed to emerge because groups chose to defect from their original stance. Al-
Ghad leader Ayman Nour decided that he would submit his papers for candidacy despite 
the boycott by al-Wafd. When asked about his decision not to cooperate with the 
emerging alliance, he explained, “It is their right to choose this option – But I believe that 
boycotting is not the appropriate answer in response to a ruler determined to stay in 
power no matter what. I believe we need to participate to bring change
7
”. In addition to 
Nour, Talaat Sadat, nephew of Anwar Sadat from al-Ahrar Party, also submitted his 
papers for candidacy. Given Nour’s decision to run for president, al-Wafd decided that it 
no longer wanted to boycott the elections and would field its leader, Numan Jummah, 
instead. Jummah and Nour have a long history of a personal rivalry, as Nour broke away 
from al-Wafd to form al-Ghad party. Even though each party was well aware that they 
had very little chance of actually winning the presidential elections, my conjecture is that 
they did not want to lose this opportunity to rally their constituents or run the risk of 
allowing other candidates to appeal to their constituency. Al-Wafd and al-Ghad appeal to 
a very similar constituency consisting of the upper middle class and professionals such as 
doctors and lawyers. Allowing al-Ghad to run for elections uncontested would weaken al-
Wafd’s constituency.  
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Despite their initial efforts towards achieving an alliance, opposition parties failed 
to mobilize their constituents towards a referendum or elections boycott. The lack of a 
united front showed their inability to form an alliance against the regime. As one 
observer explained, “The lack of coordination among opposition parties is very 
problematic as they lose credibility in demanding reforms from the government. The 
ruling party will be safe from pressure”
8
.  
Ideologically similar parties, such as al-Wafd and al-Ghad, were unable to work 
together in an alliance. By contrast, al-Wafd was surprisingly able to achieve some level 
of alliance building with leftist parties showing that ideological differences or similarity 
has little influence on alliance making. As explained in Chapter II, al-Wafd’s 
constituency lies mostly among the upper classes, especially the landed elite, while leftist 
parties receive most of their support from a very different section of the population – the 
urban lower-middle class and lower class. It appears that, the divided nature of al-Wafd’s 
constituency in relation to the leftists parties eliminated the possibility of member 
poaching as a major obstacle to forming alliances. One interviewee stated that both al-
Tagammu and the Nasserite party were trying to establish an alliance with al-Wafd. The 
competition between the two parties led to intense rivalry as each tried to exclude the 
other from the alliance
9
. My conjecture is that, since al-Tagammu and the Nasserites have 
fluid constituencies in relation to each other but divided constituencies in relation to al-
Wafd, they each tried to out-do the other in forming an alliance with al-Wafd.  
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As the presidential elections drew closer, Nour and Jummah began campaigning 
enthusiastically throughout the country. Al-Wafd surprised citizens and observers alike 
by selecting a controversial new party slogan, itkhanana, “we have been suffocated.” The 
slogan showed the extent to which the opposition was looking upon this election as a 
means to express their frustration with the current regime. As Slackman explains: 
 
While the word comes from the root to strangle, it is used in everyday conversation as an 
expression of exasperation, and its use as a political slogan has resonated here because it 




Nour also rallied constituents with aggressive campaigning. His prison sentence had 
turned him into a martyr of sorts. Both Jummah and Nour attracted large crowds at their 
speaking events all around the country. 
 For the first time in his political career as the president, Mubarak faced political 
rivals at the polls and launched an election campaign. State run newspapers began 
releasing articles praising his regime. Al-Ahram, in particular, released several articles 
extolling his accomplishments. One observer told me that Mubarak had actually been 
seen talking to people about their daily struggles and what he would do to change things 
in his next term in office
11
.  
 The charged political atmosphere and increased demands for change created 
opportunities for the opposition be  to form alliances on at least some occasions. While 
opportunities to form alliances emerged, none actually materialized. In the next section, I 
examine the interaction between the Muslim Brotherhood and Kifaya.  
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Interaction between the Muslim Brotherhood and Kifaya: 
 
 The Muslim Brotherhood is the largest opposition group in Egypt. In its attempt 
to gain legal recognition, the group has tried to cultivate an organizational culture of 
working with the existing political structure of the regime. It has therefore made an 
attempt to engage in only state-sponsored protest activity in which members refrain from 
directly criticizing the regime. In 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood’s earlier stance on only 
engaging in state-sponsored protest activity changed significantly. The charged political 
atmosphere, combined with general outrage over the limited extent of the reforms, 
sparked a wave of protest from the Muslim Brotherhood. Muslim Brotherhood protests 
occurred in close temporal proximity to  demonstrations by a new group – Kifaya. 
Originally formed as an anti-Iraq war group, Kifaya had gained momentum as a pro-
reform, anti-Mubarak alliance of several different political activists ranging from former 
Brethren to Copts and to leftists. Despite similarities on several issues in their programs, 
the two groups failed to form an alliance to jointly resist the superficial reforms initiated 
by the Mubarak regime. 
 The Muslim Brotherhood organized its first large-scale demonstration on March 
27
th
. Brotherhood members gathered in front of the parliament asking the regime to 
abolish emergency laws. The protest was unlicensed and several members were arrested. 
Protesters also gathered at Ramses and Zaynab Square in Cairo, chanting slogans for 
reform. Hours later, members gathered at al-Fateh mosque and the Press Syndicate. Isam 
el-Aryan, a Muslim Brotherhood member, told The New York Times in a phone interview, 
“We are now struggling for real reform in Egypt.” He continued, “And real reform has an 
agenda that is entirely different from the formal constitutional change. What we want is 
161 
 
to change the prevailing atmosphere
12
”. Kifaya organized its own demonstration on the 
same day, calling for an end to the Mubarak era. In response to the Brotherhood protest, 
Kifaya leaders told the press that they had motivated the change in the Muslim 
Brotherhood. One member remarked, “The Brotherhood is like an enormous body with a 
very small brain. It takes time to get it moving.” He continued, “They don’t want to miss 
out – our pressure forces them to organize their own demonstration
13
”.  
 Kifaya organized another protest on March 30
th
 in front of the People’s Assembly 
building (Majlis al-Shaab al-Misriya). Security officers blocked all streets to the 
parliament, forcing the protesters to march to the journalists syndicate instead. The 
protesters declared that they were completely opposed to the Mubarak regime and wanted 
its immediate end. They expressed hostility towards the United States for propping up 
Mubarak and emphasized that they would not accept hereditary rule of his son as a 
solution. The members raised their red and yellow colored flag to make their presence 
felt. However, the Kifaya protest soon turned violent. Eyewitnesses reported that a band 
of thugs attacked the protesters, especially targeting women. Police and security officials 
watched as they were publicly beaten
14
. The attack raised their profile further and called 
attention to their cause. 
Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Kifaya had become targets of the regime 
because of their street mobilization, even though the turnout at Kifaya protests was 
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significantly lower than those organized by the Muslim Brotherhood. Even though they 
had different ideological commitments, the two groups had many similarities in their 
agenda as both were demanding change in the prevailing political atmosphere of strict 
government control over political activity. Despite the similarities in their agenda and 
efforts to work together, the two groups could not engage in a mobilization alliance. The 
love-hate tussle between the two groups became a popular topic for social and political 
commentary. One popularly read Egyptian blogger pointed out that the tussle between the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Kifaya seemed to be more on the issue of hereditary rule than 
the religious issue. While Kifaya had expressed complete opposition to Mubarak and his 
son Gamal, Muslim Brotherhood members had claimed that as long as emergency rule 
was lifted, they would accept either of the two as the president
15
.  
 On April 27
th
, Kifaya organized 14 marches under the banner, “no constitution 
without freedom.” Once again, security officials cracked down arresting several 
protesters. A week later, on May 4
th
, the Muslim Brotherhood held a large demonstration 
on the occasion of Mubarak’s birthday. In addition to pro-reform slogans, the Muslim 
Brotherhood members also spoke favorably of Coptic Christians. One member was 
quoted as chanting, “The Muslim Brotherhood is a part of the nation and Copts are sons 
of the nation
16
”. The sudden appeal to the Coptic Christian community appeared to be 
aimed at Kifaya, whose leader George Ishak is a Copt. June saw another series of protests 
coinciding with the Kifaya campaign against the Mubarak regime. Referring to Mubarak, 
George Ishak, the head of Kafaya said, “You are tired, you need to rest, we will call you 
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father of the nation
17
”. Ishak told news reporters that the “culture of fear” that had 
gripped the country has been broken. People are now not afraid of mass political action
18
. 
Three weeks later, the Brotherhood launched a civil disobedience campaign to increase 
pressure on the Mubarak regime.  
 After organizing several protests in close proximity to each other, on July 20
th
, the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Kifaya finally agreed to organize a joint demonstration. 
However, this demonstration showed the divisions among the two groups rather than the 
possibility of an alliance. As many as 5,000 Muslim Brotherhood members gathered 
along with several hundred Kifaya members. Muslim Brotherhood members shouted 
slogans such as “with our blood and soul, we redeem you Islam.” Kifaya members 
changed, “Down with Mubarak” and “Enough with Mubarak.” Muslim Brotherhood 
members began leaving the protest halfway though the two hour rally. When asked the 
reason for disbanding the protest, Brotherhood leaders replied that their goal was not to 
insult the president or state institutions, and they had to leave for this reason
19
. Yet the 
Muslim Brotherhood had challenged Mubarak directly on several previous occasions, 
especially in the large protest organized on his birthday. 
 As shown above, the Muslim Brotherhood and Kifaya held several separate 
protests, some within a day of each other. Despite their efforts to cooperate in the July 
20
th
 protest, an alliance did not emerge. The Muslim Brotherhood had become 
increasingly insecure about Kifaya’s need to expand its constituency, especially in the 
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liberal minded sections of the Muslim Brotherhood. As discussed in previous chapters, 
the Muslim Brotherhood had already lost some of its members to a liberal-minded break 
off group, al-Wasat in 1996. Kifaya had taken the Egyptian political scene by storm and 
received high levels of regional and international press attention. Even without an 
established constituency, the group took several bold steps that challenged not just the 
regime, but existing groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite sharing the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s opposition to United States’ foreign policy, superficial reforms in Egypt, 
and the Mubarak regime’s use of draconian repressive policies, Kifaya tried to establish 
differences with the group by presenting itself as a more dynamic movement willing to 
challenge the regime in fearless ways. In this way, Kifaya appeared to be trying to attract 
younger and more liberal-minded sections of the Muslim Broterhood’s constituency. 
Despite having similarities in their agenda and being faced with similar circumstances, 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Kifaya could not form an alliance. It appears that The 
Muslim Brotherhood’s past experiences with the succession of the younger cadre of 
members to al-Wasat had much to do with their need to counter Kifaya’s emergence as a 
more dynamic opposition movement. Other observers also noted that Kifaya had become 
a “threat” to the Muslim Brotherhood. As Murphy explains: 
And in this restless Arab Spring, the 77 year old organization which favors Islamic law 
and says it is committed to democracy has been roused from a public slumber. Worried 
that the proactive steps taken by secular Egyptian reformers like Kifaya (Enough) 
movement could cost the Brotherhood its position as Egypt’s leading opposition 
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National Alliance for Restoration and Change: 
 
 As the largest opposition group in Egyptian politics, the Muslim Brotherhood 
carries many different political currents under its sway. While held together under the 
banner, “Islamist,” the Brotherhood is actually composed of different groups of members 
who have various interpretations of what it means to be an “Islamist.” In 1996, one such 
group succeeded and joined with others to form its own political group by the name of 
“al-Wasat
21
.” In March 2005, the Brotherhood experienced another such succession in 
the form of “Reform, Development and Justice Party.” The new group was initiated by 
Khaled Zafrani, a former Brotherhood activist who had recruited several current 
members. The new group put in its papers to the CPP as a moderate Islamist party that 
supports civil liberties. Reform, Justice and Development Party did not spark a furor 
within the Muslim Brotherhood as was the case with al-Wasat in 1996. However, the 
secession of two “moderate” groups prompted the Muslim Brotherhood to rethink its role 
in the polity and its relationships with other parties. Specifically, according to one 
Muslim Brotherhood member, the group decided that there was a need to engage in 
meaningful discussions with other parties
22
. In an interview with al-Wafd newspaper, 
Muhammad Habib, Deputy General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood stated that the 
group did not maintain any contact with the breakaway groups, the Justice and 
Development Party or al-Wasat, as each had been formed without consultations with 
Muslim Brotherhood leaders. He continued that since the opposition parties were in a 
similar situation  after boycotting the referendum, a united front could emerge. The front 
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would be more powerful, Habib argued, if it included all political elements and if the 
Muslim Brotherhood would be willing to limit its own role and decision making authority 
in the interest of equitable participation by several groups. He stated that the Muslim 
Brotherhood had already begun talks with other opposition parties on forming the front 
and that more details about the alliance would emerge soon
23
. 
 The Muslim Brotherhood revealed the face of the new alliance in June. The 
National Alliance for Restoration and Change (NARC), would begin with a conference of 
all political parties on June 30
th
. The purpose of the conference would be to exercise 
peaceful pressure on the regime through legal and constitutional means to make it 
responsive to democratic change. The Muslim Brotherhood received mixed responses 
from other parties to their invitation. While the SLP responded favorably, the Nasserites 
said that they would first need to consider the proposition internally. al-Wafd leader 
Mohammed Alwan said that his party had no problem with working with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, even though it is a religious group. al-Tagammu on the other hand stated 
that were would not be willing to participate in any alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood 
because of its religious nature.  
 The June 30
th
 inaugural conference of NARC was held as planned. 1,000 Muslim 
Brotherhood activists attended, but only al-Wafd sent a high-level representative. The 
Nasserite Party declined attendance after discussing the matter internally. Despite the 
lack of attendance by other parties, the Muslim Brotherhood called for a civil 
disobedience campaign against the government. al-Wafd party delegate Mohammed 
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Alwan declared that his party supported the call for civil disobedience and that they are 
honored to be a part of NARC. 
 When asked why other groups did not attend the June 30
th
 NARC meeting, 
Muslim Brotherhood General Guide Muhammad Akif explained that they were trying to 
bring together various groups and parties through seminars and conferences to help 
coordinate goals and strategies. If other parties did not want to participate, the Muslim 
Brotherhood could not do anything about it. The group had already declared itself willing 
to cooperate with others on the principles of mutual equality, but if others did not want to 
pay the price for a joint struggle, that was their choice
24
.  
  Despite the initial unenthusiastic response to NARC, the Muslim Brotherhood 
continued its efforts to build the alliance. Habib declared in various interviews with 
regional and national newspapers that NARC had discussed ideas about launching a civil 
disobedience movement, including boycott, demonstrations, and protests, but that 
members had not yet agreed on a final program. NARC had also taken the initiative to 
form a constitutional studies committee consisting of various political forces to discuss 
drafting of a new constitution. He explained that the alliance had been set up to address 
the growing need for unity among parties so that they can exert pressure on the regime 
for change
25
. He further added that all decisions within NARC would be taken by two-
third majority and that the Muslim Brotherhood would only have 25% of the seats in the 
permanent secretariat. He acknowledged that while every political party has a different 
agenda, but there are also some common denominators over which they can not differ. 
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For example, they all want to see a democratic system with equality and respect for 
different ideas and rotation of power
26
. One analyst noted that the Muslim Brotherhood 
was sending the message, “we want to participate not dominate
27
”.  
 Even though the Muslim Brotherhood made every effort to assure other groups 
and parties that the alliance would be highly beneficial to all participating members and 
that it would not impose its own hegemony, NARC failed to gain additional allies. The 
proposed alliance soon lost momentum and disappeared from public discourse. Once 
again, Egyptian opposition groups had failed to join forces in their struggle against the 
regime. The Muslim Brotherhood commands a wide constituency within the country 
making it Egypt’s most powerful and visible opposition group. The 2005 political 
opening provided other opposition groups with an opportunity to campaign and increase 
their support bases by attracting Muslim Brotherhood supporters who simply do not see 
any other option to have their voice heard. Leftists are trying to attract workers and 
students who currently support the Brotherhood, while liberal groups such as Kifaya want 
to expand in the liberal minded pockets of the group’s constituents. It appeared that 
forming an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood would prevent the groups from 
achieving these aims and would put their existing constituencies at risk. The only group 
that responded favorably to NARC was al-Wafd. al-Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood 
have very different constituencies, with al-Wafd receiving most of its support from the 
upper - class of the population, especially the elite while the Muslim Brotherhood taps 
into the middle and lower middle class. Further the Muslim Brotherhood receives support 
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from urban sections of the population while al-Wafd is the only party besides the ruling 
NDP to receive support from rural areas. My conjecture is that the divided nature of 
group constituencies has made it possible for the two groups to form mobilization 
alliances.  
In August, a government-run panel approved the candidacy of nine candidates to 
participate in the elections against Mubarak. The candidates included Nour and Jummah, 
but Talat Sadat’s candidacy was not approved. The presidential election was held as 
scheduled on September 7
th
 without foreign observers or any of the provisions that 
opposition members had previously demanded. Courts registered widespread complaints 
of electoral fraud, but still considered the results valid. Mubarak won by a wide margin, 
followed by Nour and then Jummah.  
The results of the election left citizens outraged. On October 2
nd
, the Muslim 
Brotherhood organized student protests in Cairo University, Ain Shams, and al-Azhar, 
demanding fair elections. Further protests occurred in Cairo on October 11
th
. On October 
25
th
, the Muslim Brotherhood organized another rally in Cairo in which a large group of 
women and children participated. The rally was publicized though street posts, t-shirts 
and even songs. The increased visibility of the Muslim Brotherhood was an indication 
that members considered it perfectly legitimate to be associated with a banned 
organization. A regional news source reported that the Muslim Brotherhood was 
considering fielding as many as 150 candidates in the parliamentary elections
28
. After the 
presidential elections were held, the opposition groups had one last chance of having their 
voice heard in the parliamentary elections to be held in November. Once again, al-Wafd 
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initiated an alliance to try and put pressure on the Mubarak regime by forming a voting 
bloc.  
 




, al-Wafd invited several parties including Nasserites, Kifaya, al-
Ghad, and the Muslim Brotherhood, to participate in a new alliance called United 
National Front for Change (henceforth, the Front). The goal of the alliance was to allow 
various opposition groups and parties to formulate a joint strategy for participating in the 
elections and also to serve as a forum for pushing for reform in Egypt. As a part of the 
coordination effort, the Muslim Brotherhood agreed to withdraw some of their candidates 
from the parliamentary election in certain districts to allow other groups to field their own 
candidates.  
Not all parties responded favorably to al-Wafd’s invitation. Al-Ghad did not join, 
as the group was hosted by al-Wafd at their headquarters in al-Masoura. Kifaya agree to 
support the alliance in principle, but owing to its social movement status, did not 
participate in putting together candidate lists. Al-Wafd, Arab Nasserites and Tagammu 
decided to field joint candidates which would require campaign alliances, but after much 
discussion the Front could only agree to one common program: Members decided not to 
run candidates against each other. The Brotherhood’s membership in the alliance also 
seemed improbable. A governing party member explained that the main reason the 
alliance did not seem to be working was because the parties are very weak. They could 
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not coordinate with each other because of internal divisions and dissensions
29
. Yet, as I 
explain, the reasons for the failure of the alliance lay elsewhere.  
After much internal discussion, the Muslim Brotherhood agreed to coordinate its 
candidate lists with al-Wafd and al-Tagammu so that the groups would no run candidates 
against each other. Muhammed Akef, the General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
declared that while the group was coordinating with al-Wafd and al-Tagammu, it did not 
have to agree on ideology
30
.  
While the groups had formed an alliance to not run candidates against each other, 
the risk of “member poaching” once again became a major issue as by allowing other 
candidates to campaign unopposed each group was risking its constituency. The Muslim 
Brotherhood broke its commitment to the alliance and decided to contest a seat from Kafr 
Shukr constituency against a very prominent al-Tagammu leader, Khaled Muhyi al-Din. 
Al-Tagammu members viciously attacked the Muslim Brotherhood for going back on its 
agreement with the Front. After the elections, Akef defended the group’s decision by 
claiming that it had had concerns about Khaled Muhyi al-Din’s failing health and thus 
whether he would not be able to perform his duties adequately
31
. The Muslim 
Brotherhood’s statements were especially offensive to the al-Tagammu because al-Din is 
an extremely important figure in Egyptian politics: he was one of the Free Officers who 
revolted against the Egyptian monarchy in 1952. It appears that the risk of al-Tagammu 
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making encroachments on the Muslim Brotherhood’s constituency in the district 
prevented the alliance from succeeding.  
The first round of parliamentary elections began on November 9
th
. In a ruling that 
surprised many observers, the Egyptian courts upheld a decision to allow civil society 
and human rights groups to monitor the elections. The court ruling was highly significant 
as the judiciary had again shown its teeth as a credible source of opposition to the 
Mubarak regime
32
. In addition to the independent observers, transparent ballot boxes 
were also a new feature in the elections. While the courts registered some reports of 
irregularities and frauds, overall analysts noted that these may have been Egypt’s “freest 
elections
33
”. The first round of the elections revealed the majority of the seats would go 
to the ruling NDP. The Muslim Brotherhood gained an impressive 34 seats, while al-
Wafd, Tagammu, and al-Ghad only won one seat each. The second round began on 
November 20
th
. Wary of the Muslim Brotherhood’s excellent performance in the first 
round, security officers arrested 200 Muslim Brotherhood members ahead of the polls. 
However, the Muslim Brotherhood did exceedingly well in the second round, gaining 
additional seats and raising its total representation to 76 seats. After the second round of 
polling, the Muslim Brotherhood had gained five times more seats than its representation 
in the parliament before the elections.  
The final round of voting was held on December 1
st
. Again security forces 
arrested several Muslim Brotherhood members, but  the organization gained yet more 
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seats. The Muslim Brotherhood gained a total of 88 seats, which put its representation at 
20% of the parliament.  Joint candidates from the United National Front for Change did 
not win any seats. Isam al-Aryan referred to the formation for the joint electoral list by 
the front as a “hasty and rushed decision
34
.” Another analyst pointed out that the Front 
had a program that was too ambitious and suffered from a resounding defeat as a result
35
.  
The failure of the United Front once again shows the inability of the various 
opposition parties to form an alliance. It appears that, since each group does not have a 
consistent and exclusive constituency, forming an alliance has raised fears about losing 
constituents. As one analyst explains, perhaps the opposition parties should not have been 
working to form the Front in the first place and focused their energies on solidifying their 
constituencies: 
 
Operating in a semiauthoritarian political system with a dominant ruling party, Egypt’s 
opposition should have worked to articulate clear electoral profiles and reached out to the 
public with distinct program. To believe that united opposition fronts can better challenge 
autocratic rulers than autonomous parties ignores the vital need for each party to develop 





Analysis: Mobilization Alliances in Egypt: 
 
 Egypt’s political system is composed of a hegemonic ruling party which controls 
most of the parliament and a president who has been in power for two decades. While 
parliamentary elections are held every five years, the opposition remains limited in its 
voice in the government and on the street. The Muslim Brotherhood is the most powerful 
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opposition group in the country but remains officially banned from participating as a 
political party. Decades of semiauthoritarian rule has not stunted the formation of 
opposition parties, but had limited the extent to which they have been able to command 
base constituencies. With the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood, most opposition 
parties have had difficulty in carving a niche of political support through visibility in the 
public sphere. The 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections were an opportunity for 
these parties to gain voice in the political system.  
While limited in its scope, the 2005 political opening sparked a rise in political 
activity throughout the country. New groups such as Kifaya challenged the Mubarak 
regime directly, and long-term parties such as al-Wafd raised a controversial campaign 
slogan to express their frustration with the current system. The rise in political activity 
led to some expectation that opposition groups in Egypt would find some common 
ground and that alliances would emerge. As one scholar argues: 
Secular- religious national alliances for democracy are instrumental in contesting 
authoritarian state power and articulating popular consensus over the need for political 
transformation. Moderate Islamists’ pragmatism and the issues they address place them 




 The formation of alliances among groups—for example, students, workers and 
religious groups—have been instrumental throughout history in inciting revolutions and 
brining down unjust and totalitarian governments. But how are these alliances achieved? 
As I have shown in the case of Egypt, while opposition groups had several opportunities 
to work together, most of the proposed alliances failed to materialize. Opposition groups 
did not respond favorably to each others’ calls for an alliance. In some cases while groups 
agreed to form an alliance they defected before the mobilization could be achieved. Many 
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alliances seemed to fail for no obvious reason. For example, during the campaign for the 
referendum and presidential election boycott, opposition parties seemed to be reaching an 
agreement making it likely an an alliance would emerge.  But not only did the alliance 
ultimately fail to appeal to additional members, its founding parties also chose not to 
adhere to the original agreement. The Muslim Brotherhood and Kifaya were leading the 
opposition in anti-regime mobilization, but did not form an alliance to successfully 
organize any protests or demonstrations. The Muslim Brotherhood initiated National 
Alliance for Restoration and Change (NARC), inviting diverse members to put pressure 
on the Mubarak regime for free and fair elections, but only al-Wafd responded favorably. 
al-Wafd made a final effort to bring the opposition together under the umbrella of United 
National Front for Change but the alliance failed as groups became concerned about 
others’ mobilizing their constituents.  
 My research shows that the reason mobilization alliances failed in the case of 
Egypt was not ideological difference, regime repression or the stability of Mubarak’s 
government. While the regime was using heavy handed repression against the opposition, 
groups challenged the regime individually through controversial slogans and protests that 
put them in harm’s way, as can be seen in the case of Kifaya and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. While Mubarak had been in power for several decades, the 2005 political 
opening had significantly altered the prevailing political atmosphere in the country and 
raised hopes for change. Long-standing groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and al-
Wafd found new political energy, while new groups such as Kifaya and al-Ghad emerged 
to raise a challenge to the regime. These efforts show that the opposition was not 
apathetic about the 2005 political opening, but rather saw it as an opportunity to initiate 
176 
 
change. While the prevailing atmosphere was that change could be achieved, joint 
mobilization did not emerge during this time period.  
The alliance patterns fit within the model I have described. In the case of the 
campaign for the referendum/ presidential election boycott, some alliances emerged 
among rightist al-Wafd party and leftist al-Tagammu and the Nasserite Party. However, 
these parties have very different constituencies. Al-Wafd’s constituency lies among the 
upper classes, especially the elite, while leftists target middle and lower classes. al-Ghad 
did not cooperate with al-Wafd in the election boycott campaign or in the United 
National Front for Change despite both parties being liberal, rightist and secular. The 
leaders of the two groups have a personal rivalry, which they could not bridge because 
they are aiming at the same constituency. 
 Based on the interaction between Kifaya and the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
commentary provided by observers, the lack of alliance making between Kifaya and the 
Muslim Brotherhood appears to be a product of Kifaya’s fluid constituency and Muslim 
Brotherhood’s fear of Kifaya’s expansion. One analyst commented that Kifaya has taken 
the form of a “transnational protest movement” that remains elitist and has yet to develop 
grass-roots support
38
. Kifaya leaders are trying to appeal to those sections of population 
that want change and are frustrated with the lack of political activism towards this goal. 
Since many of their potential constituents are the liberal sections of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, they are trying to establish a clear line of difference between themselves 
and the Brethren. Kifaya’s dynamic nature and sudden forceful appearance on the 
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Egyptian political scene was intimidating to the Muslim Brotherhood, which had already 
lost several younger members to al-Wasat and the Reform, Development and Justice 
Party. The fluid nature of group constituencies may have prevented alliances in this case. 
 While the Muslim Brotherhood initiated NARC failed to gain momentum, it did 
succeed in obtaining the support of al-Wafd party. The Muslim Brotherhood and al-Wafd 
had been allied partners in the 1984 elections, although the partnership did not continue 
in the 1987 elections. al-Wafd’s liberal ideology and support from the Coptic Christian 
community make it ideologically very different from the Muslim Brotherhood, but its 
support among the elite sections of society makes its constituency distinct from the 
Brethren, who have their major constituency among the middle and lower middle classes. 
 I have shown in the case of Egypt that overall the alliances initiated by various 
groups failed to be successful. I now examine the case of Pakistan, where despite a 
history of highly volatile differences among opposition parties, several alliances emerged.  
 
Mobilization Alliances in Pakistan: 
 
 On October 12
th
 1999, Nawaz Sharif’s unpopular PML government was deposed 
in a military coup. General Pervez Musharraf, the Chief of Army Staff under Sharif, took 
over as the leader of the country, putting an end to democratic politics for nearly a 
decade. The military is one of the most respectable institutions in Pakistan, considered 
untainted by the corruption and lack of vision that characterizes democratic politics in the 
country. For this reason, the majority of the citizens initially welcomed the Musharraf 
government. They had hopes that his policies would not only “clean up” politics, but also 
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initiate sound economy policy that would benefit the middle class rather than poaching 
on their tax contributions
39
.  
 After taking over the government, Musharraf began consolidating his rule. The 
first step was to ban rallies and other forms of collective political activity. He neutralized 
the PML but putting Sharif in jail and arresting several hundred party activists under 
charges of defying laws banning rallies and demonstrations. With Sharif’s arrest, his 
wife, Kulsum Sharif, took over the leadership of the party and became its major 
spokesperson. She addressed PML supporters at several rallies inciting public outrage 
over the arrest of her husband. Security forces cracked down by putting Kulsum Sharif 
under house arrest. They also cordoned off her home to prevent her from holding party 
meetings at the premises. Observers argued that the government was afraid of Kulsum, 
reflecting paranoia towards any opposition
40
.  
 After his trial in December 2000, Sharif and his family were allowed to go into 
exile in Saudi Arabia. Two of Pakistan’s most important leaders – Benazir Bhutto and 
Nawaz Sharif—had now been exiled from the country. However, both continued to have 
a major influence on their parties and were instrumental in directing their strategies in the 
years to come.  
 Musharraf came to power without the support of any political party. He soon 
realized that in order to maintain power, especially control over the legislature, he would 
have to form a party or co-opt an existing group. He enticed both PML and PPP into 
supporting his rule. A prominent journalist reported that Musharraf was making extensive 
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use of the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI to contact various parties, create divisions and 
engineer defections
41
. He was successful in gaining the acquiescence of a faction of the 
PML. The faction broke away from the PML and called itself PML(q) or Quaid-e-Azam 
group, also commonly known as the King’s Party. PML(q) gained wide electoral and 
other political victories by virtue of its association with the ruling regime. According to 
Pakistani news sources, the secretary to Musharraf, Tarq Aziz personally supervised the 
consolidation of the King’s Party in rural Punjab, where the PML was weak
42
. In 
exchange, Musharraf effectively established control over the parliament, allowing him to 
pass constitutional amendments with ease. He also approached Islamist parties for their 
support. Through a series of private associations, MMA agreed to support Musharraf in 
passing some constitutional amendments. A PPP faction led by Aftab Sherpao also gave 
its support to the military government. The new group came to be known as PPP(s). In 




As a further step to consolidate his support in the country, Musharraf also 
developed a devolution plan. Through local body elections, he formed patron client 
relationships with local landlords, feudal and tribal leaders whose future political career 
depended on Musharraf staying in power. In January 2004, Musharraf succeeded in 
passing a set of amendments to the constitution collectively known as the Legal 
Framework Order (LFO). These amendments put the capstone on the consolidation of his 
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rule in the country by allowing him to continue his presidency until 2007, use his 
discretion to dismiss the parliament at any time, and formalize the role of the military in 
politics. Musharraf seemed well entrenched in Pakistani politics, more than any of his 
military or democratically elected predecessors.  
 Opposition to the Musharraf rule gained momentum after US President Bill 
Clinton’s visit to the country in March 2000. Observers explained that Bill Clinton’s 
insistence on restoration of “real democracy” in Pakistan emboldened the opposition, and 
demands for restoration of democracy became louder after his visit
44
. Various alliances 
emerged to put pressure on the government despite ideological differences among groups, 
state repression, enticements, and other incentives to defect. I discuss the formation of 
alliances through three case studies: 1) The emergence of Alliance for the Restoration of 
Democracy (ARD) and Majlis-e-Muttahida-e-Amal (MMA); 2) The campaign against the 
Legal Framework Order (LFO) and 3) The campaign against the local bodies’ elections. 
Each of these campaigns engaged in mobilization through an alliance against the 
Musharraf regime. The alliances were not always easily formed or maintained. Historical 
enmities and government-offered incentives for defecting often posed insurmountable 
challenges. As I will show, at times parties did defect from the alliance to support the 
regime in exchange for certain conditions. Forming an alliance with other parties was the 
subject of much controversy and internal debate and dissensions in several groups. Yet, 
despite these pressures the alliances emerged and engaged in widespread mobilization 
against the regime. 
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Formation of ARD and MMA: 
 
 On March 29
th
 2000, Pakistani opposition parties met in Lahore to discuss their 
strategy in opposing the Musharraf regime. The parties decided to revive the alliance 
many of them had formed in 1999 under the Sharif government – the Grand Democratic 
Alliance (GDA). The original purpose of GDA had been to oppose the Sharif 
government, but with Sharif out of power and the political system closed for the time 
being, GDA members had to decide whether to include PML in the alliance. One the one 
hand, GDA could not be an effective alliance without the inclusion of a major party that 
has a well established constituency in Punjab; on the other hand, a leading member of the 
GDA, the PPP was firmly opposed to PML’s membership owing to their history of 
intense rivalry. While several PML members felt that they should join GDA, factions 
within the party were of the opinion that since PML has the anti-Bhutto vote bank, if they 
joined the alliance, their supporters would be disillusioned with the new association with 
the PPP. As one journalist explains: 
 
The Pakistan People’s Party led by Ms. Benazir Bhutto is a key partner of the GDA and 
the contention of the rebels in the PML was that how could their party join hands with an 
archrival like PPP? It sounds logical, but the argument of the Sharif loyalists is a month is 




 Bhutto and Sharif had spent a lifetime hating each other, and an alliance between 
the two would have been unthinkable just a few months ago. GDA debated the issue by 
forming a special committee to consider the proposal. Individual members were not 
allowed to negotiate separately with the PML or any other party wanting to join the 
alliance. After internal deliberations, PML decided not to join GDA as this would create 
divisions within the party. 
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 Although PML did not join GDA, the party did participate in a meeting of the 
alliance on August 6
th
. The PPP and PML cooperated for the first time, setting aside their 
personal rivalries. The inclusion of the PML in the alliance meeting came with 
consequences. Appalled by the possibility of renegotiations with the PML, Tehreek-e-
Insaaf party decided to defect from the alliance. Despite Tehreek-e-Insaaf’s party’s 
protests, contacts between PPP and PML increased leading to speculations in the news 
media that PML might be joining GDA after all
46
.  
 On October 30
th
, PML formally decided to join GDA and GDA welcomed the 
proposal. The decision led to the defection of a faction within the PML that was firmly 
opposed to the PPP and PML’s cooperation with other parties through this new alliance. 
The faction included four top officials of the party. Those that chose to stay with the 
party changed their name to PML(n) or – Nawaz Sharif group. The three main parties 
forming the GDA now included PPP, PML(n) and the regional Awami National Party 
(ANP). The group elected Nawab Nasarullah Khan as their head. GDA changed its name 
to Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) to disassociate itself from its history 
of opposition to the Sharif government.  
 Nasarullah Khan declared that ARD would be a political alliance, meant to put 
pressure on the current government. The group did not have plans to function as an 
electoral alliance. ARD’s first campaign was to launch an opposition campaign against 
the government initiated local bodies polls to be held on a non-party basis on December 
31
st
. However, the alliance was still very new at the time, and the elections were held as 
planned.  
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The first set of ARD rallies came in March when the group announced that it 
would hold a public meeting at the historic Mochi Gate in Lahore. The announcement 
immediately caught the attention of national and regional media as this would be the first 
attempt to engage in organized resistance against the Musharraf regime. As one news 
correspondent explained, “Should it take place, it [the rally] would be the fist step 
towards politics of defiance by key opposition parties of the country which have so far 
been keeping a low profile
47
”. The rally happened as scheduled. Thousands of protesters 
demanded that the government lift the ban on political activity, restore the constitution, 
and create an impartial election commission with a clear schedule for holding elections. 
Despite the differences among the parties, they had agreed to mobilize on the common 
points in their agenda unlike the case of the Muslim Brotherhood and Kifaya in Egypt. 
Security officials arrested several hundred protesters for defying the law. Others were 
beaten in public. Analysts explained that the regime’s heavy handedness in dealing with 
the ARD rally revealed far more about Musharraf’s paranoia than the strength of the 
opposition. Through its reaction to the rally, the regime managed to imbue the event with 
an air of importance that would perhaps have been otherwise absent
48
. 
 In April 2001, ARD planned another rally in Karachi to press the government to 
restore democracy and hold elections. Security officials sealed off the venue for the 
protest and arrested as many as 800 activists including several top ARD leaders. All 
roads leading to the rally were blocked and the government deployed policemen to patrol 
the city for two days. In addition several other ARD leaders were arrested in corruption 
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charges soon after the rally. The government seemed to be sending a clear message that 
the regime had both the will and the resources to suppress the opposition to its fullest 
extent. Future ARD protests continued to be met with arrests, baton charges and barb 
wire fences barricading the protesters. 
 In 2002, Musharraf announced that he would hold a referendum in May, which 
would allow him to legitimate his power as the President and continue his rule. This 
would be the third time a military ruler has tried to legitimize his rule through a popular 
referendum. International Crisis Group declared the referendum illegal by any 
interpretation of the Pakistani constitution. The referendum announcement incited public 
outrage against the regime. As one analyst explains: 
General Musharraf has often emphasized that he is neither another Ayub Khan or Zia-ul-
Haq, but appears to be following their script to the letter. Not only is he holding a 
referendum in an attempt to legitimize his rule, but is also engaged in trying to establish a 




 ARD decided to boycott the referendum. In April the alliance announced a series 
of rallies so express their denouncement. This time ARD found yet another partner – an 
alliance of Islamist parties under the banner Majlis-e-Muttahida-e-Amal (MMA). The 
General’s decision to hold a referendum brought opposition voices together under a 
single cause. Regional and national news sources expressed surprise at the possibility of 
disparate political forces uniting. ARD leader Nawab Nasarallah Khan told a news 
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 Formed in April 2002, MMA originally consisted of six Islamist parties led by 
two of the country’s oldest groups – Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami 
(JUI). One of the allied partners – Jamaat-Ahl-e-Hadith—broke away from the alliance 
soon after its formation. The alliance has its roots in the religious parties’ reaction to the 
US-led Afghanistan war. Despite deep ideological divisions between JI and the pro-
Taliban JUI, the alliance has been able to stay together. Many of MMA’s individual 
members had been supportive of the Musharraf regime so far. However MMA became 
opposed to Musharraf on several issues such as his Kashmir policy with India and 
relations with the United States’ war on terror.  
 MMA joined ARD in boycotting the referendum. The two groups began 
organizing widespread protests in different parts of the country. ARD organized a protest 
in Lahore at the Minar-e-Pakistan park. The Musharraf government sanctioned the protest 
but chided that the opposition would never be able to gather enough people to fill the 
venue. On April 28
th
, MMA organized a march in Rawlapindi. MMA and ARD also held 
a joint demonstration in NWFP on April 26
th
. Despite deep differences among secular 
and religious parties, unlike the case of Egypt, in Pakistan they were able to form an 
alliance to jointly challenge the regime.  
The Supreme Court approved the legitimacy of the referendum and it was held as 
planned. The government claimed a high turnout and declared that the opposition’s calls 
for a boycott had failed. Official figures put the turnout at 58% of which 98% voted 
“yes.” A turnout of 58% is unprecedented in the country as in the 1997 democratic 
elections, the turnout was 36%.  Musharraf used every trick in the book to win the 
referendum. The voting age was reduced to 18 years for the purposes of the referendum, 
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and the requirements of national identity cards and electoral lists were also waived
51
. 
International sources alleged widespread fraud and reported that polling stations 
remained deserted for most of the day. The Pakistan Human Rights Commission reported 
that the extent of the irregularities had surpassed all fears: many people voted several 
times, while others were barred from even entering the polling stations
52
. Yet, Musharraf 
gained claimed popular legitimacy to continue his rule until 2007. He announced 
parliamentary elections under his government’s supervision in October.  
 With the emergence of the pro-Musharraf PML(q) and Musharraf’s own success 
in “winning” the referendum, ARD began feverishly discussing their elections strategy. 
Even though the alliance was originally formed as a political and not an electoral 
coalition, Zafar Ali Shah, one of PML(n)’s central leaders said that ARD should convert 
itself into an electoral alliance and that party would have no trouble contesting elections 




 Alarmed by the possibility of Bhutto and Sharif running for the position of prime 
minister, Musharraf passed new laws restricting the conditions for prime ministership 
candidacy. The new law disallowed former prime ministers from running for a third term. 
Also, anyone under investigation for corruption charges would be disqualified from 
running for president. The new laws meant that both Bhutto and Sharif were disqualified, 
as both had served two terms as prime minister and both were under investigation for 
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corruption charges. Nevertheless, Bhutto and Sharif both submitted their papers for 
candidacy. The news of Bhutto’s disqualification came first. In a show of solidarity, 
Sharif withdrew his papers. While some analysts lauded Sharif’s withdrawal, others 
argued that since he would have been disqualified anyway, he conveniently withdrew his 
papers in time so that he could offer solidarity with Bhutto
54
. In an effort to further 
neutralize the PPP, in August the Musharraf government passed a new law that 
disqualified parties from contesting elections if their leader’s candidacy for prime 
ministership was rejected. Fearing disqualification, PPP registered itself as a new party 
under the name People’s Party of Pakistan Parliamentarians (PPPP). While officially 
known as PPPP, the party continued its campaign activities under the banner PPP.  
 Under direct supervision of the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, pro-
government parties, including the PML(q) and several smaller parties such as PPP(s) 
decided that they would contest elections together under the banner, “Grand Alliance.” In 
response, PML(n) and PPP decided to form an electoral alliance to contest the elections. 
The two parties made seat adjustments and decided not to run candidates against each 
other by mutually dividing up the constituencies based on their electoral strength. 
PML(n) and PPP also began talks with MMA to coordinate strategies. While PPP was 
opposed to forming an electoral alliance with MMA, because of the differences in 
ideology between the two groups, they realized that a joint electoral strategy would help 
in putting together all the anti-government voices.  
 On August 22
nd
, the Musharraf government passed a new constitutional 
amendment which have him sweeping powers, such as the right to dismiss the parliament 
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and establish a military controlled National Security Council to oversee the elections and 
matters of national importance. The amendment solidified his rule and formalized the 
role of the military in politics. Analysts explained that Musharraf had consolidated his 
power and would continue to enjoy a dictatorial status even after the elections because he 
he is able to dismiss the prime minister and dissolve the parliament at any time
55
.  One 
journalist writes: 
 
If there were any illusions about Pakistan returning to democracy after the October 
elections, they vanished last month when President Musharraf unveiled his plan to redraft 
the constitution and acquire sweeping powers. It is quite apparent that he has no intention 
of transferring power to an elected parliament, but simply plans to establish a shadow 




 As the elections drew nearer, despite enjoying high levels of street support, 
opposition parties became more and more disillusioned about their prospects as their 
rallies continued to be quelled by security forces and arrests and detentions continued. On 
September 7
th
, MMA planned a “train march,” in which members would board a train in 
Lahore and take it to Karachi. However, even before members could board the train, 
several prominent leaders, including Qazi Hussein of the JI, were arrested at the Lahore 
railway station. Security officials also foiled other campaigning attempts by PPP and 
PML(n), but the parties continued to cooperate in organizing additional campaigns. After 
intense deliberations, ARD constituent parties decided to contest elections under separate 
platforms. Their brand recognition as an alliance was limited, as the government had 
taken every step to limit their campaign activity. MMA decided to contest the elections as 
an alliance.  
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 The October elections were held as scheduled. Observers from EU, United States 
and other commonwealth countries arrived to monitor the polls. The results revealed a 
wide victory for PML(q), followed by PPP and MMA. MMA made vast gains in the 
NWFP where they formed the provincial government. Analysts explained that MMA had 
successfully used the prevailing anti-American sentiment after the Afghanistan war to 
aggregate their constituency in NWFP
57
. After the elections, a new chapter began in the 
history of opposition politics in Pakistan. With secular parties such as PPP and PML(n) 
gaining low representation in the parliament, they had very little hope in resisting the 
Musharraf regime’s legislative initiatives. Their fears were soon borne out as Musharraf 
announced his decision to have the parliament pass several amendments to the 1973 
constitution. The amendments together came to be known as Legal Framework Order 
(LFO). 
 
Anti- Legal Framework Order Campaign: 
 
 After the elections had ended, the parliament was all set to discuss the 
constitutional amendments that came to be known as Legal Framework Order. The 
Musharraf government had already implemented many of these new laws before the 
elections, but now he presented the MPs a copy of the 1973 constitution with the changes 
marked and to be discussed in the parliament. In this section, I describe the pandemonium 
that resulted and continued for the next several months as the opposition boycotted any 
session of the parliament meant to discuss the LFO. Ultimately the Musharraf regime did 
succeed in passing the LFO in the parliament with the support of certain key opposition 
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parties. The anti-LFO campaign shows that opposition alliances were not always easy to 
form in Pakistan, but despite the disagreements, they continued to challenge the 
Musharraf government in significant ways. 
 On March 6
th 
2003, the parliament held its first LFO session. Even before the 
matter could be drawn up, the opposition MPs, including MMA, PPP and PML deputies, 
broke into a chorus of protest chants and demanded that Musharraf quit the presidency. 





 as the newly elected MPs held that they would not take the oath of office under 
the new constitution. As a further expression of their opposition, the MPs also decided to 
boycott the elections of the senate chairman. The election was still held as scheduled, 
with the opposition absent from the parliament. The MPs did not allow LFO to be 
discussed in the parliament in the April 16
th
 session, once again leading to the speaker 





 Soon street protests against the LFO also emerged. PPP asked all opposition 
parties to participate in a countrywide protest on April 4
th
. MMA had also taken up the 
issue of the Iraq war in the parliament and on the streets. PPP did not participate in MMA 
organized anti-war protests, as it felt that such demonstrations would be too far from its 
core ideology. However, PPP refrained from condemning the protests. 
 Finally the government agreed to negotiate with the opposition. Each party would 
meet with the government separately to discuss the issue. Meeting groups separately was 
clearly an attempt to break the consensus on LFO within the opposition. Even before the 
negotiations began, Musharraf stressed that he would not be quitting his position as army 
chief and taking on a civilian role. One analyst explains that Musharraf’s confidence at 
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this time stemmed from his American backing, which he thought would be a substitute 
for domestic support: 
 
When Musharraf took power he promised to restore democracy within three years, after 
creating institutional checks and balances and introducing reforms that would forever end 
the alternation of power between authoritarian military rulers and ineffective elected 
civilians. Even before he achieved the status of a US ally, Musharraf had started 
espousing political ideas that rested on his continuation in office rather than on the 
effectiveness of institutions such as an independent judiciary or a government truly 
accountable to parliament. now with the international sanctions usually applied to 
military regimes having being lifted in return for his support in the anti-terrorism effort, 




Mindful of Musharraf’s strong position, MMA, PPP and PML(n) met at the residence of 
MMA leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed to chalk out a strategy for the upcoming negotiations. 
The negotiations seemed fruitful as after the first round of talks, the government and the 
opposition parties jointly agreed to form an 11-member committee to review LFO – 5 of 
the members would be from pro-Musharraf parties and 6 from the three main opposition 
parties. The convener would be a representative of the prime minister. The committee 
would draft a report on the contentious parts of the LFO and present their 
recommendations to the parliament.  
 The committee proved to be unsuccessful in drafting a report by consensus and 
instead presented two reports to the parliament – one drafted by the pro-reform parties 
and the other by the three opposition parties. The opposition parties had cooperated 
closely through the deliberations and had managed to maintain a united front in the face 
of the pro-government parties. The secular opposition groups agreed to include some 
MMA demands in addition to recommendations on LFO. These demands included 
proclaiming Friday a national holiday to observe the Muslim holyday of Jummah and 
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implementing Islamic ideology in the constitution. The demands revealed that the 
opposition had found a way to accommodate each other’s demands without reconciling tp 
them in their opposition to the regime. A pro-government member of the parliament 
exclaimed shock at these demands, he argued, “I think the myth of combined opposition 
parties with one view on all issues has exploded, and the differences between the 
opposition parties have become crystal clear
59
”.  
 The opposition remained united on the LFO issue. In June, MMA, PPP and 
PML(n) organized a seminar entitled, “LFO – a Mutilation of the 1973 Constitution” in 
Karachi. Several top leaders attended and spoke at the event. The opposition also 
continued to boycott the national assembly. On June 20
th
, MMA and PPP MPs walked 
out of a budget session on the LFO issue after filing a “no confidence” motion against the 
speaker who was in favor of LFO. The government responded with arrests and searches. 
Over 180 PPP activists were arrested, many were tortured. PPP observed June 29
th
 as a 
national condemnation day in response by organizing a protest in Lahore. MMA and 
PML(n) joined in the protest. The opposition’s overall low levels of formal representation 
in the government meant that they had to form an alliance both in the parliament and on 
the street.  
 While the opposition seemed to be firmly united on the LFO issue, cracks began 
to appear when MMA agreed to another round of negotiations with the government in 
July. Other parties were also invited, but PML(n) and PPP decided to boycott the talks. 
MMA’s acceptance of the invitation led to widespread speculation in the news media that 
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the opposition was splintering
60
. One ARD leader was quoted saying, “The political 
forces are fighting for the supremacy of the parliament and restoration of the 1973 
constitution but the MMA was busy in deal with the government
61
”. The government 
responded by blaming the ARD for the failure of talks on LFO. As a representative 
explained, “We intended to have purposeful dialogue, but some elements such as PPP 
parliamentarians and PML(n) are creating obstacles
62
”. MMA engaged in several rounds 
of talks with the government, many of which failed. But the alliance continued to engage 
in further negotiations with the regime, much to the chagrin of ARD who accused MMA 
of taking the country 20 years back by agreeing to Musharraf’s terms
63
. 
 After several rounds of negotiations, the government and MMA finally reached a 
consensus and on January 1
st
 2004, LFO passed in the assembly. As a part of the 
agreement, MMA agreed to allow Musharraf to remain in office until 2007; in exchange, 
he would step down as the army chief of staff in December 2004. Relations between 
MMA and ARD reached a significant low. The government seemed to have succeeded in 
splintering the opposition and passing LFO, which changed the nature of politics in 
Pakistan from a parliamentary to a presidential system and formalized the role of the 
military in governance. 
Even though the opposition seemed to have splintered, their differences did not 
last long; united they could put more pressure on the government and make more 
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demands. On March 16
th
 MMA leaders met at the residence of Qazi Hussain Ahmed to 
discuss whether the group should cooperate with ARD. The members collectively 
decided that they should continue to seek close relations with other opposition parties. 
ARD also decided that working together would serve them both. MMA and ARD jointly 
opposed Musharraf’s National Security Council bill, which aimed to set up a more formal 
role for the military in the government. MMA and ARD members created a furor in the 
parliament but the bill passed without much debate.  
Following the passage of the bill, the police arrested a ARD leader and senior 
PML(n) member for sedition. Other PML(n) members were also arrested for protesting 
his incarceration. The regime targeted further repression on the PML(n) when several 
thousand supporters gathered at the airport to welcome Sharif’s brother Shahbaz back 
from exile. The police arrested over 1,000 members and beat several others in public 
view. ARD and MMA collectively walked out of the June 24
th
 parliamentary session to 
protest the arrest of PML(n) members and Shahbaz Sharif’s subsequent deportation.  
MMA and ARD’s alliance was further solidified when in September, when 
Musharraf announced that he would not be stepping down as army chief as per the 
agreement. MMA threatened to resign from the parliament over the issue and proclaimed 
that they would be working actively with ARD to devise a joint strategy; Musharraf 
remained unfazed. In the absence of a strong opposition voice in the parliament, he 
succeeded in passing anti-terrorism bills and contempt-of-court bills with little debate. 
The Pakistani citizens began losing faith in the opposition’s ability to oppose Musharraf 
with any real influence. A prominent columnist Ghazi Salahuddin explained, “There is 
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little interest at the popular level to join such a call [anti-government campaign] from the 
opposition. Pakistani’s feel completely depoliticized
64
.” 
MMA and ARD continued to oppose the LFO in protests and rallies, even though 
the bill had already passed in the parliament. On January 1
st
 2005, they called for a “black 
day” as a part of their efforts to resist Musharraf. The parties held protests nationwide, 
especially in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and Karachi. They announced that they would hold 
a joint meeting within the next few days to chalk out a strategy.  
 In 2005, the Musharraf government announced local bodies’ elections. This was 
another chance for the opposition parties to regain their voice in official channels. 
However, with their failure to stop LFO from being passed and implemented raised new 
challenges in forming a united electoral bloc. In the next section I examine the activism 
surrounding the local bodies’ polls campaign in greater detail.  
 
Local Bodies Election Campaign 
  
 With the LFO firmly in place and a parliament composed of his cronies, 
Musharraf announced that local bodies’ elections would be held in July or August 2005. 
MMA contacted all opposition parties to coordinate strategy. PPP declared that it did not 
wish to cooperate with MMA because of its status as a staunchly secular party. However, 
I learned from several party members that the PPP’s differences with MMA were not on 
religion but MMA’s betrayal of the united opposition against the LFO
65
. PPP argued that 
being the largest and strongest political party, it had a large following among the masses 
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and therefore was in a position to win the elections on its own
66
. However, once the 
government crony parties began their enthusiastic campaign, PPP decided to participate 
in local elections in coordination with MMA to ensure their defeat.  
 MMA, PML(n) and PPP decided that they would consult with each other in 
fielding candidates and make seat adjustments. Also, the parties decided to field joint 
candidates all over Punjab. In Sind, MQM and PML(n) decided that they would field 
candidates where they were strongest. MQM would field candidates in urban areas where 
most of its constituency lies, while PML(n) would focus on rural areas. The parties 
agreed not to make any seat adjustments or seek support from the PML(q). Unlike Egypt, 
it appears that in Pakistan, rather than competing for constituencies, the groups pooled 
their supporters effectively to oppose the regime.  
 Even though electoral alliances had emerged, in order to effectively oppose the 
government, the opposition would still have to launch a mass campaign. ARD- MMA 
negotiations began on how to form a “grand alliance” on a minimum point agenda. PPP 
sources revealed that the party leadership had discussed the possibility of forming an 
alliance with MMA without compromising its stance on certain issues of national and 
political concern
67
. The government became increasingly concerned about the emerging 
alliances and began intimidating local bodies’ elections candidates, voters and arresting 
journalists and party members. Security officials raided the office of Jamaat-e-Islami, 
confiscating computers, documents and harassing its members.  
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 The local bodies’ polls results revealed an excellent showing for pro-government 
parties and a poor showing for opposition groups. Soon after the elections, the Musharraf 
government began a madrassa registration campaign in an effort to curb growing 
extremism in the country. Some 1,400 foreign students studying in Pakistani madrassas 
were asked to leave, and some seminaries were barred from teaching material that 
promoted hatred of other religious. The madarassa reform initiative, along with the 
massive vote rigging in the local body polls, angered the MMA  
On September 9
th
, MMA along with PPP and PML(n) announced a day of strike 
to demand that Musharraf step down and hold free and fair elections. The parties alleged 
that the government had engaged in widespread vote rigging and demanded that 
parliamentary polls be held under a neutral body.  
 All opposition parties rallied their constituencies around the country to participate 
in the September 9
th
 strike. They asked for shops to remain closed and public transport to 
stay off the streets. To appeal to the transporters union, the rising price of petroleum was 
also added to the reasons for the strike. Transport associations gave their support by 
agreeing to keep their busses off the streets. Also, several associations assured that their 
businesses would remain closed. Political analysts opined that the opposition parties were 
well aware that their demands would not be met but pursued the strike to show their 
strength and keep pressure on the government
68
.  
 The government assured transporters and shop owners that they would provide 
protection to those not willing to participate in the strike. Yet the September 9
th
 strike 
was widely observed. Traffic remained off the streets and shops remained closed in major 
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cities. The strike remained peaceful for the most part, but McDonalds and Kentucky 
Fried Chicken franchises were attacked in some parts of the country. One news daily 
described the strike as a “litmus test” for the opposition parties who have joined hands 
against Musharraf
69
. The newspaper added that while the opposition parties had no clear 
vision of the future, to their credit, they were working together across ideological divides, 
“Apart from the pathos of the tragic comedy that this whole situation has turned into, its 
was heartening to see the ‘religious’ maulana of MMA heeding the call of a trendy 
command from the secular PPP
70
.”   
 The opposition’s campaign against the government was cut short by a devastating 
earthquake that hit the country on October 8
th
. The quake took thousands of lives while 
leaving many others stranded. Opposition activity declined during this time period as the 
parties became involved with relief efforts. Although it was clearly a national disaster, 
the earthquake could not have come at a better time for President Musharraf. As one 
journalist explains: 
These tremors have unfortunately brought huge amount of tragedy with the population 
but these have also shaken the confidence of the opposition which now like millions of 
affectees would be trying to rehabilitate and reconstruct their planned opposition to 





 After the shock and horror of the earthquake subsided, opposition parties once 
again regrouped, but they had lost the momentum that they had once gathered. They 
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declared that they would organize another anti-Musharraf campaign after Eid. The new 





Analysis: Mobilization Alliances in Pakistan: 
 
 After coming to power, General Musharraf took several steps to consolidate his 
rule in the country. He repressed political opposition by putting a moratorium on political 
activity, arrested hundreds of opposition party members, and introduced constitutional 
amendments, such as the Legal Framework Order (LFO). He also set out to gain the 
support of some opposition parties by enticing them with benefits such as wide 
representation in the parliament and dropping of corruption charges. 
 Many of Musharraf’s initiatives were successful. A faction of the PML, PML(q) 
succeeded to support Musharraf’s rule. PPP also experienced internal factionalism with 
the formation of PPP(s) under Sherpao. MMA also gave their support to Musharraf on 
the LFO issue. LFO was ultimately passed in the parliament and opposition parties were 
badly defeated in the parliamentary and local body elections. However, Musharraf met 
with a united opposition front at every step. Soon after he took power, secular parties 
resolved their differences and formed ARD. Religious parties, though supportive of 
Musharraf at first, soon decided to cooperate with ARD to oppose his rule. ARD and 
MMA organized several joint protests, parliament walkouts and strikes. They were 
successful in taking their campaigns to the national level because of successfully 
aggregating their divided constituencies.  
 Despite the best efforts of the opposition parties, LFO was passed in the 
parliament with MMA’s support. MMA’s betrayal of the united opposition led to bitter 
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enmities, especially between MMA and PPP. However no party could ignore MMA’s 
large regional constituency in the NWFP. Therefore it seems that despite their support in 
getting LFO passed, other parties continued to form alliances with the MMA. 
 The local bodies’ polls once again showed the power of divided constituencies in 
bringing parties together. Opposition parties made seat adjustments based on the division 
of constituencies in various regions. Unlike Egypt, they did not defect from these 
agreements because it appears they were well aware that they could not win in other 
districts. The most significant aspect of opposition alliances in Pakistan was that they 
were formed despite high levels of government repression and virtually no hope of 
actually being successful in challenging the regime. 
 
Mobilization Alliances in Egypt and Pakistan: 
 
 Mobilization alliances are formed when groups pool their constituents to engage 
in street politics such as protests or civil disobedience. In this chapter I argued that groups 
with divided constituencies form mobilization alliances despite ideological differences, 
regime repression and policies of divide and rule while groups with fluid constituencies 
are unable to do so. 
 Under divided constituencies, groups receive consistent support from certain 
specific sections of the population. The chances that their supports will defect and change 
their loyalties to other groups are limited, as is the possibility of attracting other group’s 
supporters. Therefore, groups are less concerned about other groups using the 
mobilization alliance to poach their constituents. Further, in order to show increased 
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street strength to the regime, the groups must pool their constituents. For these reasons, 
mobilization alliances emerge under conditions of divided constituencies. 
 I explained how in the case of Pakistan, opposition groups were able to form an 
alliance to exert  pressure on the Musharraf government. The alliances were formed 
despite high levels of regime repression and the government’s attempts to divide the 
opposition by offering incentives to defect from the alliances. 
 I showed how in Pakistan, the alliances were not always easy to form. PPP and 
PML faced internal dissensions and factionalism when deciding to form an alliance under 
the GDA banner. PPP had its own ideological differences with MMA. Further, MMA 
decided to defect from the united opposition front against LFO to allow the Musharraf 
government to pass the bill in the parliament. Despite these difficulties, the Musahrraf 
government faced a united opposition at every step. Opposition parties were able to put 
aside their rivalries and differences to launch a united anti-regime campaign.  
 I argue that such alliances were possible because groups were able to successfully 
pool their constituents. Each groups receives support from a specific section of the 
population which has remained stable over time. Many constituencies are located in a 
particular ethnic group or class giving rise to intense rivalries among the parties but also 
creating opportunities for them to take advantage of their divided constituencies to form 
alliances.   
 In Egypt, despite the fact that many opposition groups mobilized individually 
against the Mubarak government, no joint mobilization occurred. Similar to Pakistan, the 
government used repression to keep the opposition at bay and engaged in divide and rule 
policies by providing institutional access to moderate groups and severely punishing 
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those that crossed the line in their opposition to the regime. While opposition groups tried 
to form alliances with each other, they achieved limited success. I examined the case of 
the referendum/ elections boycott, interaction between Kifaya and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Brotherhood initiated NARC and United National Front for Change, 
initiated by al-Wafd. In each of these cases, I showed that unlike Pakistan, the opposition 
groups were not able to form an alliance based on a common agenda despite several 
similarities in their individual programs. I also showed that ideological similarities or 
differences had little impact on the successful formation of an alliance.  
 I argue that the nature of constituencies in Egypt provides additional theoretical 
leverage in explaining the lack of alliance building in Egypt as compared to other 
explanations such as regime repression or divide and rule policies which were prevalent 
in Pakistan also. Egyptian opposition groups receive no consistent basis of support within 
the population. Many new groups are still trying to establish their constituencies by 
attracting supporters of other groups or appealing to “fence sitters.” The fluid nature of 
constituencies prevents mobilization alliances as each group fears that its allied partners 
will use the mobilization event to appeal to its constituents. The mobilization event 
provides each ally easy access to other groups’ constituency at a particular time and 
place. The fear of poaching prevents the groups from forming mobilization alliances.  
I showed how groups with divided constituencies in Egypt were able to form 
mobilization alliances despite their ideological differences, for example the Muslim 
Brotherhood and al-Wafd and al-Wafd and leftists parties. Groups with fluid 
constituencies, for example the Brotherhood and Kifaya and the Brotherhood and leftists 
parties were unable to form alliances with each other.
1 
Chapter V: Conclusion 
 
 Why are opposition groups able to form alliances in their activism against the 
regime in some cases but not in others? Specifically, why did opposition movements in 
Pakistan engage in high levels of alliance building while similar alliance patterns did not 
emerge in Egypt?  
 Not only does this research make a substantive contribution to the study of 
alliance politics, it also highlights the importance of widening the field of social 
movements and opposition politics beyond regime-movement dyads to how groups 
interact with each other. As Rucht explains: 
It is time to abandon the simplified image of a two-party struggle between a (unified) 
movement and its (unified) opponent acting in some kind of a social vacuum. Unlike two 
individuals who may engage in personal struggles without spectators, social movements 
are internally differentiated actors operating within complex social settings that, in part, 
consist of public arenas. These settings are not just a kind of neutral background but 




 Groups compete with each other for popular support, voice in the government, as 
well as access to resources. Lust-Okar argues that understanding the dynamic nature of 
the interaction among opposition groups is an important predictor of how they engage in 
claim making against the regime
2
. The formation of alliances among opposition groups is 
a particularly intriguing phenomenon because not only must the groups resolve their own 
collective action problems, but as Lichbach argues, they must also engage other actors in 
a “coalition game
3
.” Opposition groups’ interaction with each other is therefore critical to 
their identity, strategies and indeed long-term survival.  
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 This study examines two cases where opposition groups operating under 
seemingly similar circumstances show very different alliance outcomes. In Pakistan, 
various groups formed alliances to engage in protest, civil disobedience as well as 
parliament walkouts and public statements. In Egypt, while diverse groups tried to 
engage each other in alliances, very few materialized. The differences in alliance 
outcomes became amply clear during the state-initiated political opening in both 
countries.  
In 2005, Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak announced presidential elections in 
addition to parliamentary elections. In Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf held 
parliamentary elections in 2002, followed by provincial elections in 2005. The state 
initiated political openings sparked a “wave of contention” in each country. In Egypt, 
new and existing opposition groups took to the streets and challenged Mubarak, asking 
him to step down. In Pakistan, opposition groups raised their voices to protest the 
suspension of democracy, superficial elections, and other mounting social and economic 
problems. The rising discontent provided several opportunities for opposition groups to 
form alliances. In Pakistan, groups worked together through electoral alliances, 
campaigning against the Legal Framework Order and post-local bodies’ elections protest. 
In Egypt, opposition groups failed to form an alliance to boycott the May referendum to 
approve the amendment to Article 76, could not engage in joint protest and did not form 
any significant electoral alliances despite their efforts to engage each other. How can we 
explain the differences in the alliance outcomes when incentives to cooperate were 
clearly present in both cases? 




 In this study I argue that understanding the nature of group constituencies and the 
nature of the alliance provides additional theoretical leverage in explaining the 
differences in the cases. Groups may operate under fluid or divided constituencies. Under 
fluid constituencies, groups have no consistent support base. They may receive support 
from different sections of the population at different times. The boundaries of the 
constituency are not well defined and the chances that supporters may defect and give 
their loyalties to another group are high. Under divided constituencies, groups receive 
consistent support from a specific section of the population that remains stable over time. 
The constituency base may be located in a particular geographic area, ethnic group, race 
or class. The boundaries of the constituency are well defined and the chances that 
supports may defect and give their loyalty to another group are low.  
Alliances may be of two kinds: mobilization or elite. Mobilization alliances are 
formed when different groups bring their constituents together to engage in a protest, 
civil disobedience or sit-in. The goal is to pool constituents to engage in collective action. 
Elite alliances are agreements among leaders of various groups to work together without 
engaging their constituents. The alliance may involve a joint statement, symbolic office 
closing or writing an article critical of the regime. The goal of the alliance is to engage in 
opposition activity without pooling constituents.  
 I argue that groups operating under divided constituencies may form mobilization 
alliances while groups operating under fluid constituencies are unable to do so. However, 
groups operating under fluid constituencies may form elite alliances. Specifically, such 
groups may form issue-based elite alliances. These are focused on a specific policy 
concern and are often technical in nature, for example targeting a policy holding 
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newspapers liable for printing false information. Value-based alliances address a larger 
concern that targets the social and political fabric of the society, for example, freedom of 
speech and expression in the country, free market economy or women’s rights. Such 
concerns are not only controversial, but also volatile. Groups with divided constituencies 
may form both value-based and issue-based elite alliances. The argument is depicted in 
the following table: 








 I have shown that Pakistan is a case of divided constituencies, while in Egypt, by 
comparison, opposition groups have less well-defined bases of support, and thus may be 
characterized as fluid constituencies. Pakistan’s regional and ethnic diversity coupled 
with experiences with democracy in the past have led to the formation of a number of 
political opposition groups each based within a certain region, ethnic group or class in the 
country. Egypt’s relatively high levels of restrictions on political dissent coupled with 
ethnic and regional homogeneity have prevented opposition groups from commanding 
base constituencies. Many groups are too recent to have a solid support base, while other 
long standing groups have experienced shifting support bases over time. 
 I examine how opposition groups in Pakistan formed an issue-based elite alliance 
to protest the Kalabagh dam project in 1998, but this campaign later expanded to a large-
scale anti-government mobilization alliance that culminated in the 2002 coup headed by 
Musharraf. I contrast this case with Egypt, where groups formed an issue-based elite 
Constituency Type Mobilization Elite 
Fluid No Yes: Issue-based 
Divided Yes: Issue-
based/Value based 




alliance to pressure the Mubarak regime to repeal Law 93, which significantly repressed 
freedom of press in the country. The elite alliance launched a campaign and successfully 
convinced the regime to retract the law. The same groups, however, were unable to form 
a value-based elite alliance to protest the results of the 1995 elections held a few months 
later.  
 I go on to explain how groups in Pakistan formed various mobilization alliances 
against the Musharraf regime during the 2002- 2005 time period. Even though the regime 
tried to repress the opposition and use divide-and-rule policies by offering certain groups 
incentives for defecting from the alliance, several mobilization campaigns did emerge. In 
Egypt, despite the fact that various groups tried to form alliances to take full advantage of 
the 2005 political opening, no significant alliances emerged. 
 In this chapter, I summarize the results of the study and explain areas for future 
research. I begin by presenting a detailed explanation of the main argument explaining 
the formation of alliances. I go on to summarize the case studies, explaining how the 
model applies to the empirical data. Finally I discuss how the study of alliances in 
contentious politics can be taken further and the areas that are yet under explored. 
Explaining Alliances: 
 
 I argue that while explanations based on the role of cost/benefit analysis, regime 
policies of divide and rule, and those that stress the role of bridging ideological divides 
among groups contribute to understanding some aspects of alliance making, they leave 
many questions regarding the actual circumstances that make alliance making possible 
unanswered. While structural theories provide a powerful explanation of alliance making, 
there are other factors besides regime policies that groups consider when forming 
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alliances that have remained underexplored in the literature and are important variables in 
the cases I examine. In this section I provide a detailed explanation of the model, defining 
key terms and elaborating the hypotheses. 
 
Defining the Model:   
In this study I examined alliance formation among a broad set of opposition 
actors, including legally recognized political parties, political groups operating like 
parties but without formal recognition, and loosely structured social movements. By 
keeping the definition broad, I was able to capture the different avenues through which 
dissent is expressed in countries where there are high levels of restrictions on forming 
and operating a formally organized political party. Specifically, In Egypt, the most 
important voices of dissent have come from non-legally recognized political groups, for 
example, the Muslim Brotherhood and more recently from Kifaya, which operates like a 
social movement rather than a political party. Keeping the definition sufficiently broad 
allowed me to study alliance making among these diverse groups that form an important 
part of the Egyptian political landscape. 
I define an alliance broadly as a partnership among two or more political groups. 
Alliances are formed with a purpose and operate within a time frame. While alliances 
suggest that groups are frequently able to find commonality with each other, they also 
emphasize that differences prevent the two actors from merging into one
4
. Specifically, I 
identify two kinds of alliances: mobilization alliances, formed to engage in street politics 
by involving the constituents in a protest, sit-in, or act of civil disobedience, and elite 
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alliances, formed among movement leaders to cooperate on a particular issue without 
engaging constituents. The alliance may be issue-based, that is, focused on a specific  and 
often technical policy concern, for example a law that holds newspaper’s liable for 
publishing false information, textile mills quotas or the construction of a dam , or value-
based, that is focused on a broader concern for example, freedom of speech and 
expression, free market economy and women’s rights. Value-based concerns have a 
much broader focus and are often highly politically charged and sensitive as they address 
the core principles of the polity and society. Issue-based concerns are focused and 
technical as they ask for specific policy changes.  
We can say that an alliance has been successfully formed when the actors agree 
on a plan of action and carry it through, for example, by mobilizing constituents, 
informing members, signing the petition, or making public statements as agreed upon. 
Constituencies are defined as the popular support base of the group – its voters, members, 
or those that offer moral, financial or other support to the group. While opposition groups 
may have many different goals and objectives, their identity, strategy and indeed long-
term survival depends on their ability to attract and keep constituencies. A constituent is 
broadly defined as an individual who supports the groups by providing membership dues 
and/or other financial support, participating in the group’s activities when called upon 
and/or voting for the group. Constituencies may be divided – where different opposition 
groups receive support from specific sections of the population and the constituency base 
remains stable over time, or fluid, where opposition groups receive support from several 




Explaining the Model:  
Opposition groups may form alliances with their contemporaries for many 
different purposes: through an alliance they may be able to show greater might to the 
regime, portray themselves as moderate actors who work in the political mainstream, 
destabilize the regime, or address a mutual concern. As Rucht explains: 
Indeed, seeking allies can become critical for a movement’s survival, particularly when it 
is in an outsider position. Only by broadening their support can most movements hope to 
make an impact. Hence, challenging an opponent and appealing to potential constituents 




 The primary facet that determines the power, influence and survival over time for 
any opposition group or social movement are its supporters. A bigger constituency base 
means greater visibility and attention to their causes. Further, constituents provide 
financial support through membership dues and donations. Therefore, every group wants 
to protect its constituency while also expanding and gaining additional supporters. 
Groups may increase their support base over time through campaigns, networking and 
public service. They may target another group’s constituency by presenting themselves as 
a better or more dynamic alternative or appeal to fence sitters. Groups may also establish 
their constituency by appealing to a particular ethnic group, geographical area, race or 
class with which the leaders have some affinity. While the purpose of forming an alliance 
with another opposition group is often to address an area of mutual concern by showing 
collective might to the regime, groups are also concerned about protecting their 
supporters from poaching by their partners. 
 I have argued that the formation of alliances is influenced by the nature of 
constituencies and the nature of the alliance. Opposition groups may have fluid or divided 
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constituencies. Under fluid constituencies, groups receive support from several sections 
of the population and have no clear or consistent basis for support over time. Under 
divided constituencies, each group commands an identifiable, specific constituency base 
that may be located in a geographical area, ethic group, or class and remains stable over 
time. A country can be said to have fluid or divided constituencies overall when the 
majority of the opposition groups have no clear basis of support or receive support from 
specific sections of the population respectively. Yet even in countries where the overall 
nature of constituencies is divided or fluid, specific groups may have fluid or divided 
constituencies in relation to each other. Alliances may be mobilization or elite based by 
nature. Mobilization alliances pool the constituents of the partners through a protest, sit 
in, or civil disobedience, while elite alliances are agreements among groups leaders to 
work together without engaging their constituents.  
 I explain the specific arguments in hypotheses H1 through H6. I first explain the 
formation of mobilization alliances in H1 and H2: 
 
 H1: Opposition groups form mobilization alliances when their constituencies are 
divided. 
 
H2: Opposition groups are unable to form mobilization alliances when their 
constituencies are fluid.  
 
 While mobilization alliances are useful in showing the collective might of the 
opposition to the regime, they also expose group constituencies to poaching by their 
allied partners. Through the mobilization alliance, each group has easy access to the other 
group’s constituency at a particular venue and time. Each group can therefore use the 
mobilization event to present itself as a better alternative and make itself visible to 
members of the other group. Supporters of other groups can therefore be easily enticed 
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into changing their loyalties. While some groups are in a better position to engage in such 
“member poaching” as compared with others, alliances often fall apart as one or more 
groups become concerned about their potential partner’s intentions.  
Lichbach has explained that groups are continuously involved in the process of 
“product differentiation,” whereby they present themselves as a unique and better 
solution as compared to other groups. Product differentiation is often more prevalent 
among smaller and newer groups that seek to establish an identity separate from already 
established actors
6
. An alliance through which one group has easy access to another 
group’s supporters may present a perfect opportunity to engage in such product 
differentiation in order to attract more constituents. 
Since divided constituencies are located in a specific section of the population and 
are stable over time, groups are assured that their supporters are unlikely to change their 
loyalties to other groups even when participating in a protest jointly. Also, groups realize 
that their chances of gaining additional support and expanding their constituency are 
limited, since supporters of other groups are unlikely to change their loyalties. This 
situation is particularly true when constituencies are divided by ethnicity or race. For 
example, Punjabis in Pakistan are less likely to support a Baluchi based opposition group 
even if they agree with its ideology or politics. The party membership is based on a 
primordial identity or kinship and social network.  
 When constituencies are divided, the mobilization event is unlikely to be used as a 
staging ground for each group to present itself as a better alternative, since the chances of 
gaining support from another group’s constituents is very low. Instead, the alliance 
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partners can safely pool their constituents and show greater might to the regime, call 
attention to themselves and in some cases, successfully destabilize the regime  
 Fluid constituencies are not located in a specific base and may overlap in sections 
with other groups. Such constituencies are therefore likely to vary considerably over time 
as many supports defect to new or existing groups. Under such circumstances, each group 
is concerned about protecting its own constituency. Current supporters may become 
convinced to change their loyalties when new groups emerge or when existing groups 
present a new face and become increasingly visible on the political scene.  
 Mobilization alliances require groups to pool their constituents through a protest, 
sit-in or other forms of street politics. When the constituency base is not defined, forming 
a mobilization alliance with another group will expose existing supporters to poaching by 
the other group, who will use the event to make themselves visible or present themselves 
as a better alternative. Mobilization alliances are therefore risky for groups with fluid 
constituencies. Mobilizing constituents alone presents a better opportunity to increase 
group visibility and gain additional supporters while also protecting existing supporters 
from poaching by other groups.  
 Even though groups with fluid constituencies are unable to form mobilization 
alliances, they may form issue-based elite alliances. This argument is presented in the 
hypotheses H3 and H4: 
 
H3: Opposition groups form issue-based elite alliances when their constituencies are 
fluid. 
 
H4: Opposition groups are unable to form value-based elite alliances when their 




Elite alliances are formed among leaders of different groups when they agree to 
work together without engaging their constituencies. An elite alliance may involve joint 
statements, symbolic office closings or writing an article critical of the regime. Elite 
alliances only involve group leaders or specific members or officers. These alliances do 
not put group constituents at risk by providing other groups with opportunities to poach 
by presenting themselves as a better alternative. Group leaders already have established 
careers in a particular group and are therefore not likely to change their loyalties to their 
allied partners. The non-engagement of constituents allows the group leaders to form 
alliances even though there may be ideological or other differences among them.  
 Groups with fluid constituencies are able to form elite alliances as these allow 
them to form alliances without putting their constituents at risk. Specific individuals can 
participate in the alliance without exposing their constituency base. However, an elite 
alliance may lead to a mobilization alliance in the future, especially when the nature of 
the concern is very sensitive. If the concern appeals to the constituents, they may start 
mobilizing spontaneously, creating opportunities for poaching by other groups. For this 
reason, groups with fluid constituencies may form an elite alliance only when it is issue-
based. The alliance must be formed focused on a specific policy of concern, for example, 
opposing the building of a dam. Such specific, technical and focused concerns are 
unlikely to draw the attention of the masses, and therefore will not lead to mobilization in 
the future, assuring the groups that their constituencies will not be at risk. An issue-based 
elite alliance is therefore likely to emerge. 
 Groups with fluid constituencies are unable to form value-based elite alliances, as 
these have a broad agenda and focus, for example, women’s rights. Forming an elite 
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alliance on such a broad focus does not assure the groups that the elite alliance will not 
lead to mobilization in the future. Such broad concerns may instigate constituents to 
engage in collective action spontaneously exposing them to poaching by the alliance 
partners. Further, constituents may put pressure on the group to mobilize. Since groups 
with fluid constituencies want to prevent the emergence of a mobilization alliance, they 
are unable to form value-based elite alliances. 
 Even though groups with divided constituencies may form mobilization alliances, 
they may also engage in elite alliances. They may form both issue-based and value-based 
elite alliances. I explain in the hypotheses H5 and H6: 
H5: Opposition groups form issue-based elite alliances when their constituencies are 
divided. 
 
H6: Opposition groups form value-based elite alliances when their constituencies are 
divided.  
 
While mobilization alliances receive greater attention and visibility on the 
political landscape, elite alliances may be useful under certain circumstances. Groups 
may engage in elite alliances when there are logistical issues associated with organizing a 
mobilization event together. Mobilization alliances are also more taxing on group 
resources. Even if groups have the resources to mobilize together, the nature of the issue 
may be too technical to draw the attention of their constituents. For these reasons, groups 
with divided constituencies may sometimes prefer to form elite alliances, even if they are 
able to form mobilization alliances. 
 Groups with divided constituencies may form both issue-based and value-based 
elite alliances. Group leaders cooperate with each other without mobilizing their 
constituencies by publishing an article critical of the regime, issuing a public statement or 
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symbolic office closing. Issue-based alliances allow groups to focus on a specific area of 
mutual concern without engaging their constituents. The alliances can sometimes be a 
useful starting point for more extensive cooperation in the future, especially when groups 
are unable to engage in street politics at the time because of material or other limitations.  
Forming value-based elite alliances requires groups to work together on a more 
general and often sensitive issue. These elite alliances can often lead to mobilization as 
the nature of the concern is likely to touch a nerve among constituents. Yet, groups with 
divided constituencies are able to form value-based elite alliances, because they are not as 
concerned about engaging in a mobilization alliance in the future. Since their 
constituencies have been stable over time, they do not fear that other groups will use the 
mobilization alliance to poach their constituents. Therefore, they may also form value-
based elite alliances which have the prospect of drawing in constituents. 
 
Applying the Theory to the Cases: 
 
 In this study I argue that while groups consider many factors when forming 
alliances with each other, examining the nature of constituencies and the nature of the 
alliance provides additional leverage in explaining alliances as compared with existing 
explanations, such as the role of cost/benefit analysis, bridging ideological divides and 
regime repression or divide and rule polices. In the previous section I explained the 
theoretical model of alliances building. In this section, I review how I applied the model 
to the empirical data. While I provide extensive data on alliance making in both countries 
through party documents, government documents, interviews, news coverage and 
secondary research and  illustrate a pattern in alliance formation based on constituencies 
and the nature of the alliance, there are areas where the theory requires additional 
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substantiation through more evidence – these areas include the thoughts and perceptions 
of groups leaders when forming alliances and how fears of “member poaching” actually 
played out. I discuss this shortcoming as an area of future research later in this chapter.  
 While both Egypt and Pakistan lack national-level viable political parties, there 
are important differences in the distribution of constituencies in the two countries. In 
Pakistan, national level parties such as PPP and PML are actually more regional in 
character and have failed to expand their constituencies to other parts of the country. 
PPP’s constituency is located in Sind, with most of its important leaders coming from the 
same ethnicity. PML’s constituency is located in Punjab, with most of its leadership 
being Punjabi.  
 While Pakistan was founded as a homeland for South Asian Muslims, Islamist 
parties have generally not been successful in national elections. Yet, Islamists have 
succeeded in carving out regional and sect-based constituencies. After the 2002 elections, 
it became clear that Islamists had formed a regional base in NWFP. Every region in 
Pakistan has its own political party that represents the dominant ethnicity of the 
geographic area. Some regions are ethnically homogenous and are therefore represented 
by one political party; other sub-regional tribal and other groupings have their own 
political parties.  
 Politics in Pakistan is characterized by the presence of a number of political 
parties commanding various sized constituencies located in specific sections of the 
population. Most parties have ethnic, regional or sect-based constituencies. Not only are 
the parties political rivals, they are also separated by their ethnic identity. It is therefore 
ironical that opposition parties in Pakistan have been so successful in forming alliances 
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with each other. I argue that the parties’ ethnic and other divisions are accompanied by 
their constituency divisions, making the formation of alliances possible. 
 Egypt’s political landscape consists of a number of opposition groups, some that 
are an important part of the country’s history and others have emerged recently. Two of 
Egypt’s long-standing groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Wafd, have been 
successful in carving out core constituencies. The Muslim Brotherhood receives support 
from students and trade unions, especially in urban areas. al-Wafd receives a much 
smaller pocket of support from wealthy sections of the population, especially the 
lawyer’s professional association and has support in rural areas. 
 Over the last few years, several new opposition groups have emerged in the 
country. These groups include the legal political party al-Ghad, headed by Ayman Nour 
and the social movement Kifaya. While these groups have received high levels of 
national and international publicity owing to controversies surrounding their leadership 
and protest activities, neither has a strong core constituency.  
 While leftist parties are an integral part of the country’s history, no leftist party 
has yet been able to establish a base constituency. The leftist parties remain fragmented 
and have variable popularity among various sections of the population including students 
and workers. Overall, opposition parties in Egypt compete to gain supporters in urban 
areas while the ruling NDP party is stronger in the rural areas. While the Muslim 
Brotherhood and al-Wafd have divided constituencies in relation to each other, most 
other groups compete among themselves and with the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Wafd 
to gain supporters. Pakistan is clearly a case of divided constituencies, while in 
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comparison, Egypt appears to have fluid constituencies. This important difference is 
highly relevant when groups try to form alliances.  
Understanding the nature of constituencies in Egypt remains a challenging and 
elusive task, largely because most analysts, observers and indeed party members find it 
difficult to pin point areas of support for each group. While these difficulties point to 
fluid constituencies, more research is need to understand how and where different parties 
are establishing bases of support. I discuss this as an avenue of future research later in the 
chapter.  
Formation of Elite Alliances: 
 While protests, rebellions, and mass campaigns effectively draw the attention of 
bystanders, the media, and indeed the regime, opposition movements may also engage in 
campaigns through non-mobilization means. They may publish an article critical of the 
regime, close their offices as a symbolic gesture, or make a public statement. While such 
campaigns do not draw widespread attention, they are important forms of opposition 
activity as they provide additional avenues for conflict and cooperation among groups.  
 In this study, I argued that groups with fluid constituencies may form issue-based 
elite alliances, as these have a clear non-mobilization agenda. Value-based elite alliances 
are unlikely among such groups as the sensitive nature of such concerns can lead to 
mobilization. Groups with divided constituencies may form both issue-based and value-
based elite alliances. 
 I applied the model to the case of the 1995 Press Law in Egypt and the Kalabagh 
dam project activism in Pakistan in 1999. In both cases, I showed how groups with 
divided and fluid constituencies were able to form issue-based elite alliances despite their 
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ideological, ethnic or other differences, high levels of regime repressions and the stability 
of the government. In Egypt, despite being successful in their Press Law activism, the 
same groups were unable to form a value-based elite alliance to campaign against the 
results of the 1995 elections, held a few months later. In Pakistan the anti-Kalabagh 
issue-based elite alliances soon expanded to a more value-based alliance attacking the 
legitimacy of the regime. Soon the alliance attracted more members and culminated in a 
mass mobilization alliances leading to the 2002 military coup.  
 While Egyptian opposition politics is well known for ideological differences, 
personal rivalries, and differences in strategies among the various actors, the groups were 
able to form an effective alliance to protest the 1995 Press Law in Egypt. The alliance 
succeeded in convincing the Mubarak regime to repeal the law surviving a volatile 
elections year political climate, high levels of regime repression and the Mubarak 
government being firmly in power with no opposition representation in the parliament. 
The 1995 Press Law remains one of the only repressive measures of the 1990s to be 
repealed in Egypt.  
 The data fits my argument that groups with fluid constituencies form issue-based 
elite alliances but are unable to form value-based elite alliances. An elite alliance allowed 
groups to work together without mobilizing their constituencies and putting their 
supporters at risk. The nature of the alliance was very focused on a particular area of 
policy concern – Law Number 93. The alliance did not address issues of freedom of 
speech and expression or democracy and civil liberties in the country. My conjecture is 
that, the issue focused nature of the activism assured the groups that the alliance would 
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not lead to mobilization in the future. Therefore the groups were able to form an alliance 
to address an area of mutual concern. 
 The success of the anti-Press Law alliance should have laid the groundwork for 
opposition groups to form an alliance once again to protest the results of the 1995 
elections. The charged political atmosphere created another opportunity for the 
opposition groups to work together, but no elite alliance materialized. The lack of 
alliance formation to protest the results of the 1995 election shows that groups with fluid 
constituencies are unable to form elite alliances on a value-based issue. Campaigning 
against the results of the elections is a much more broad and sensitive concern than Law 
Number 93. The focus of the alliance would therefore be much more diffuse and 
sensitive, creating fears that the alliance could lead to mobilization in the future. My 
conjecture is that fears of losing their constituency base kept parties from cooperating 
with each other, even though they had successfully challenged the Mubarak regime 
together just a few months ago.  
 In Pakistan, by comparison, the anti-Kalabagh dam activism showed that groups 
with divided constituencies can engage in issue-based and value-based elite alliances. 
The issue-based elite alliance between the regional ANP and PPP soon expanded to 
include more members, address additional issues and ultimately resulted in a widespread 
anti-Sharif campaign in 1998-1999. The divided nature of constituencies assures groups 
that their supporters will not defect and join other groups. A value-based elite alliance 
can easily lead to mobilization in the future as they deal with sensitive and volatile 




Formation of Mobilization Alliances:  
Opposition groups have long favored protests, sit- ins, and civil disobedience as 
strategies for expressing dissent against an unjust and tyrannical regime. Such strategies 
disrupt daily life, therefore making it difficult for the regime to govern, call attention to 
street strength of the opposition and in some cases, can successfully destabilize the 
regime. When forming mobilization alliances, opposition groups pool their constituencies 
to show greater street strength to the regime. Through a joint protest, sit-in or civil 
disobedience, the opposition can succeed in showing the regime its ability to unite and 
thereby posing a greater challenge to the regime.  
 While mobilization alliances seem like an obvious solution to the problem of 
opposing an unjust regime, pooling constituencies poses large challenges to opposition 
groups as they compete for constituents. In this study, I argued that groups with divided 
constituencies are able to engage in mobilization alliances, while those with fluid 
constituencies are unable to do so. Groups with divided constituencies are less concerned 
about their partners using the mobilization event as an opportunity to poach their 
constituencies. Therefore, they are able to engage in such alliances. Groups with fluid 
constituencies have an inconsistent support base; therefore, engaging in mobilization 
alliances exposes their existing constituencies to poaching by their partners. Their 
partners may use the protest event to present themselves as a better alternative and 
therefore attract additional supporters.  
 I closely examined how opposition groups in Egypt had several opportunities to 
form alliances during the 2005 state-initiated political opening. Yet the alliances did not 
materialize. I explained how the campaign to boycott the May referendum and the 
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subsequent presidential campaign failed, the Muslim Brotherhood could not work with 
Kifaya and the inability of National Alliance for Restoration and Change, initiated by the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the National Front for Change, initiated by al-Wafd, to gather 
momentum among the opposition.  
 By contrast, in Pakistan, I explained how despite ethnic and other divisions 
among groups and high levels of regime repression, the opposition used the 2002 state 
initiated political opening to show their collective might to the regime. I explained the 
formation of the ARD alliance, the emergence of the anti-Legal Framework Order 
Campaign and the local bodies campaign with the local elections in 2005. 
 I sum up the cases, but applying the empirical evidence to the theoretical 
argument using the following chart: 
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Areas of Future Research: 
 
 Politics makes for strange bedfellows. Opposition groups that clash at certain 
times, work together flawlessly at other times. By examining the processes that are at 
play when groups form alliances with each other, I begin to explain why certain groups 
are able to form alliances and other groups are unable to do so. I explain how despite 
their ideological and other differences and regime policies, groups may form alliances 
based on the nature of their constituencies and the nature of the alliance. 
 Not only does this study make a contribution in understanding the formation of 
alliances, it also provides further insight into how groups interact with each other. 
Contentious politics is replete with studies of opposition regime dyads, but few studies 
have examined how opposition groups interact with their contemporaries. “The 
opposition” actually consists of a number of squabbling groups. Their dealings with each 
other are an important determinant of their future history and may hold important 
answers when explaining group behavior. 
 The study of alliances among opposition groups warrants further research to gain 
a more nuanced understanding of the processes at play when groups decide to work 
together or are unable to do so. In this section, I acknowledge areas of weakness in this 
research and point to ways through which these gaps can be addressed in future work: 
 
Divided and Fluid Constituencies: In this study I drew an important distinction between 
divided and fluid constituencies. While Pakistan is a case of divided constituencies, 
constituencies in Egypt remain more elusive. Through my research, I found that most 
analysts, observers and group members found it difficult to point to areas of support for 
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different groups. While this difficulty points to fluid constituencies, more work is needed 
to understand how consistencies are structured in Egypt.  Specifically, for future research, 
it will be important to know exactly what sections of the population remain loyal to 
particular groups and what sections form the “fence sitters.” A more nuanced understand 
of constituencies in Egypt will require extensive field research including more detailed 
interviews with party members, attending group events such as protests and meetings to 
assess the kinds of people attending, examining internal and external party documents, 
and speaking with constituents.  
With further research, it may also be possible to understand divided and fluid 
constituencies as a scale rather than as absolute categories. Levels of divided or fluid 
constituencies may have different effects on the nature of alliances. Comparing alliance 
making across societies with seemingly divided constituencies may reveal that some 
constituencies are more divided than others. Similarly, fluid constituencies may exist at 
several different levels. 
 Understanding how constituencies influence the success or failure of alliances 
requires attending events where groups are working together. How did the group leaders 
and their constituents interact? Were their attempts at member poaching? How were these 
carried out? Specifically, did group leaders try to actively seek members of other groups 
or were constituents “poached” through exposure to another group? Non-participant 
observations combined with interviews may reveal important insights in this regard.  
 
Understanding the Role of Elites in Alliances Making: Ultimately all alliance making 
decisions are taken and directed by group/ party elites. How do personal rivalries or 
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cooperation among group leaders affect alliances? Under what circumstances are elites 
able to put aside personal rivalries and cooperate? Understanding the role of structural 
factors in elite decision making is an important area of research and may reveal 
importance insights into alliances  
In order to understand the influence of constituencies on alliance making, it is 
important to know how elites evaluated certain situations and the factors that influenced 
their decision-making. Specifically, were the elites concerned about losing members to 
other groups? How did they weigh the risk of losing members as compared with the 
benefits of the alliance, including the possibility of gaining additional members? Field 
research will require extensive interviews with elites and government officials to 
understand why elites make certain decisions to form mobilization or elite alliances. 
 
Role of International/Regional/Domestic Media: The high level of coverage given to 
opposition groups during election times by international, domestic and regional media 
may affect their alliances with each other. Alliances are highly public events and tend to 
receive national and international media attention. The nature of such publicity may 
influence how groups form alliances and/or with whom they choose to cooperate. 
Examining media coverage of various alliances and understanding how such coverage 
influenced the working of the alliance may reveal important insight into a different facet 






Pakistan and Egypt since 2005 – Food Riots, Ruling Coalitions and the Formation of 
Alliances 
 While 2005 was an eventful year in both Egypt and Pakistan, the years to come 
brought further political developments that once again showed the inability of Egyptian 
opposition groups to form alliances. In this section I explain some of the major events 
that have taken place since the end of the relevant time period for this study that are 
relevant to the project. In Pakistan, the Musharraf regime and his pro-government parties 
took a back seat after the February 2008 elections. Former opposition alliances pooled 
their constituencies to win the elections and became ruling coalitions.  PPP formed a new 
government with the close cooperation of PML(n). Provincial governments also saw 
former opposition alliances taking over the reigns of power.  
 In 2008 Egypt, along with several other African, Middle Eastern and Asian 
countries experiences massive food shortages. The price of consumer commodities rose 
as much as 30%. The food shortages led to riots in several countries including Egypt. 
One of the most dramatic protests took place on April 6
th
 in Mahalla al-Korba when an 
angry group of students, union workers and other activists tore down a Mubarak bill 
board into the crowd. The protest was advertised primarily through the internet. A 27 
year old civil engineer Ahmed Maher Ibrahim used a social networking website 
Facebook to register others for the protest. Within weeks, over 70,000 people had 
registered through the Facebook group site, openly revealing their identity and opposition 
to the economic crisis engulfing the country. The Facebook site asked members to further 
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advertise the protest by spray painting signs, hanging posters and passing bills, so that 
those without access to the internet could be reached
7
.  
 While Kifaya participated in this protest, the event was largely organized by 
activists with no party or political group association. The Muslim Brotherhood supported 
the protest event morally but did not make a public statement declaring that it would 
organize or participate in the event. Other parties also refrained from publicly 
participating. 
 The Muslim Brotherhood’s non-participation raised rumors that the group was 
appeasing the government or trying to protect its public image before the upcoming 
municipal elections
8
. This is not the first time that the Brotherhood has held back on 
participating in a food related protest. Sadat’s regime also experienced food riots in 1977 
where the Muslim Brotherhood honored their secret agreement with the regime (the 
details of which were released later) and withheld participation. Brotherhood General 
Guide Afik later explained that the Brotherhood did not participate in the April 6
th
 protest 
because it had no leadership or public agenda. Under such circumstances, protests are 
likely to turn disorderly
9
. The Brotherhood faced much public criticism for not 
supporting the April 6
th
 protest.  
 On May 4
th
 2008, the Muslim Brotherhood did organize its own protest against 
the rising prices of food. It advertised the protest through its website and asked members 
to remain peaceful and orderly in their demonstrations. The protest was held as 
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scheduled, but in comparison to the drama of the April 6
th
 protest, it drew smaller crowds 
and was largely quiet and uneventful. In explaining its lack of success, Akif argued that 
real civil disobedience can only emerge when all political forces join hands and 
participate. Since this option is not available in Egypt, the best the group can do is voice 
its concerns through such protests. Akif further explained that opposition groups in Egypt 
do not agree on anything, and while the Brotherhood had tried to form a united coalition 
with other groups, they have failed
10
. While more extensive research is needed to 
understand the circumstances behind the lack of alliances in the April 6
th
 and May 4
th
 
protests, Akif’s statement clearly reveals that even in the face of economic crises 
affecting all citizens, opposition groups in Egypt are unable to form alliances with each 
other.  
 In Pakistan, 2008 proved to be an eventful year with Benazir Bhutto’s public 
assassination and the February general elections. Bhutto’s husband, Asif Zardari took 
over the leadership of the PPP. Musharraf’s pro-government parties were defeated in the 
elections and with growing pressure to withdraw from politics, he decided to take a step 
back from the functioning of the government, but remain on the sidelines as a “father 
figure
11
.” PPP won the elections and Asif Zaradi became the new prime minister. 
 However PPP faced a major obstacle in forming the government. While, PPP had 
done well in Sind, PML(n) had done exceedingly well in its constituency in Punjab. With 
PML(n)’s high levels of support, Zaradi became concerned that the party could become a 
formidable opposition voice threatening his government in the future. To avoid working 
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with PML(n) as the opposition, PPP decided to continue its alliance with its arch rival 
and formed and invited the party to form a coalition government
12
. PML(n) accepted the 
offer creating a first ever PPP-PML(n) ruling government in the history of the country.
 MMA won only 6 seats in the elections, which was a dismal performance 
compared with its 57 seats in 2002. They were ousted from the provincial government in 
NWFP. ANP formed the new provincial government in coalition with its ARD partner 
PPP. MMA decided to disband as an alliance after the elections. The full details of the 
reasons for MMA’s break up are yet unknown.  
 While many opposition groups had worked very effectively in alliances, it 
remains to be seen how well they will perform as a ruling coalitions. PPP and PML(n) 
have already experiences differences over reinstating supreme court judges that were 
dismissed under Musharraf. Now that they face no common enemy, the dynamics of the 
alliance have changed. More research is needed to understand the nature of ruling 
coalitions and why they are able to work together under certain circumstances, but not 
under others 
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